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Sangheli Proposes Economic Union Alternative to EU

LD2101111994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1058 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetsky]

[Text] Chisinau January 21 TASS—Moldovan Premier Andrei Sangheli said on Friday that an economic union, now being created by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), should become an alternative to the European Union [EU] in future.

According to the prime minister, Moldova has always favoured an economic union of the Commonwealth countries, since neither Russia, nor Ukraine, nor still Moldova can compete with the European Economic Community single-handed.

The European Union countries want the former Soviet republics to form their own economic space, their market and their production, Sangeli said, stressing that the eastern market is responsible for the lion's share of the Moldovan export.

The prime minister called the industrial slump the main difficulty in carrying out economic reforms in Moldova. "If our economy had accomplished the 1990 results, it would be easier to carry out reforms," he said. "When we carry out good reforms, but living standards drop, people will not understand such a government."

Question Mark Over Armenian-Azerbaijan Talks

MK2201113094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 4

[Mekhman Gafarly report in the "Negotiations" column: "A Meeting Between the Armenian and Azerbaijan Presidents Has Been Scheduled"]

[Text] After a meeting in Moscow between Andrey Kozyrev, head of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, and foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia Gasan Gasanov and Vahan Papazyan, chances have emerged for talks to be held between President Geydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia with the mediation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 25 January in Moscow. It is not certain that they will take place on the date scheduled, however, because Yerevan and Baku have not yet made a final decision.

Tofik Abbasov, head of the Azerbaijan presidential apparatus press service, told SEGODNYA's correspondent that the meeting depends on whether the expert commission formed with representatives of Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan Foreign Ministries will complete its work. Furthermore, Mr. Abbasov noted that the president will come to the meeting if he has the time. Baku, however, welcomes Russia's initiative and will soon make its final decision known.

Yerevan's attitude to the scheduled Moscow meeting is essentially the same. The press service of the Armenian presidential apparatus told SEGODNYA's correspondent that "this question will be decided in the very near future."

Such a position by Yerevan and Baku suggests that the meeting between presidents Ter-Petrosyan and Aliyev set for 25 January may not take place or may be moved to a later date.

At present both warring sides understand the impossibility of resolving the Karabakh conflict militarily. The upcoming meeting, however, even if it does take place, will be hardly capable of putting an end to the Karabakh issue because Baku will never agree to the loss of part of its territory, while the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic will not want to lose its unrecognized independence. At present there is no compromise option that would suit both sides. Therefore, chances are that no peace agreement will be concluded between Armenia and Azerbaijan any time soon.

Factors on Setup of Ruble Zone Eyed

PM2401095194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Anatoliy Komissarov, adviser to the International Reform Fund, and Candidate of Economic Sciences Vera Shirobokova, consultant for the International Reform Fund: "The Ruble: One for All, or All for One?"]

[Text] The story of the ruble zone's creation and disintegration clearly reflects the inconsistency of Russia's policy regarding economic cooperation with the former Soviet republics. For two years now, decisions have been adopted on the need for closer integration within the CIS framework and the creation of an economic union, which remain nothing more than good intentions.

As a result of a series of bilateral agreements being signed in August-October 1992, as well as the multilateral Agreement "On a Unified Monetary System and Coordinated Monetary, Credit, and Currency Policy of States Retaining the Ruble As Legal Tender," the creation of a ruble zone incorporating nine states was proclaimed. They were: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The ruble was acknowledged to be the only legal tender in states within the ruble zone.

In January 1993, heads of state adopted the decision to set up the Interstate Ruble Zone Bank, of which all countries in the ruble zone were founders. It was to carry out multilateral transactions on a clearing basis. However, agreement was not reached on two fundamental issues when drafting the bank's statute: Which ruble would be the common currency—the Russian ruble or a supranational ruble—and how decisions would be made in the bank's council.

Another agreement—on practical measures to set up a new type of ruble zone—was signed in September 1993 by six states: In addition to Russia, the signatories were Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan.

In practice, however, Russia's commitment—declared at summit level interstate meetings—to strengthening integration processes within the CIS framework amounts to transferring economic relations with the former Soviet republics to its general system of foreign economic relations.

To a certain extent, these actions by the Russian authorities have objective foundation, as the newly independent states are trying quite hard to obtain raw materials and energy on preferential terms within the framework of closer economic cooperation; they are also endeavoring to resolve the problem of clearing the debt facing Russia in a way that is advantageous to themselves.

This kind of simplified approach is a breeding ground for negative attitudes to reintegration in a number of Russian federal departments, which take an equally simplified view of protecting Russia's interests, bringing the problem of equivalent commodity exchange to the fore.

The majority of economists admit that, from the point of view of Russia's strategic state interests, in the long term the policy of reintegration within the CIS framework is the only right policy to follow, for a whole number of objective reasons. The most important of these is the need to smooth over the consequences of the breakup of the USSR in the economic sphere, as they have considerably aggravated the crisis in all the states concerned.

Russia has gradually taken an increasingly tough stand on the question of the ruble zone. Its terms for those wishing to remain in this zone have become increasingly unacceptable to them, and this has in fact forced the states which originally signed the agreements on setting up a new type of ruble zone to introduce their own currencies.

The explanation for Russia's tough policy given by those who support it is that it must protect its own economic interests, as combining the monetary systems of Russia and the other five states could cause a surge of inflation and an increase in Russia's trade deficit with these countries; it would also make it practically impossible for Russia to retrieve debts from these countries.

There is no doubt that the newly independent states' different levels of development, supply of natural resources, and pace of transformations are an objective impediment to the reintegration of their economies. However, this has never been a secret to the Russian leadership. Nevertheless, it has not prevented it from concluding treaties and agreements on economic integration within the CIS framework....

A fairly recent session of the CIS Coordination and Consultation Committee essentially announced that the idea of a ruble zone has been abandoned and that the CIS countries now recognize each other's national currency. The transition to multicurrency conditions of operation in the CIS is being broadly publicized: a free trade zone; a customs union; a common market of goods, labor, and capital; and a currency and economic union.

But in the absence of a real money and currency market, the CIS countries' national currency exchange rates can be for transfer purposes only and do not in themselves signify the restoration of equivalent exchange.

Unfortunately, we are seeing a repetition of the old practice whereby agreements are signed—and only then do the parties involved begin to try to develop a mechanism to implement those agreements. For example, it has been announced that a payments union between Russia and Kazakhstan will be formed in the near future, although no decision has been made regarding a key issue in the formation of this union: Namely, the question of tying quotations for Kazakhstan's currency to the dollar or some other freely convertible currency. Despite the fact that it is acquiring fundamental importance.

The introduction of national currencies to payment relations cannot in itself solve the serious problem of balancing mutual payments and nonpayments. We can hardly expect Russian enterprises to be interested in obtaining their partners' som or tenge, with which they certainly will not always be able to acquire the goods they need in these or in other former Soviet republics. Consequently, there is a visible prospect of transactions remaining bilateral in nature and barter being employed everywhere, which will still further reduce the market's capacity and make enterprises' activity even more difficult.

Failure to solve this problem could make mutual payments for supplies of goods still more complicated and ultimately lead to a further reduction in commodity exchange. This would mean that Russia would not receive raw materials and components from the former republics and at the same time experience difficulties with the sale of its own products, which, in turn, would lead to a further decline in Russia's output and, as a consequence of this, an increase in unemployment and social tension. A policy of "economic pressure" on Russia's partners in the former Soviet republics, as some Russian leaders suggest, would hardly help in this respect. We must also take into account that, if Russia were to pursue a very tough economic policy in relation to its partners, sooner or later its place would be taken by other countries.

Moreover, in order to effectively protect Russia's economy against negative influences from the former Soviet republics (the transfer of large amounts of rubles, the reexport of Russian goods, and so forth), we must urgently equip our borders with every facility, which seems an unrealistic prospect at present.

So, the new type of ruble zone has been left behind in the past. However, the problems in relations between the newly independent states still remain and are intensifying. The course of setting up an economic union is now being pursued, although implementation has been put off for quite some time. One factor of considerable importance in this respect is that our CIS partners' confidence in Russian policy has been undermined as a result of its vagueness and inconsistency.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 21 Jan

LD2101121894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0544 GMT 21 Jan 94

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow 21 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Today's Moscow newspapers focus on the results of the week-long work of the Russian parliament State Duma (lower chamber) and the Russian government reshuffle. Commenting on the present balance of forces at the State Duma, TRUD newspaper notes that "the first voting results showed that three factions—the Russian Agrarian Party, the Communist Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party (165 votes)—cooperate at least in settling personnel issues."

It is difficult to appraise the interests of the "New Regional Policy" group: they will emerge when political and economic issues are settled. In any case, reformist blocs (poorly united between themselves) which have only 133 votes, should be interested in cooperation with the above group and with the Women of Russia faction.

Commenting on the regulations affecting the working and living conditions of State Duma members which were discussed by the Duma on Thursday, the same newspaper writes that "the debate on material maintenance of deputies graphically showed how strong the conviction is in our country that it is more convenient to care for people's interests, enjoying the salary of a federal minister and looking at the world through the window of a personal car."

Referring to the calculations done by the experts from Russia's Choice group within the Duma, IZVESTIYA notes that in keeping with what the State Duma deputies are planning, the monthly upkeep of one people's deputy will cost the taxpayer 15 million rubles. The paper quotes the views of Russia's Choice on this issue: "If, despite everything, such a decision is finally taken, it must, in the current economic conditions, be regarded as irresponsible and not conducive to increasing the prestige of the highest body of legislative authority".

IZVESTIYA also criticizes the personnel changes within the Russian government. "So, Viktor Chernomyrdin has made his choice: Soskovets, Zaveryukha, Chubays, and Yarov. He may, of course, be wrong," the paper writes. The paper says that the team of deputy prime ministers thus selected "bears witness, first and foremost, to the fact that the prime minister no longer wishes to listen to what the president has to say, laying claims to the role of not just an independent, but, possibly, a stronger political figure."

Forecasting that the new government will to some extent distance itself from the previous reform course, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI says that the main question is "the extent of this distancing and whether the government and its chairman are going to have enough will and common sense to halt this process before it passes the danger mark. There are serious grounds for alarm. For instance, Chernomyrdin's statement on the readiness to cooperate with the Duma has taken on an altogether new meaning after a majority of the lower chamber's committees dealing with the economy and economics turned out to be in the hands of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], all the more so if the Duma's intention to set aside a special hour once a week to examine the work of the government is taken into account."

IZVESTIYA informs its readers that the Russian procurator- general's office is studying the possibility of instituting a criminal case against legislator Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the LDPR.

The newspaper writes that "the administration for the observance of laws on federal security and ethnic relations of the Russian procurator-general's office is completing its study of applications by citizens and mass organizations demanding that Zhirinovskiy be criminally prosecuted for war propaganda in his book 'The Last Leap to the South' as well as in interviews and television statements."

Newspapers report some particulars about a land-crash of an Antei military transport plane near the city of Tver (some 200 km northwest of Moscow) on 19 January. Noting that reasons for the crash were not fully investigated yet, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and PRAVDA newspapers claim that there was no explosion aboard the plane.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper writes in this connection that "all three 'black boxes' of the plane were found." Specialists affirm that the plane's control systems failed.

Noting that today is the 70th commemoration day of Vladimir Lenin's death, PRAVDA carries an article entitled "What 'Democrats' Are Like and How They Fight Leninism."

The article criticizes the entire road covered by the Soviet Union and then by Russia, starting from the course for restructuring proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev and ending with the course for reforms pursued by the present Russian leadership.

Press Review for 22 Jan

LD2201074494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0628 GMT 22 Jan 94

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—Major newspapers highlight today the latest session of the new Russian Cabinet of Ministers and the situation on the Russian currency market.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA points out in this connection that, with the exception of Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov, the make-up of the new government is almost the same as that of the previous one. "If one bears in mind Gaydar's words that he could not influence the government's policy of late, as well as the fact that Fedorov said about the same thing, one may come to the conclusion that what we are having now is just the old cabinet, but free from political contradictions and psychological conflicts," the newspaper writes. "However, it is the old cabinet that was pursuing the reform policy without much success and without any system. Consequently, the old- new government, hastily made up, will pretty soon have either to be really renewed, or to renew (or rather define) its programme."

Commenting on the resignation of Gaydar and Fedorov, the newspaper stresses that "all this produces the impression of a step, calculated beforehand." NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writes with reference to Boris Fedorov and Leonid Abalkin, a well-known economist: "A dramatic growth of inflation in the first quarter of this year was inevitable, and no government, whatever its make-up, could prevent it. It is noteworthy in this connection that both Yegor Gaydar, the 'motive force' of the reform, and Boris Fedorov, its ideologist, preferred to wash their hands of it and not to link themselves with the government any longer. Now that the radical democrats freed themselves of responsibility for the situation in the Russian economy, it is obvious that the renewed government will be held responsible for the overall economic disintegration."

Commenting on the reorganisation of the government, IZVESTIYA writes that "the prime minister left the cabinet almost without the architects and active supporters of the previous policy and, at the same time, announced that the reform course would remain unchanged." The newspaper quotes the prime minister as saying that "we shall fight inflation by non-monetarist methods." "If the invariability of the policy consists in the transfer from monetarist to non- monetarist methods of fighting inflation, then new people will be really needed in the government. The impression is that we are on the threshold of a major turn towards old times."

Pointing to the relative stabilisation of the Russian currency market, IZVESTIYA writes that the hope for the stabilisation of the exchange rate is based on the dramatic reduction of the demand for hard currency at the latest auction. "It stood at 67,100,000 dollars, while since the beginning of the year it had been almost all the time on the level of 150 million dollars. The inevitable result of the rush with the purchasing of hard currency was the depletion of the ruble resources of all participants in currency transactions. It is not accidental that only 66 banks took part in the latest auction, while the usual figure is 83-85."

"Personal changes in the government invariably reflect political changes," KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes. Analysing the political situation in the country, the newspaper comes to the conclusion that, most probably, we shall witness in the future "the Ukrainian version of runaway inflation, the curtailment of production in all industries, the coming to power of a 'tough guy' and, in the long run, the retreat to previous positions."

"Now there are grounds to believe that the cabinet has shifted from the right-wing liberal flank to the right-wing centre," PRAVDA writes. "Will the everyday work of the government confirm this supposition? If so, is it possible to say that we are witnessing the beginning of the political drift of state power towards the left and that it is coming closer to the real interests of working people?" "A lot of questions might be asked, but one thing is clear: the monetarist idea has lost its value."

Touching upon the issues of the reorganisation of the government, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA points out that "although Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said he had had no special differences with the president, many observers believe that they did have a clash over the government make-up, which may trigger another political crisis in the top echelon. Even today many people regard Chernomyrdin as a politician, who is claiming an independent role in the political arena."

TRUD frontpages an article dealing with the investigation into the crash of the Tu-154m plane belonging to the Baykal Air Company, that took place near Irkutsk on January 3. "The results of the work of the government commission will soon be made public. One thing is clear already: some time ago an utterly unwise decision was taken on the dissolution of Gosavianadzor, a unique control body. It actually kept under control the take-off of every plane. The dissolution of Gosavianadzor made passenger flights a very dangerous undertaking."

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and PRAVDA carry materials dealing with the 70th anniversary of Lenin's death. "On January 21 numerous representatives of communist and workers' parties, the young communist league (Komsomol), war and labour veterans, Muscovites and guests of the Russian capital came to the Red Square to pay tribute of respect to Lenin," PRAVDA writes.

Reviews Sunday Programs

LD2401065294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0601 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 24 ITAR-TASS—"Russia's reviewed government after all reshuffles and personal losses is dominated by former members of the Soviet

government led by Ryzhkov and Pavlov," according to Yevgeniy Kiselev, the host of the Sunday television analytical programme Itogi.

Vice-Premier Aleksandr Shokhin said in an interview with the same programme it would be wrong to speak about a change in the government policy. "The question is that we are entering a new period, a new phase of the economic policy, and this new phase means that we must do thorough, routine work, hard work. It is impossible to promise an abrupt improvement of overall performance in three or six months, the vice-premier stressed.

Itogi also interviewed Boris Fedorov who declined to join the new government as finance minister. He said it was impossible to continue "a normal economic policy" as long as Viktor Gerashchenko remained the chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. According to Fedorov, inflation in Russia will soon reach at least 30 per cent a month.

Responding to a question about his possible role in the parliament to which he had been elected Fedorov said he intended to engage in "constructive criticism of the government but not in political gambling. The interests of the state are above all".

Fedorov categorically denied rumours that he had met the U.S. ambassador in Moscow a short time ago to ask him for a job.

Both Itogi and the independent television analytical programme Voskresenye discussed the recent drop in the rouble exchange value against the dollar after January 13. According to experts, the panic buying was provoked by two main factors: the end-of-the-year and payments aimed at offsetting inflation and Yegor Gaydar's resignation.

Asked by Itogi about his view on the plummeting of the rouble last week, Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko said that the fall was due to "several factors, both economic and political". Gerashchenko stressed that the resignation of Gaydar and Fedorov "cannot mean a change in the policy which is objectively necessary".

The Central Bank chairman said inflation in January and February would amount to approximately 20 per cent, and may reach 25 per cent in February when debts to some industries will have to be paid. He said the debts have reached 2.5 trillion roubles.

Missile Forces Aide on Impact of Detargeting Accord

PM2001113594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General V.I. Yesin, chief of Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff Operations Directorate, by Aleksandr Dolinin; place and date not given: "Missiles Are Not Now Targeted at Each Other. But Missilemen's Alert Duty Is Not Being Abolished"]

[Text] During the U.S. President's recent visit to Russia documents were signed on the dismantling of Ukrainian missiles, on the respective nontargeting of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear missiles....

All this directly concerns the Strategic Missile Forces, which constitute the basis of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. To what extent are their tasks being complicated? Is there no longer any point to continuous alert duty? Lieutenant General Viktor Yesin, chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff Operations Directorate, answers these and other questions.

[Dolinin] Viktor Ivanovich, will anything change in the strategic missilemen's service if the intentions to alter the assigned flight missions [poletnyye zadaniya] are realized?

[Yesin] They will continue on alert duty. The mutually acceptable accord reached on the nontargeting of missiles means for us that they will have a "zero" assigned flight mission. Day-to-day control of nuclear systems will proceed from the premise that Russia, as defined in its military doctrine, regards no state as its adversary. We will be threatening no one, but this in no way rules out the possibility, in a certain situation, of feeding targets into the missiles' control system on an order from the supreme commander in chief of the Armed Forces—the president of Russia. This possibility remains, and the meaning and purpose of alert duty are not changing. Missilemen must always be ready to defend the fatherland.

[Dolinin] In connection with the fact that, in accordance with the trilateral statement by the presidents of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine, the RS-22 (SS-24) missiles on Ukrainian territory will be deactivated over the course of 10 months by removing their warheads, what obligations are imposed on the Strategic Missile Forces?

[Yesin] In accordance with the agreements reached between Ukraine and Russia back in 1993, Russia will provide maintenance and ensure the technical safety of the nuclear warheads being removed, as well as dismantling them in its own enterprises.

If the Ukrainian side shows an interest, on the conclusion of appropriate mutually advantageous agreements it will be possible to salvage the missiles currently in Ukraine at the already prepared Russian elimination bases. We have everything necessary for this.

[Dolinin] What will happen to the missilemen officers in the event of the elimination of nuclear missile weapons in Ukraine?

[Yesin] Approximately one-third of the officers of the 43d Missile Army serving in Ukraine evince a desire to be transferred to Russia. There are places for officers who have shown themselves to positive advantage during service. There is a shortage of officers in the Strategic Missile Forces, particularly in primary posts. Things are more complex with senior officers. We could take on many, but we cannot at once provide them with housing. Today there are more than 8,000 members of the Missile Forces without apartments. Not everything is within our power.

[Dolinin] In accordance with the START I and START II Treaties, missiles with multiple reentry vehicles are to be removed from the effective combat strength of the Strategic Missile Forces. Only single-warhead missiles will remain. Today these account for only one-third of the missiles on alert duty. What will make up for the rest?

[Yesin] First, I deem it necessary to point out that production of missiles with multiple reentry vehicles for the needs of the Missile Forces has been terminated, and within the framework of the international accords signed by Russia they will be taken off alert duty as the warrantied (service) life expires.

Second, under the START I and START II Treaties the quantitative makeup of the Strategic Missile Forces grouping will be reduced. In order to maintain the deterrent potential of the Strategic Missile Forces at the necessary level for defense needs, work is under way in the Missile Forces in the context of life-prolonging technology [po resursosberegayushchey tekhnologii] to modernize the missile complex with a single-warhead missile. Colonel General I. Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, is devoting very close attention to this question. On New Year's Eve he chaired a state commission session with the participation of general and chief designers. It was pointed out there that we are ensuring the readiness to begin proving-ground tests of a modernized single-warhead missile, which is to replace those whose service life has expired—those, so to speak, which have grown old naturally.

...Given all the objective processes and the existing difficulties, the future of the Strategic Missile Forces is predictable, and the life, activity, and combat training of missilemen are proceeding in a planned manner.

Commentary Views U.S. Response to Kozyrev Statement

LD2201004194 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1910 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Announcer-read commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov; from the "Commonwealth Update" program]

[Text] Statements by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev that countries of the CIS and the Baltic states are regions of Russian vital interests had a somewhat strange response in Washington. A State Department spokesman said the United States wished to get explanations. Explanations were given, yet some feeling of perplexity over the first response remains. Vladislav Kozyakov has been looking into the matter and has written the following:

What we found surprising was the haste with which the American official spokesman expressed his displeasure with the Russian minister's statement. The State Department spokesman did not have the full text of Andrey Kozyrev's statement made at a Moscow conference on Russian policy on the territory of the former USSR. All he had was brief reports for news agencies. That, however, did not stop him from reproaching Russian policy. Moreover, the American official interpreted quite freely Kozyrev's statement about the need of a Russian military presence in the territory and even claimed it contradicted what the Russian spokesman said at the recent summit in Moscow.

But where has this hasty desire to put to doubt the political course of Russia come from? This question is to the point to ask, especially in the light of the Moscow summit, which was marked by a further strengthening of the Russian-American partnership. Washington's hasty response to Andrey Kozyrev's statement can serve as a reminder that even at the current high-level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington, the American side sometimes displays signs of the past policy of double standards. The realities of today, when the CIS has emerged in the territory of the former Soviet Union and when the Baltic independent states have come into existence, have quite a few specific features. One of the most important is to preserve centuries-old contacts between Russia and its immediate neighbors. It is therefore natural that Moscow regards them as a region of primary vital interest.

Incidentally, the Americans also have such a notion. For example, they include into the zone of their national interest the countries of Central America and the Caribbean basin. On these grounds, as is known, the United States resorted to military intervention, for example, in Panama, Grenada, and a number of other countries. The United States has imposed a trade blockade and used other sanctions against some of the countries of that region. As for Russia, it builds its relations with the CIS countries and Baltic states on the basis of respect of international law. And if Russia maintains its military presence in, say, Tajikistan, Georgia, or some other Commonwealth country, it does it fully in accordance with bilateral agreement.

As far as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia is concerned, negotiations on the issue are under way. At the same time, Russia is pressing for respect of human rights, the rights of the millions of Russian speakers living in the CIS countries. And Moscow says it is ready to act firmly if the rights of Russian speakers are abused. Understanding of Russia's vital interests in the countries, former Soviet republics, is essential for maintaining its partnership with the United States, as well as other countries.

'Real Fears' About Ukranian Nuclear Arms Voiced

PM2001092994 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2020 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Announcer-read report from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A press conference on the military-political aspects of the agreement between the Russian, U.S., and Ukrainian presidents was held at the Defense Ministry today. Leading Russian nuclear disarmament specialists expressed real fears about the condition of the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal. The stockpiles are overloaded, the personnel are poorly trained, and proper servicing is not carried out. Given this situation, Russian plants are prepared to dismantle all Ukrainian warheads within two years. The ball is now in the Ukrainian leadership's court. [Video shows warships in harbor, under construction]

More on Maslin News Briefing on Ukrainian Missiles

PM1901133594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report: "Why Russia Is Concerned"]

[Text] The Russian Defense Ministry held a press conference for Russian and foreign journalists devoted to the military-political aspects of the Russian and U.S. presidents' Moscow summit meeting. Leading experts in the nuclear missile sphere—Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of a Russian Defense Ministry main directorate; Major General Anatoliy Svetikov, first deputy chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff Operational Directorate; Major General Anatoliy Lukyanov, deputy chief of the Russian Defense Ministry International Treaty Directorate; and Boris Gorobets, spokesman for the Ministry of Atomic Energy—answered journalists' questions.

They all revealed the complexity not only of the military-political, but also of the military-technical aspects of the problem of the nuclear potential in Ukraine and once again underlined not only the political significance of the tripartite agreement on eliminating these weapons, but also the considerable contribution it makes to strengthening nuclear security—provided that the matter is resolved positively. Col. Gen. Yevgeniy Maslin reminded the press conference that it is a question of around 1,300 warheads [boyegolovka] for SS-19 and SS-24 missiles and 600 air-launched cruise missile warheads [golovnaya boyevaya chast]. The general said that this arsenal causes most profound concern in Russia.

The point is that the state of these warheads is still deteriorating. The warranty periods of most of the munitions' components are expiring and they are not undergoing the requisite technical maintenance, while maintenance personnel lack the requisite level of both theoretical and practical training. The complexity of the situation is indicated not least by the fact that three warheads were recently delivered to Russia from Ukraine in a preaccident state.

Our country does indeed have the technology to dismantle and salvage the nuclear munitions, but time is pressing on. It is no coincidence that it was specifically said during the summit meeting that the first consignment of 200 warheads must arrive at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy enterprises for elimination within the next 10 months.

Nor has Kiev's desire for material compensation been forgotten—in exchange for the aforementioned first [consignment of] 200 warheads Ukraine will receive 100 fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations from Russia. Further payments are to be determined. If that does not seem enough to Ukraine, it was said at the press conference, the following legitimate question arises: Perhaps Ukraine does not want to part with its nuclear arms, contrary to its own declarations?

The press conference did not overlook the problem of mutual nontargeting of strategic nuclear missiles, enshrined in the Moscow declaration signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton. When asked by your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent whether this clause contravenes the status of nuclear weapons as a means of deterring an aggressor (as in the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine") Generals Anatoliy Lukyanov and Anatoliy Svetikov replied that our nuclear arsenal does, of course, retain the functions of deterrence and intimidation. The fact that the missiles will not be targeted at the United States and Russia, respectively, in everyday life, a sign of the new quality of the partnership relations between the two countries, is another matter. Because the missiles nonetheless remain on alert duty, we can always resume the possibility of their combat use if necessary.

General Praises Tripartite Pact, Criticizes Ukraine

MK1901114094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Dmitriy Gornostayev report in the "In Brief" column: "Nuclear Weapons in Kiev Are in an Inadequate Condition"]

[Text] Addressing a press conference at the Russian Federation defense conference yesterday, which was devoted to the military aspects of the visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton, Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate, said that Russia will be ready within a year to evacuate to its territory all nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine to be dismantled. As of now 176 ICBM launching pads are located in Ukraine, including 130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24 units. Overall Kiev has 1,300 ICBM warheads and 600 air-based cruise missile warheads. Having given a positive assessment of the signing of the trilateral Russian-Ukrainian-U.S. agreement on the abolition of Kiev's nuclear potential, General Maslin stated that it is impermissible to mark time on the evacuation and dismantling of the nuclear missiles. The beginning of this process now depends on the Ukrainian parliament, which is to ratify the trilateral agreement. Should it not be approved by the Ukrainian lawmakers, there may be unpredictable consequences. Nuclear munition storages are over-filled, which has already led to enhanced radiation backgrounds. The shelf life of most nuclear missile components have run out; part of the charges are in a near-emergency condition, while the level of emergency response crews shows that in the event of an explosion or leakage they will not be able to handle the consequences. "There are people," Maslin said, "who do not understand this danger." But there are also others who appreciate the threat but do not wish to help the abolition, either because they are playing the nuclear card or are unwilling to part with their chairs in state structures which they obtained after Ukraine assumed jurisdiction over the nuclear weapons of the former USSR located on its territory.

Briefing on Tripartite Nuclear Agreement Held in Moscow

LD2101173294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1652 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Chubarov and Denis Perkin]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—Ukrainian agreement to dismantle and store nuclear warheads from SS-24 missiles within ten months is one of the few results of the Russian-Ukrainian-U.S. negotiations, President of the National Security and International Relations Center Sergey Rogov told a briefing here today.

Rogov criticized the agreement, saying "commentaries claiming the tripartite statement on nuclear arms removes all problems related to nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory are too hasty".

In his words, the major drawback of the document is that it is not concrete. It carries no schedule of nuclear arms withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. If there is no withdrawal before the conference on non-proliferation of nuclear arms due to be held in 1995, the international community will face serious problems in discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's future and a possibility of its joining by China, Israel and North Korea, stressed Rogov.

Even if Ukraine withdraws 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 1,500 warheads declared in the statement, it will not be able to sign the treaty on non-proliferation of

nuclear arms. In the words of Rogov, Ukraine has another 670 nuclear warheads from air-based missiles and gravity bombs.

Aide Cites Advantages of Monetary Union With Belarus

PM2101163194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

[Article by Vera Shirobokova, adviser to "Reforma" international fund: "Going Halves With the Ruble. Belarus's Joining the Ruble Zone in the Interests of the Two Countries"]

[Text] The mass media have recently carried a whole series of reports on Belarus's joining the ruble zone. The agreement is regarded as extremely unfavorable to Russia. This, however, does not square with reality, to put it mildly. If only because no agreement has yet been signed and, accordingly, the terms have not been decided.

There is only the intention of two friendly countries to create such a union, and its framework terms have been decided. The agreement itself, recording the basic principles for uniting the monetary systems, is still being prepared.

For it is only possible to unite monetary systems if the two countries have tough, coordinated price, credit, tax, and budget policies. This also presupposes the presence of a single emission center in the united ruble zone, a switch to unified discount rates for central bank credits, and the implementation of a unified currency policy in respect of third countries.

Opponents of Belarus's joining the ruble zone believe that this will have lots of highly negative consequences for the Russian economy. But is this so?

We must obviously start looking for the answer by assessing Russia's strategic interests—both economic and geopolitical. Nobody any longer disputes the existence of such interests. The question is different: Does closer economic integration with Belarus accord with these interests? It undoubtedly does.

In the long term, from the viewpoint of Russia's strategic state interests, the policy of reintegration with all the CIS countries, including Belarus, is the only correct one because of a whole number of objective reasons.

The most important of these is the smoothing of the consequences of the USSR's breakup in the economic sphere, which significantly deepened the crisis in all the states, including Russia. The former Union republics are the traditional market where Russia's output is competitive. Imports of raw materials and subassemblies from these countries also cannot be quickly replaced by Russian production or imports. In this sense Russia's losses from the breaking of ties clearly are not comparable with the possible expense of arranging trade and economic relations with partners in the CIS.

All this, apart from Russia's dependence on imported raw materials, also applies fully to Belarus. A whole range of production facilities are concentrated there which are either absent in Russia (heavy quarry dump trucks, for example) or which produce output that is superior to analogous Russian output in terms of its technical and economic parameters (Belarus tractors). In addition, many Russian enterprises are linked with Belarusian ones by collaborative deliveries. Transit oil and gas pipelines pass over this state's territory to Europe, as do railroads and roads. Belarus has a relatively developed foreign trade infrastructure (customs, warehouses, transshipment bases), and Russia is extremely interested in using it.

The provision of facilities on its own western borders is too much of a luxury, given Russia's present economic position. In addition, there have been very great losses in paying for Russian freight to transit Belarusian territory.

Of course, the Belarusian market is also very large and attractive from the viewpoint of selling Russian output (and not just raw materials). It is plainly not in Russia's interests to surrender this market to other countries.

Now about the negative consequences which might affect the Russian economy as a result of merging the two countries' monetary systems. These are undoubtedly possible if the mechanism of this merger is not worked out.

The paramount need is to standardize economic legislation. We have already spoken of the need for a single emission center. The exchange rate for Belarusian rubles and Russian rubles is a very acute problem.

It is obvious that a rate of one to one, given exchange quotations of at least three to one, will cause a sharp surge in inflation—which will lead ultimately to negative consequences not only for Russia but also for Belarus itself. We should seek a mutually acceptable solution to the exchange rate—a solution based on realistic assessments of the real value of Belarusian money. In this sense the exchange rate can serve only as a guideline. It does not reflect the actual correlation.

As regards supplying Belarus with cash in hand, this can be done on a security. Only it should be remembered here that its terms must be acceptable to Belarus.

If these requirements are fulfilled, the two countries' closer economic integration can even now ensure for Russia a definite economic gain. Since foreign economic ties are being activated, the problems of transactions and payments, which are currently exerting a highly adverse impact on our economy, will be simplified.

Chernomyrdin Says Foreign Commitments Remain Secure

LD2101160794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1403 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said that "new government appointments will in no way jeopardize Russia's commitments to foreign partners. This country will observe the conditions and deadlines for payments of foreign debt that were agreed upon with the IMF, the World Bank, and other western financial organizations."

In an exclusive interview he gave Interfax Friday [21 January] he said that "this was also true of our commitments to foreign countries. Our partners have nothing to worry about. The policy of Russia remains unchanged and will not be dependent on individual cabinet members. President Yeltsin is the guarantor of this."

He thought that the plunge of the ruble against the dollar in the currency exchange had nothing to do with the actual economic situation in the country or government activities.

The noticeable decline of the dollar in the currency exchange Thursday suggested, he thinks, that the anxiety caused by changes in the Russian government was subsiding. In his view, "the activities of banks in the currency market confirm that the panic was man-made, especially by not very responsible remarks of certain civil servants."

Answering an Interfax question, Chernomyrdin emphasized that his negotiations with the president on changes in the government "were not always easy," but that both men wanted to set up an "able team of leaders intent on rejuvenating the country through reforms."

"Some observers make a mistake saying that Chernomyrdin has formed a government of 'tacit agreement.' I hope that the country will see that this is not so in the first months of this year," the premier said. He thought that the public tended to exaggerate "the role played by personalities" in the reform.

"Everybody can see now that the country is firmly on the reform course. What we want above all is to carry these reforms out with the least amount of damage to society, the individual, the family. I do not think that replacement of a minister is a tragedy. I believe this is a natural process. If we had not been confident of our ability to halt production decline, we would not have started this job. There is no shortage of critics. It is people who are prepared to do the hard work that are in short supply. We are willing to do it," Chernomyrdin said.

The exclusive interview is published in the January 21 edition of Interfax's Presidential Bulletin.

Chernomyrdin Reassures Russia's Creditors

LD2101154894 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Government changes will not affect the honoring of Russia's commitments to foreign partners in any way, Viktor Chernomyrdin has told Interfax. We will continue to adhere to all deadlines and conditions for the repayment of our foreign debt, which were agreed with the IMF, the World Bank, and other financial organizations, he stressed. Russia's policies toward individual foreign countries will also remain unchanged. The president is the guarantee of this, Chernomyrdin noted. The prime minister does not feel that renewal in the country depends all that greatly on the role of individual personalities. Cabinet changes are a natural process. Russia cannot be deflected from the path of reform. But the main task is to carry out these reforms with the least possible harm to each member of society, the head of the Russian Government believes.

German, Japanese, British Envoys Comment on New Government

LD2101163394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1505 GMT 21 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] **DIPLOMATS OF GERMANY...**

Germany does not share the opinion stating that the new composition of the Russian Government means "an end to reform policy," press secretary of the German Embassy to Moscow Enno Barker declared in his interview with INTERFAX Friday.

"We do not think that reforms in Russia are in danger due to the fact that their supporters have left the government," he said.

According to the diplomat, Germany "counts on the tandem Yeltsin- Chernomyrdin which embodies the Russian reformatory course." "It is up to them to decide on which key figures in the government to rely upon. It would be a short-sighted approach to think that the process of reformation of the Russian political and economic system would stop after Gaydar's resignation," he said.

Barker expressed the opinion that "the Russian political elite still maintains its principal consent regarding continuation of the reforms, which means that they will not be overthrown."

He was remindful that Germany maintains the closest economic ties with Russia compared with all other western countries, and that is why it is greatly concerned over the situation in the Russian economy. The diplomat expressed hope that both countries would continue their cooperation.

He also pointed out that despite different messages, Germany "is convinced that Russia has not concluded the real process of the new Russian government's formation."

OF JAPAN...

The reshuffle in the Russian Government should not affect Japanese-Russian relations, said a senior official at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, who asked not to be identified.

He told INTERFAX on Friday that Japan wished to "expand" its relations with Russia "in a balanced way" on the basis of agreements reached during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo. "This means that a solution to the territorial problem in Japanese-Russian relations (the Kuril Islands issue) should be based on historical facts and the principles of law and justice," he said.

The official said that, with Yegor Gaidar's resignation and the reorganization of the government, "extremely close attention should be paid to the conduct and composition of the secretariat of the Russian president." "The importance of that body is growing extremely fast under the present circumstances. One has the impression that the secretariat of the Russian president is beginning to fulfill the functions of departments in the former Central Committee of the Communist Party, that is it stands above the government," the official said.

AND GREAT BRITAIN.

Britain will support Russian President Boris Yeltsin as long as he remains loyal to his policy of reform, said a senior official at the British Embassy in Moscow.

In an interview with INTERFAX, the official, who asked not to be named, said it was an alarming fact that the reformists have left the government.

"The reforms may slow down and inflation may increase," he said.

But the changes in the government might have positive effects, too, the diplomat said. "The Russian Government has up until now been heterogeneous. Maybe now that it consists of people having the same views, its policy will be more effective," he said.

Fishing Vessels Seal Off Disputed Area in Okhotsk Sea

LD2201143594 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Russian vessels fishing on the border between Russia's economic zone and a disputed area in the Sea of Okhotsk exploited by foreign boats have sealed off the area in the north and northeast.

Leader of the Russian Fish Workers' Trade Union Viktor Zeryanov told Interfax the Trade Union considered inadmissible the government delay on the issue of stopping fishery in this area and demanded urgent measures to enforce its protection.

Russian experts fear uncontrolled fishery by foreign boats may considerably reduce fish reserves in the Sea of Okhotsk and ruin its ecosystem which is [word indistinct] with serious socioeconomic aftermath for the indigenous population and fishers of the Far East.

Ministry Protests Violations by Japanese Fishing Vessels

LD2201133194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1201 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Bazhenov]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jan—ITAR-TASS has learned that the Russian Foreign Ministry today made a representation to the Japanese Embassy in Russia in connection with mass violations by Japanese fishing boats on the border of Russia's territorial waters in the area of Kunashir island [one of the Kurils], which took place on 21, 22 January.

Nikolay Solovyev, director of the second Asian department of the Russian Foreign Ministry said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that last Friday [21 January]: More than 50 Japanese schooners made a show of entering Russian territorial waters and, in spite of a request by Russian border guards to leave, remained there for more than five hours. On 22 January, 30 Japanese schooners again entered Russia's territorial waters and remained there for more than five hours.

It is quite remarkable that three vessels of the Japanese security directorate were not far from this area, but, unfortunately, they did not prevent, in any way, the Japanese schooners from violating Russian territorial waters.

At the same time, Solovyev noted that the behavior of the crew of the Japanese schooners toward Russian border guards was impertinent.

The official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry said: Such unprecedented violations of Russian territorial waters by Japanese fishing vessels may have a negative effect on the development of relations between the countries.

Solovyev stressed that the Russian Foreign Ministry: Cannot avoid expressing its serious concern in connection with this matter, taking into consideration the fact that these violations are taking place on the eve of bilateral consultations being held at the level of deputy foreign ministers, as well as on the eve of a sitting of the working group on the treaty on peace.

Further on Japanese Violations

OW2201144694 Tokyo KYODO in English 1426 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, Jan. 22 KYODO—Russia alleges a number of Japanese fishing boats entered and stayed in Russian territorial waters Friday [21 January] and Saturday near Kunashiri Island, one of the Russian-held islands claimed by Japan, Japanese embassy officials said.

The Russian Foreign Ministry filed a protest with the embassy, the officials said.

The Japanese embassy said it does not know what happened near Kunashiri.

ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY reported more than 50 Japanese vessels violated territorial waters on Friday and some 30 others on Saturday.

Russian border guards demanded that the Japanese leave but the boats stayed for more than five hours, ITAR-TASS said, quoting Nikolay Solovyev, head of the ministry's Asia-Pacific Affairs Bureau.

Three Japanese patrol boats were there but did not take any action, ITAR-TASS said.

Japan has long called for the return of the Russian-occupied islands—Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islets—which the former Soviet Union seized immediately after World War II.

Japan To Discontinue Humanitarian

LD2301071894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0659 GMT 23 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo January 23 TASS—Japan intends to stop giving humanitarian aid to Russia and to monitor the effectiveness of other programmes for assistance to Moscow, according to a Japanese Government decision to revise the policy of assistance to Russia, a number of central Japanese newspapers reported on Sunday referring to sources in the country's Foreign Ministry.

According to the sources, Tokyo has arrived at a conclusion about the need to give up implementing the earlier announced humanitarian aid programmes, worth a total of 500 million U.S. dollars, considering the internal political situation in Russia.

Tokyo believes that the implementation of humanitarian aid programmes now may only be detrimental to the administration of President Boris Yeltsin, because, in the light of mounting nationalist and great-power sentiments in Russia, the Russian Government has been increasingly criticised for accepting foreign humanitarian aid.

Still, Tokyo intends to carry out all the other programmes for assistance to Russia in keeping with its commitments but will also monitor the effectiveness of their realisation.

Japanese Foreign Ministry sources emphasise that it is planned to attach paramount importance, first of all, to those programmes which actually promote radical economic reforms and help moscow take measures necessary to build a market economy.

Tokyo came to a conclusion about the need for such an approach in view of the formation of a new Russian Government which plans to introduce changes to the previously pursued economic policy, and with due regard for the results of the December elections to Russia's new parliament.

The Japanese Government intends to call on other western countries to reconsider their programme for assistance to Moscow so that they would stimulate Russia's headway along the road of reforms to a greater extent.

Japan Refutes Aid Rumor

LD2401060794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0248 GMT 24 Jan 94

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovnin]

[Text] Tokyo, 24 Jan—Today a representative of the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry called the reports that appeared in the press about Tokyo deciding to stop humanitarian aid to Russia "a lie." On Sunday a number of Japanese newspapers, citing anonymous sources in the country's Foreign Affairs Ministry, informed that such a step was seemingly connected with the fact that the Russian population was having an increasingly negative attitude to "sops from abroad."

In a talk with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, a representative of the department on questions of aid to new independent states of the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that such reports in no way corresponded to the facts. According to him, no changes had been made in the programs of aid to Russia, and they were all being consistently carried out at working level. This is also true in full for humanitarian aid to the former USSR, for which Tokyo has alloted $100,000,000, mainly to provide medicines.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry representative called the recently announced auction for Japanese companies to gain the right to supply consumer goods to Russia within the framework of the humanitarian aid program evidence of Japan's consecutive efforts in this direction.

Commentary on Fishing Violations

LD2401013494

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 2300 GMT on 23 January carries a commentary by Viktor Levin on a report that the Japanese Government, in a reply to the Russian Foreign Ministry, has stated it cannot recognize the legitimacy of calling Japanese fishermen violators of Russian state borders.

Levin recalls the facts that provoked the Russian Foreign Ministry: the intrusion by Japanese fishing vessels into Russian territorial waters in the area of the South Kurils.

Levin says: "The Japanese authorities are effectively trying to justify the actions of the fishermen and are even trying to place a juridical foundation under this, making out that there was no violation of the borders."

He says Japan is hinting heavily that it does not recognize the South Kurils as Russian territory. "But this, in my view, is more than laying claim to the islands," Levin says. "This is pressure. And the actions ensuing from it look simply provocative."

Levin continues: "To talk about who the disputed islands belong to is one thing, but to try without prior arrangement to affirm their position in any shape on the spot, so to speak, is something quite different.

"In such an event Russia's reply can be one thing: resolute thwarting of border violations by every means. Russia is not a state with whom one can speak in the language of ultimatums and provocative actions. In my view, Japan, in taking the aforesaid position, is committing a crude political error.

"The question of who the disputed islands belong to is by no means unambiguous. The islands form part of Russia, and Russia is not only within its rights but also obliged to use all means to prevent intrusion into its territorial waters. Any testing of Russian borders for strength will bring forth the appropriate reaction."

Levin concludes, saying: "Tokyo says it wants to develop normal relations and discuss thorny questions at the negotiating table. But its actions cast a cloud over these relations and at the very least do not help the success of the talks."

Japan To Urge Full Troop Withdrawal From South Kurils

LD2301120794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1145 GMT 23 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo January 23 TASS—During the forthcoming Russian-Japanese talks between representatives of the command of the armed forces of the two countries, to be held here at the beginning of February, the Japanese side intends to demand complete withdrawal of Russian troops from South Kurils, which Tokyo lays claim to. A final decision to hold such talks was taken by the Japanese government on Saturday, the newspaper SEKAI NIPPO reported on Sunday.

Representatives of the command of the Russian Armed Forces are to arrive in Tokyo to attend a two-day seminar for the military and experts from Russia, the United States, and Japan on security in the northern Pacific. The seminar opens on February 1. Immediately after the seminar, the two sides will hold talks.

The Russian side intends to suggest setting about taking measures to build confidence between the two countries in the military field. In particular, Moscow will suggest implementing a programme for exchanges of servicemen and mutual friendship visits of the navy ships of the two countries.

The Japanese military, according to the newspaper, are planning to urge Moscow to demilitarise the South Kurils as soon as possible and provide Tokyo with full information concerning the potential of the armed forces and defence construction in Russia's Far East.

Japan To Investigate Kuril Islands Incident

LD2401095794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0812 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Gilovnin]

[Text] Tokyo January 24 TASS— In response to a request made by the Russian Foreign Ministry the Japanese authorities have began an investigation into an incident which occurred on January 21-22 when several dozens Japanese trawlers crossed into Russian territorial waters near the south Kuril island of Kunashir and remained there for a long time despite repeated warnings from the Russian side.

Director of the 2nd Russian Foreign Ministry department, Nikolay Solovyov, told ITAR-TASS that on January 21, over 50 Japanese vessels entered Russian territorial waters near the island and remained there for over five hours despite warnings made by Russian border guards demanding that Japanese vessels leave the area.

On January 22, the incident was repeated with 30 Japanese vessels crossing into Russian territorial waters and subsequently staying there for five hours. According to Solovyov, three vessels belonging to the Japanese Department for Safety at Sea were close to the area where the incident occurred but made no attempt to prevent Japanese vessels from violating the border. The high-ranking Russian diplomat particularly noted arrogant conduct of Japanese crews towards Russian border guards.

The Department for Safety at Sea and the Japanese Foreign Ministries are investigating the circumstances under which the incident occurred. At present, fishermen who were directly involved in the incident near

Kunashir, are being questioned, sources from both departments told ITAR-TASS.

According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, to begin with, Tokyo has to make sure that the incident really took place and find out whether Russian border guards fired warning shots. The investigation has been deliberately slow and there are many grounds to suppose that the Japanese side would like to hush up the incident. This is evident from the position assumed by the Department for Safety at Sea on the island of Hokkaido adjoining to the Kuril islands which, in response to an inquiry made by ITAR- TASS, denied the very fact of the incident near Kunashir.

Tokyo regards the south Kuril islands to be its "northern territories" which were illegally occupied by Moscow in 1945. Stemming from this position, Tokyo does not recognise the Russian state border in this area and rejects accusations of violating it.

Last year, Japanese fishermen illegally entered Russian territorial waters in the area of Kuril islands over 5,000 times. However, the scale and arrogance of the recent violation made the incident conspicuous in an endless chain of similar incidents which occurred before.

Japan Drafts Accord on Helping Republics Scrap Nuclear Arms

LD2401121394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0312 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo, 24 Jan—The Japanese Government expects to conclude by March this year outline agreements with three republics of the former Soviet Union, excluding Russia, on assistance in scrapping the nuclear weapons they have inherited after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this today at the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

In the words of a member of the disarmament section at the Japanese Foreign Ministry, diplomats from Tokyo are conducting talks in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to decide what share each of the three republic is to receive of the $100 million Japan allocated to the CIS in April 1993 to facilitate the scrapping of nuclear weapons and the utilization of radioactive waste.

The Japanese assistance is to be directed toward facilitating International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections at military and civilian nuclear facilities in these countries, and toward ensuring the safe storage of fissile materials. Specific programs will also envisage sending to the spot Japanese specialists from nuclear power stations and nuclear waste depositories, as well as teaching Japanese experience to local staff.

Tokyo has decided to expedite the process of drafting outline agreements in view of the fact that Ukraine and Kazakhstan have recently adopted a constructive stand concerning accession to the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that Kiev has guaranteed the withdrawal of this type of weapons from its territory.

Admiral Gromov on LRW Dumping, Kurils, Pacific Fleet

LD2101151094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Liquid radioactive wastes (LRW) will not be dumped in the Sea of Japan for a month or two, Admiral Feliks Gromov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy said in answering an INTERFAX question at a news conference in Vladivostok Friday. He explained that other ways of safe storage were under study.

The admiral did not know if the tanker that the Japanese had offered would do for the purpose. The ship must have a double bottom, a double hull made of good steel, a good system for LRW pumping in and out and equipment for turning liquid wastes into solids.

This is a matter for the state to handle, the Navy Commander-in- Chief said. The problem had become so acute, he explained, because every agency used to set up its own system for disposal of dangerous wastes; as a result no system for their permanent storage was available. This matter is now being dealt with by the Russian Atomic Industry Ministry.

Gromov said that these events (dumping the wastes in the sea - IF) should not be dramatized. He said that there were no traces of radioactive wastes as early as after 20 hours, their concentration was so low and the Sea of Japan so pure.

Gromov did not confirm that Russia had sold a submarine to North Korea. "If the navy sold anything to it, it was scrap metal," he said.

He wanted Russia to keep the disputed Kuril Isles. "Russians have been living there for a long time and Russia needs the fish, land and deposits there."

The Navy Commander-in-Chief emphasized that, despite its reduction and financial shortages, the Pacific Fleet was capable of maintaining stability and safe shipping from the Chukotsk Peninsula to the south of the Maritime Territory.

"The fleet will continue renovation albeit at a slower rate in line with the new military doctrine," the admiral said.

He emphasized that Russia would not build aircraft carrying ships for the Pacific Fleet and was surprised that the Japanese were building one.

Speaking on navy reform in line with the new doctrine the admiral said that the emphasis was placed on confidence building, peace keeping missions and partnership with NATO and other coalitions, in particular in the Pacific area.

Foreign Ministry Denies Offering To Pay ROK Debt in Arms

LD2201174994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1731 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry has denied allegations that Russia has offered to pay its debts to South Korea by selling or launching joint production of modern arms.

In an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS, Nikolay Solovyov, head of the Second Department for Asia of the Russian Foreign Ministry, on Saturday, said that "the Russian Foreign Ministry did not hand over to the Embassy of South Korea on January 19 any official documents concerning the selling or joint production of missiles, submarines or other modern technologies as a form of debt payment for credits."

The statement followed a publication by the South Korean newspaper HANGUK ILBO which quoted sources in the South Korean Foreign Ministry as saying that Russia had officially offered to pay its debts for Korean credits either by selling its arms or launching their joint production. The newspaper also claimed that on January 19 the South Korean Embassy in Moscow had been presented with a list of military technologies offered by Russia for selling or joint production. It said the list had to be considered by the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The newspaper said that during his visit to Seoul in August 1993 Aleksandr Shokhin, who was a Russian vice-prime minister at that time, handed over to South Korea a package of proposals on military and technical cooperation. Solovyov confirmed this information, but added that South Korea has not made an official reply yet.

New Deputy Foreign Minister on Trade With Asia

MK2201121094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 4

[Anastasiya Romashkevich report: "Russia's Policy in Asia-Pacific Region. Asia Can Make up for Russia's Losses in the West. Aleksandr Panov Ready To Give Helping Hand to Russian Businessmen for Asian Market"]

[Text] Russian politicians of the highest rank have repeatedly underlined that broader cooperation with the countries of Asia could plug some of the gaps in Russia's relations with the West. This equally applies to trade and economic relations, as well as political ones. Their invigoration will be discussed in the course of a tour of the countries of Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and China by Andrey Kozyrev, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is setting off on this trip on 24 January. Aleksandr Panov, who has recently changed his job from ambassador to Seoul to that of deputy minister of foreign affairs, kindly agreed to comment on the state of Russia's relations in the Asia-Pacific Region in an interview with your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent.

Russia Faces Asia

In Mr. Panov's opinion, Russia has till this moment been paying its main attention to broader relations with the West. This can partially be explained by the fact that the more economically developed part of the Russian territory is in Europe. However, the diplomat believes, relations with Asia are extremely promising only if because of the current rapid economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. Of no minor importance is also the fact that Asian countries are not refusing to buy finished products from Russia. Mr. Panov thinks that Moscow has been able to do much in recent years to expand trade and economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region: far from falling, the volume of trade has grown. Russia's political ties with countries in the region are also picking up: Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan took place after all, and he also went to South Korea, India, and China. This years opens with a visit to the PRC by Andrey Kozyrev. In Moscow, they are awaiting South Korea President Kim Yong-sam, and the head of Japan's cabinet, Morahiro Hosokawa.

Foreign Ministry Offers its Services to Russian Businessmen

Mr. Panov believes that a stronger Russian position in the Asia- Pacific Region will be helped by its participation in regional organizations. Russia already today takes part in two of them: the Pacific Economic Council, which brings together private businesses; and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. Membership in these structures helps Russian entrepreneurs keep abreast of all important events in the region. According to the diplomat, entrepreneurs of the Russian Far East began to trade independently on Asia's markets in recent years. Today they account for nearly 50 percent ($600-700 million) of Russia's trade with South Korea. The business contacts, however, are not always successful owing to unfamiliarity with the region. Mr. Panov therefore advises that Russian businessmen increasingly seek assistance from Russian embassies and trade missions which, in his words, are ready to help them find partners.

Mr. Panov thinks that membership in regional structures would help Russia avoid competition with countries like the United States and Japan that traditionally wield strong influence in the region and are naturally reluctant to yield ground to Moscow. The diplomat noted with regret, however, that real competition is a long way off because U.S. trade with Asia-Pacific countries is around $300 billion, while Russia's trade with the Asia-Pacific region has never exceeded $10-15 billion. As for boosting these figures through arms exports, one should not expect contracts worth billions in the near future. Russia, he believes, lacks sufficient experience in this business.

Besides, Asian markets, arms markets in particular, are traditionally geared to supplies from the United States, France, and Great Britain.

To Draw Borders With China Is Easier Than With Japan

Mr. Panov thinks that, for the first time in decades, relations between Russia and China are simply normal: "In the past, we either fraternized or argued." Problems do exist, of course, but they are solvable. One is territorial. There is a widely held opinion that Russia is handing over its territories to the PRC unilaterally. What really is happening, according to him, is that Beijing also makes concessions. The diplomat also terms as promising Russia's recent proposal on the joint economic use of these border territories. The other problem is the transparency of the Russian- Chinese border. There too, the Russian Foreign Ministry is taking measures to limit no-visa entry by the Chinese.

As for Japan, in the wake of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo, the sides have in full measure come to realize the entire complexity of the territorial problem. Mr. Panov believes that one should not expect an appreciable progress in its solution in the near future. According to him, Russia and Japan will start a new round of talks in February, but a complete settlement of this question should be preceded by the process of rapprochement in the sides' positions on the entire set of both political and economic problems.

Yeltsin Telephones Kohl About Politics, Economy

LD2101131594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1224 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin held a telephone conversation today with FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Both leaders exchanged views on certain topical questions concerning bilateral relations and world politics. Individual aspects of the Russian president's visit to the FRG, due in May this year, were discussed, along with the planned festivities marking the completion of the Russian troops' withdrawal from Germany, the press service of the president of the Russian Federation reports.

Boris Yeltsin informed Helmut Kohl about the domestic political situation in Russia and about the start of the Federal Assembly's work.

President Yeltsin emphasized the invariability of the Russian leadership's course toward democratic transformations in the country.

Russia To Continue Gas Deliveries to Germany

PM2101144694 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

["Own information" report from "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" column: "Russian Gas Deliveries to East Germany To Be Continued"]

[Text] The conflict between "Gazprom" and its German partner "Wintershall" on the one hand and the "Verbundnetz Gaz" joint-stock company on the other, which IZVESTIYA reported in its previous issue, has by all accounts been settled.

INTERFAX has reported that "Wintershall" and "Verbundnetz Gaz" reported Thursday [20 January] that they had managed to reach a last-minute compromise on the price of Russian gas and thereby avert the termination of deliveries of it to the FRG's eastern Laender. It was announced that this month the sides will sign a long-term contract for gas deliveries from Russia.

Parties Release Statement on Former Yugoslavia Policy

LD2101132594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The Liberal Democratic Party, Agrarian Party and Communist Party groups in the lower house of the Russian parliament made public Friday [21 January] their draft statement on the situation in former Yugoslavia.

The State Duma would denounce the use of any kind of force, in particular imposition of no-fly zones, against former Yugoslav republics.

The draft also calls for withdrawal of all foreign military contingents from former Yugoslavia and for appropriate steps to be taken by the Russian authorities.

At their Wednesday meeting the Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev had agreed that the ministry [as received] or his deputy Vitaliy Churkin would attend the discussion on former Yugoslavia during the regular Friday "government hour."

Lukin Opposes NATO Plans for Former Yugoslavia

LD2101164994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1505 GMT 21 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] The Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, has addressed to the Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev a formal request for the package of international treaties and other acts, subject to parliamentary ratification.

He told INTERFAX on Friday [21 January] that he had asked the minister to set priorities on the documents' review.

In line with the federal Constitution, the Duma endorses the appointment and the calling of Russia's ambassadors. For this reason, Lukin also asked Kozyrev to spell out his suggestions on this score, too.

Russia's ambassador to the U.S. before his election to the Duma, Lukin explained that formally he was still ambassador, even though he had sent a letter of resignation to President Yeltsin.

He reported that his committee had held its first session on Thursday. "We know what to do, but we don't know where to do it since up until now we've had no premises to house the committee," Lukin said.

He said that he had initiated parliamentary debates on the situation in the former Yugoslavia and had drafted an appropriate statement.

An alternative draft on the Yugoslav crisis, according to Lukin, had been prepared by three factions— the Communists, Agrarians, and Liberal-Democrats.

Lukin voiced "grave concern" over NATO's persistent discussions on the possibility of hitting targets in the former Yugoslavia.

The document notes that force will hardly end the war there but will only aggravate the conflict.

In Lukin's opinion, the Duma should urge the president and government "to spare no effort to avoid the escalation of fighting in the former Yugoslavia."

In the alternative draft, the Communists, Agrarians, and Liberal- Democrats describe as "inadmissible any coercive measure against the former Yugoslav republics, including the establishment of no-fly zones."

The Russian side is requested to adopt "appropriate measures" within the framework of the UN Security Council "for getting these recommendations implemented."

Churkin Urges Concentrating on Achieving Bosnia Settlement

LD2201210194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2016 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jan—What is important now is to focus attention on the main thing, namely to complete the process of a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Otherwise the world will continue watching the tragedy unfold, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin.

In an exclusive interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent upon his return earlier tonight from Geneva, where another round of talks between the sides involved in the Bosnian conflict was held, Churkin said that with every unsuccessful round it is becoming more difficult to hope for success at the talks on a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was at the previous round of talks in Brussels last December that another opportunity to achieve accord was missed, Vitaliy Churkin added. At that moment the international community lacks determination to bring the matter to a logical end, and now it is lacking even more.

Vitaliy Churkin said the next round is scheduled to take place in Geneva on 10 February. That meeting will aim to achieve more modest tasks, and it will be attended by fewer participants. Representatives of the sides will gather only to discuss confidence measures, so it will be a meeting with limited goals.

Comments on Latest Round of Bosnia Talks

LD2301161694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1300 GMT 23 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jan—What is important now is to focus attention on bringing to completion the process of political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Otherwise the world will continue watching the tragedy unfold, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin.

In his exclusive interview to an ITAR-TASS correspondent upon his return from Geneva on Saturday evening, where another round of talks between the sides involved in the Bosnian conflict had taken place, Churkin said that with every unsuccessful round it was becoming more difficult to hope for success of the talks on the Bosnia settlement.

Churkin said that the last round was unsuccessful. He noted that it was at the previous round of talks in Brussels last December that another opportunity to achieve accord was missed. At that moment the international community lacked determination to bring the matter to a logical end, and now it is lacking even more. The deputy foreign minister believes that in essence, the participants of the talks are now going round in circles, that is to say that this time they did not touch upon the problems that appeared to be the main and final problems at the last round of talks. They discussed some other, completely different questions. For instance, if last time it seemed that the questions on the Muslim republic's access to the sea and the Sava river, that is to say, the questions connected with its life support system, were the first and most important obstacles for achieving the final settlement this time, these questions were not mentioned at all. New problems have appeared and one could have the impression that the previous fifth and

sixth rounds of negotiations did not exist at all. Churkin said that this situation confirms the anxiety of the Russian side that if the clear position is not taken and if the sides are not encouraged to sign the agreement, disputes about the various aspects of this agreement may continue indefinitely.

What worries me most of all, said Churkin, is that it looks like the world community, to say nothing of the participants of the talks, has lost its bearings, and that a certain confusion, bordering on panic, has emerged in respect of the idea that nothing can be achieved, and important but secondary issues are being brought to the forefront. He underlined that: It is my deep belief that without a political settlement the humanitarian issue, no matter how hard it is pursued, will continue to find itself in a tragic state because while the war continues—when each side goes on thinking about a military victory—it will not be possible to satisfy the humanitarian requirements of the population. At present, one has the situation, the deputy minister continued, where the political side of the matter has been somewhat forgotten and very important though still secondary humanitarian issues including even individual episodes of the general humanitarian situation are being brought to the forefront.

Churkin said the Serb side, the Bosnian Serbs, had assured him, in particular, that there will be no problem with relieving the Canadian battalion by a Dutch unit in Srebrenica. He was also assured (by Dr. Karadzic and President Milosevic) that when the plan for monitoring the airport in Tuzla to ensure its non-military use is drawn up, the Serb side will consider it. This is a fundamentally different position, Churkin said. If, in the past the Serbs would simply refuse to consider the issue, this time they agreed. There are three landing strips in Tuzla and a comprehensive monitoring plan should be drawn up in order to fully guarantee that none of the strips is used for delivering military cargoes. In brief, he said, all these issues could be resolved but, if there is no political settlement, the world will watch a continuing tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As far as the question of air strikes in Bosnia are concerned, Churkin pointed to the corresponding UNSC [UN Security Council] resolutions that refer to the possibility of such actions within the framework of assistance to the UN peace-keeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and assistance to the humanitarian measures of the world community.

Speaking about the position of the Russian side on this question, it cannot be said that Russia is a priori, opposed to any air strikes, he went on. If a situation suddenly arises where the UN troops indeed become the target of a direct attack by any of the conflicting sides, Churkin said, explaining his personal view, then I would recommend (and I am sure that a political solution will be adopted) that this measure be supported. Or take another instance: a malicious act might be carried out and one of the sides refuses to allow humanitarian aid to reach the dying. In these cases, he stressed, the toughest measures may well be taken.

But when there is talk of inflicting air strikes virtually straight away in order to help the operation to replace the battalions (the replacement is actually scheduled for mid-February, there is an accord on enabling this replacement in Srebrenica), then in Churkin's opinion, such proposals are aimed at diverting attention from the real problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is hard to imagine, he went on, how air strikes would help to open the airport in Tuzla or serve to carry out the replacement of the Canadian battalion with a Dutch one. It is entirely clear that if air strikes are inflicted in the Srebrenica area, there will be no replacement—combat activity will continue and any sort of humanitarian aid will be absolutely out of the question.

As for the dissatisfaction with Lord Owen's activities over a Bosnian settlement that certain circles and people have been voicing recently, Churkin believes that the replacement or resignation of one of the co-chairmen of the London international conference on a settlement in former Yugoslavia would now be a serious mistake. Lord Owen, Churkin said, is the only person who has been dealing with the issues regarding the settlement from the very start: He has concentrated all the threads of the negotiations in his hands and if he were now to be replaced, then: Those from any of the three sides in Bosnia who do not want an accord could simply take advantage of this circumstance in order to continue to deceive everyone, raise more and more fresh issues, or return to old ones and so on and so forth.

Churkin recalled that Lord Owen at one time adopted a very tough stance—an anti-Serbian one—calling for air strikes against individual targets, and: Now, when this is no longer the case, we start hearing calls for Lord Owen to be replaced. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister believes that it is now very difficult to find a worthy replacement for Lord Owen, and without losing the tempo of the talks process, simply impossible. This would, in effect, mean, he said, that the world community would be resigning itself to its own powerlessness and it would then be a question of a completely new long round of political efforts with obscure prospects for success.

The next round, Churkin said in conclusion, has been arranged for 10 February in Geneva. That meeting has been set more modest tasks, and it will be attended by fewer participants. Representatives of the Bosnian sides [as received] will gather to discuss confidence measures, so it will be a meeting with limited goals.

Political Issues

Fedorov Receives Offer To Remain Finance Minister

LD2301225294 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] The Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, who said last week that he was going to resign, appeared in the TV program "Itogi" on Sunday to inform that he met Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and got an offer to remain in office. Mr. Fedorov said he intended to meet President Yeltsin early this week to make a final decision. Boris Fedorov advanced as a condition for his continued service for the government the resignation of Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who is responsible for the agricultural sector, and the Chairman of the Central Bank Viktor Gerashchenko. For Boris Fedorov, these two are a symbol of anti-reformist trends in the government.

Chernomyrdin Says Fedorov Still Minister

LD2401115794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1115 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin denied that he had contradicted with the president over the new government composition and said Boris Fedorov remains the finance minister for the time being.

"There are no and will be no contradictions" with Boris Yeltsin. "I have never put my problems on the shoulders of the president and I am not going to do that", Chernomyrdin told reporters on Monday after a 30-minute meeting with the president, adding that the talks focused on the 1994 budget.

Boris Fedorov remains the finance minister for the time being and it is the president who is to decide on his fate, according to the prime minister.

"Fedorov continues to work in his position. I have not accepted his resignation", Chernomyrdin said adding that it is the president who is to decide on whether to accept Fedorov's resignation.

"I do not know whether he will do it", Chernomyrdin said.

The prime minister denied press reports that economist Leonid Abalkin was appointed his adviser. Abalkin was responsible for economic reform in the government of former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

On Monday Chernomyrdin left for the city of Orel in central Russia where he is to meet 18 regional leaders to discuss the situation in agriculture.

Yeltsin To Decide on Resignation

LD2401153594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Boris Fedorov has been continuing as finance minister, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told journalists in Vnukovo-2 Airport before flying to Orel, a regional capital in Central Russia. He said he had accepted Fedorov's resignation and this matter would be decided by President Yeltsin.

The prime minister also said that he had conferred with the head of state for 30 minutes Monday morning discussing the budget draft for the first quarter of the year. He explained that he had never had and would not have "any differences with the president and never intended to pass the buck to him."

Answering an Interfax question, Chernomyrdin denied press reports that he had invited Professor Leonid Abalkin, an authority in economics, to work as his adviser. He said, however, that he wanted to have a closer look at what each of his advisers was doing.

Chernomyrdin promised that the government would pay its debts to farmers but emphasized that this had to be done "in a reasonable way and the cabinet does not intend to grant credits easily."

Chernomyrdin said his government would stick to its policy of reform, "but the time has come when, in addition to monetarist ways of solving economic problems, non-monetarist methods should be used, too." There is, for example, one mechanism that has never been used previously —"agreements between the government, trade unions and producers on the pricing of output and on setting the levels of wages for a certain period," he said.

He said the present tough credit and financial policy would be continued.

Commenting on the future monetary union between Russia and Belarus, the prime minister said not enough preparation work had yet been done for the relevant documents to be signed. He said he would certainly visit Minsk. "The hullabaloo over relations with Belarus" is "harmful and totally wrong," he said. "They want to pull us further away from each other, but they won't manage to," he said.

Chernomyrdin said Russia would remain loyal to the CIS economic union treaty. "Nothing has ever been done or will ever be done at the expense of Russia and the Russians, or at the expense of Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine," he said.

Yeltsin Reportedly Rejects Resignation

LD2401144994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1408 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Oleg Deyneko]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jan—Russian President Boris Yeltsin did not accept the resignation of Finance Minster Boris Fedorov. This was announced at a news conference today by Russian Economic Minister Aleksandr Shokhin.

Journalists were told that the right to make a final decision is left to Boris Fedorov.

Shcherbakov Favored as Replacement

LD2401153894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1408 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] As INTERFAX has learned from a reliable source, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov and the "Interprivatization Fund" president Vladimir Shcherbakov had a meeting in the first half of the day on Monday. A 45-year-old economist and first deputy prime minister in the former USSR cabinet, Shcherbakov has lately been favored as the possible new finance minister.

According to unconfirmed reports, the two men agreed that since the financial situation in the country "is extremely tense," a finance minister should also be a first deputy prime minister.

Shcherbakov is reported to have been trying to persuade Fedorov to drop his tough demands on the cabinet's makeup and stay in the government.

Fedorov Says Collapse 'Inevitable'

LD2101152794 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] No matter who is put in charge of the Finance Ministry, collapse is inevitable given the present mood of the government. This view was expressed to journalists by the former Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, who is a member of the State Duma. He said it would be best if one of his deputies were to be appointed acting minister. Fedorov believes that such a person would be able, within certain limits, to keep the ship on course. At the same time he disclosed that two or three of his deputies and several departmental heads intend to leave the Finance Ministry in the near future.

Fedorov Denies Seeking Foreign Post

LD2101135994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1231 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Sizov]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—Boris Fedorov, who has resigned as finance minister from the Russian Government, denied mass media reports that he is seeking a job in an influential foreign organisation.

He told TASS on Friday that a publication of the British "GUARDIAN" newspaper which claimed that he had asked US Ambassador in Russia Thomas Pickering to find a job for him in an influential international organisation was a "provocation".

"I have not been in the US Embassy for several months and I was not even present at the meeting with US President Bill Clinton in Spaso House on December 14 although I was invited to it", Fedorov said.

He added that he would now focus on his work as State Duma deputy to draft lawbills boosting reforms.

Chubays on Fedorov Remaining in Office

LD2001172394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1447 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays said that whether Finance Minister Boris Fedorov would remain in the government depended on whether the Central Bank was headed by Viktor Gerashchenko.

"A Gerashchenko-Fedorov tandem is something that cannot exist in the Russian economy today," Chubays, who also heads the State Property Committee, said at a conference in Moscow on Thursday. But he said it was essential that Fedorov should stay in the government, because "losing him would be a heavy blow to the reforms and the Russian financial policy."

The government's composition will most likely be approved on January 21, Chubays said.

He said that, as long as the government was headed by Chernomyrdin, the basic privatization principles would not be changed. "Too much has already been done in the field of privatization, and the State Duma, even if anti-government sentiments get the upper hand in it, will have to realize it. If I remain in the government in my present capacity, no alignment of forces will be able to stop privatization," he said.

To date between 45 and 50 percent of the state property has been privatized, Chubays said. This includes 70 percent of service industry enterprises with staffs of under 200. Of the 14,500 large industrial enterprises subject to denationalization, 11,000 have already been privatized. Over 110 Mn Russians have already used their privatization checks, half of which have been exchanged for shares in state enterprises, Chubays said.

First Session of New Government Held 21 Jan

LD2201223994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2158 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Suldin]

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—The first session of the new Russian Government which was held on Friday discussed organizational questions and mapped out the guidelines for its work in 1994.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin who chaired the session said the Government will hold sessions more often in 1994 and expressed the confidence that the reduction of the Government and the ministries by 20 per cent will not affect the quality of their work.

He paid special attention to relations between the Government and the Federal Assembly. Chernomyrdin stressed that "the Government should learn to build its work with the Federation Council and the State Duma on a new basis. We need to develop close and business-like interaction. There should be no confrontation because we have common interests."

Commenting on the work of the Government, former first vice-prime minister Yegor Gaydar said that the faction of the Russia's Choice bloc is in "constructive opposition to the Government and will support any of its constructive initiatives." At the same time his faction plans to argue all decisions which it will consider wrong or dangerous for Russia. Gaydar voiced the hope that the work of the new Government will be successful and it will solve the existing problems.

His colleague, deputy Gennadiy Burbulis believes that the present composition of the Government "has resources and the country has specialists to continue the course of reforms." As for the strategy of reform, he said it "is in jeopardy, although not in a fatal one."

"The present government has more people knowledgeable about the economic mechanism which should be rebuilt," Nikolay Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, said. He said the new cabinet is more capable and suits Russia better than the previous one. He believes the Government will have to "feel the manufacturers's interest to work more effectively" and should reconsider the tax, credit and some other of its policies.

Yabloko leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy proposed his own programme of urgent measures to curb inflation and stop production decline. According to his "optimistic forecast," inflation may get out of control by the fall and surge to 50 per cent, while production decline will total 52 per cent of the 1989 level. The year 1989 was the last year to see production growth.

Yavlinskiy said his faction is ready to form a government capable of carrying out the proposed programme within eight to nine months. Among top priority measures aimed at maintaining inflation at 20 per cent in 1994, the economist named the need to bring the dollar exchange rate in line with inflation dynamics. To this end, the "government should take the responsibility for the dynamics of the dollar exchange rate. This means the need to conclude today a futures deal to sell hard currency at a certain rate."

Another important measure is a "radical change of the policy of privileges for exporters." It will aim at keeping hard currency reserves within the country, he said.

"The present government will not make quick successes," Vladimir Lukin, one of the leaders of the Yabloko bloc, said.

Lukin believes that the cabinet should prioritise measures aimed at fighting crime in the country. "Without the struggle against the criminalisation of all spheres of life it will be impossible to build a normal market system," he added.

Speaking about the composition of the new government, Lukin noted that Chernomyrdin can act as its leader because he has supported major reform initiatives of the previous governments. "There should be only one leader bearing responsibility for the adopted programme. This is vital for the success of the entire government," Lukin said.

Georgiy Satarov, a top adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, believes that the course of reform should not be linked to individual members of the government. In an interview with ITAR-TASS, he recalled that "over the eight months of 1993 when the cabinet of Viktor Chernomyrdin worked without Yegor Gaydar there had been no considerable backtracking from the anti-inflationary policy." He warned against making "dramatic forecasts" and called for assessing the situation by the changes the Government makes in the reform programme.

Economist Pavel Bunich, a member of the Russia's Choice bloc, said the formation of the new Government marks "the decline in the vector of economic reform." he described the current period as a period of temporary appeasement connected with the formation of the president-premier-Federal-Assembly-chairmen axis. When inflation begins soaring, attempts will resume to find a scapegoat. The parliament will blame the Government. The president will do the same. This may lead to a situation in which the cabinet may become incapable. At present, the situation in the Government will depend on the prime minister's behaviour, he concluded.

Former finance minister Boris Fedorov who resigned this week said he will focus his work in the State Duma on lawmaking in order to push reform forward. He described as a "provocation" a publication in the British newspaper GUARDIAN which claimed that he had allegedly requested the U.S. ambassador to Russia to help him get a job in some influential international organisation. Fedorov told ITAR-TASS that he "has not been in the American Embassy for several months."

Vladimir Shcherbakov has denied reports that he has been offered the post of finance minister to replace Fedorov. "I have not received an official offer," Shcherbakov, who heads the international fund supporting privatisation and foreign investments, said.

Vice Premier Yarov's Responsibilities Outlined

PM2101140794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Untitled ITAR-TASS report]

[Text] By all accounts, Yuriy Yarov will retain the post of vice premier in the new government, Valeriy Vorontsov, the vice premier's adviser, has told ITAR-TASS.

He explained that Yuriy Yarov will continue to manage the social sphere for the government. Furthermore, he added, the vice premier will also be responsible for questions of the Cabinet's current work. Let us recall here that Yuriy Yarov is chairman of the Commission for the Burial of the Remains of the Tsar's Family and is also responsible for commemorating the date of the siege of Leningrad. However, the vice premier's adviser noted, the management of the Ministry of Health will in all likelihood be transferred to the control of First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets.

Chernomyrdin Says Cabinet To Meet More Often

LD2101161494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1403 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, speaking at the first session of his new cabinet on Friday, said it would meet more often, possibly twice a week, now that it was trimmed down, government spokesman Valentin Sergeyev told reporters.

The Prime Minister stressed that although the new government was cut by 20 percent, this will not affect its performance because of the professional skills of its members.

He told senior cabinet members that the government must build its relations with the Federal Assembly on the basis of cooperation, given that the cabinet and parliament were being led by "common state interests."

Chernomyrdin had accepted a proposal made at the session of the State Duma that the government should make weekly reports in the house. In his view, the prime minister or his deputies do not have to appear regularly in parliament but cabinet members and ministers must keep in permanent touch with the deputies.

Chernomyrdin stressed in particular that members of the reformed cabinet should not pay much attention to forecasts of "how long it will last, given that the present government is quite viable".

It was decided that the government would meet in a full session on February 17, with President Yeltsin possibly attending it.

Chernomyrdin warned the ministries and departments against any excessive spending while forming this year's budget.

Chernomyrdin Interviewed on Reform Policy

LD2101184694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1712 GMT 21 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: Reports by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others]

[Text] As Russia's new government set down to work on Friday, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was speaking in an exclusive interview with INTERFAX News Agency.

IF: How did you get on with the President while discussing the make up of a new cabinet? Is it possible to speak in terms of a "government crisis?"

CHERNOMYRDIN: To start with your second question, I think it is not at all serious to talk of a government crisis as such. Of course, in a society as divided and turbulent as ours is there are forces seeking to sow the seeds of chaos and panic so as to fish in troubled waters.

But all of it is simpler than that in reality. Under the country's new constitution, the Prime Minister submits a list of cabinet members to the head of state. Naturally, the President and I had to discuss at length both the key cabinet figures and a new government team as a whole, but there is nothing unusual about that.

As in any team, there is a clash of interests in a government. So we tried to pick up a team of the like-minded individuals. I hope I have managed to do so after all. To offset any speculations about the new government's make up, I would like to say this: I myself am to work with these people, not someone else, so I will be personally responsible for my choice.

Of course, my consultations with Boris Yeltsin were far from smooth but we had both sought the same goal: to create a team of professionals seeking to update the country through reforms.

IF: Much was said about incompatible differences during the latest cabinet shake up. What is the cause and substance of those differences if there were any?

CHERNOMYRDIN: To begin with, there have always been differences and no one tried to hide them. On the contrary, there was much said and written about them, that the divisions on ways of embracing reforms had deepened. But all of this is in the past.

But I think it is more important to realize one thing: the country, the society and economy are in a difficult period of transition and each stage has its own logic and priorities.

The time has now come to focus attention on curbing production slump in all economic sectors as the only way to resolve the gamut of social problems facing the country.

What sort of reforms or democracy can one talk about at a time when huge enterprises and private businesses come to a standstill while coal miners, oil workers, doctors and journalists go on strike? When private farmers, cooperatives and state farms are starved of cash to buy equipment, fuel, fertilizers and cornseed in the run up to this year's sowing campaign?

No matter how progressive, theory as such cannot salvage a huge country from shortages of food, energy and commodities and by definition, from social upheavals which will make the reforms next to impossible. If we fail to boost up production, we will fail to salvage the newly-emerging market economy. This is an axiom.

IF: Don't you think that a cabinet must be made up of people upholding different views on the direction of reforms?

CHERNOMYRDIN: A government called upon to run a huge country at a hard time such as the present is not a debating society. This is obvious.

There is no time for "flash in the pan"-style discussions. I prefer a team of the like-minded individuals, which is alone capable of acting with a fair amount of efficiency.

But this does not mean we are against any sensible opposition provided it offers its own cure for the problem. More importantly, we prefer precisely this style of work. Some observers try in vain to suggest that Chernomyrdin had ostensibly formed a government of silent consensus. This is not true and I hope the country will be able to ascertain this in the next few months.

IF: Do you think the latest shake up will lead to some corrections in the pace of reforms? If so, what changes are likely to be made?

CHERNOMYRDIN: It seems we have been carried away too far with putting labels on leading politicians such as reformist democrats or hardline upholders of the state planning and so on. This leads to a situation when the role of a personality is blown out of proportion.

It is clear to all and sundry that the reform is past the point of no return. The main task now is to try to enforce reforms with the least possible sacrifice for the society, each individual and each household. There is no tragedy if one government member is replaced by another. This is a normal process. Besides, we would not take up the job if we were uncertain about our ability to halt the production slump. There is an abundance of those who criticize us but not many who are prepared to do the daily work. something that we are ready to cope with it.

IF: The new government is widely described as being made up of a managerial corps lacking an explicit macroeconomic policy. Does the cap fit?

CHERNOMYRDIN: I do want to deprive those cap passers of their daily bread though some of their descriptions are far from being decent at times. Perhaps, it would be more correct to describe the new cabinet as a team of pragmatists aiming to fulfil concrete tasks. But it would be absolutely wrong to say we are out to throw macroeconomic approaches overboard. The government is not alone, it leans upon an enormous scientific basis and experts of world renown. This means, we will be able to co-relate global issues with the solving of day-to-day tasks without which the country will not be able to survive.

IF: In what way do you think the emergence of a new government will affect Russia's relations with international financial institutions and the problem of the country's foreign debt?

CHERNOMYRDIN: I state with full responsibility that new government appointments will in no way affect Russia's obligations to its foreign partners. Russia will continue to service its debt in line with the conditions and schedule set by the IMF, the World Bank and other financial structures of the West.

The same applies to our commitments in respect of separate countries. Our partners should not have even the slightest cause for concern.

Russia's policy on this remains unchanged and does not depend on separate cabinet members. President Yeltsin himself acts as guarantor of this.

IF: What do you make of a sharp fall in the ruble rate in the past few days?

CHERNOMYRDIN: I think it must be clear to all by now that the setback earlier this week had nothing to do either with the economic situation or government actions.

The ruble gained somewhat on Thursday which indicates that the panic caused by a government reshuffle is now subsiding. The banks' behavior at the currency market also indicate that panic buying of the dollar was artificial because of being caused by irresponsible statements by some of the government staff members.

Spokesman Denies Chernomyrdin Uses 'Foreign Advisors'

LD2101190294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1745 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Perkina]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan—"Throughout his term in office as leader of the Cabinet of Ministers, Viktor Chernomyrdin has not used the services of foreign advisors, and neither does he now", ITAR-TASS was told today by the head of the Russian Government's press service, Valentin Sergeyev. He had been asked about the reaction of the head of the government to a letter from economists Anders Oslund (Sweden) and Jeffrey Sachs (United States) in which they decline "to further assist the Russian Government".

According to Sergeyev, the head of the government believes that "the mechanical transfer of western economic methods to Russian soil has caused much more harm than good".

"The reform course drawn up by the Russian Government and approved by the president naturally incorporates some elements of Western market economics, but it

primarily takes account of particular features of our state and people and of traditions in Russia", Valentin Sergeyev concluded.

Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Hold Unscheduled Meeting

LD2401115994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1052 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had a meeting in the Kremlin on Monday. As a presidential spokesman told INTERFAX, the meeting was not planned.

Although he declined to say what the two leaders had discussed, he suggested that they had continued to examine the problems related to cabinet reorganization.

He said that the unexpected flow of criticism to the government reshuffle had been staggering for them in many ways. So they might have made a new attempt to choose a new finance minister and possibly reach a compromise with Fedorov.

As for the recent speculations about the possible appointment to the post of finance minister of ex-USSR premier Scherbakov, the spokesman described them "as an attempt to sound out the president and the prime minister on this candidate."

Democratic Russia Questions Cabinet Reshuffle

LD2301154194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1311 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] Representatives of the Democratic Russia Movement [DRM] ended a meeting in Moscow on Saturday [22 January] by expressing "anxiety and concern" over the President's endorsement of a new government which they described as "an incomprehensible step".

Their appeal to Yeltsin says that unlike Belarus, Ukraine and Uzbekistan and other republics of the former Soviet Union, Russia has acquired steady reformists such Yegor Gaydar, Anatoliy Chubays and Boris Fedorov due to your personal involvement. The DRM is now puzzled over Yeltsin's support to the upholders of the idea of "squeezing" members of the reformist wing out of the government to please "red" monopoly directors with Viktor Chernomyrdin in charge. DRM leaders accuse Yeltsin of backing up what is in essence is a new "Soviet government".

Participants in the meeting reminded Yeltsin of his verbal commitment to "the policy of radical reforms" he had expressed at a recent news conference during U.S. president Bill Clinton's visit to Moscow. However, they said, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin announcing the make up of a new cabinet "made it clear the pattern of reforms would be corrected".

DRM has warned Yeltsin of intending to put up resistance to the new economic policy leading to the winding up of reforms.

The appeal ends with a question to the President: "What is your own policy, Boris Nikolayevich?"

Shokhin Uncertain of Remaining in Government

LD1901185494

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1350 GMT on 19 January carries recorded remarks by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin from an interview with Radio Rossii. The place and date of the interview are not given. Shokhin is asked to comment on what he thinks the government should be doing.

Shokhin says: "The most preferable government policy would be to continue maintaining the policy of the past few months. Any sudden fluctuations would only be worse. Continuing the line of the Chernomyrdin government would mean continuing the policy of improving the financial health and stability of the Russian economy, while, at the same time, taking account of the economy's problems and a policy of renouncing shock methods. The most difficult thing here is finding the golden mean."

Shokhin goes on to regret that experienced government members who had learned from their mistakes were leaving the government:

"I think both the president and the prime minister should keep all those willing to work at this difficult time. One should not, of course, be raising the issue of satisfying all the ultimatums coming from absolutely everyone. However, I do think that sensible compromises should be made here. Unfortunately, the present government crisis was, of course, prompted by the not very well-timed decree on the reorganization of the Cabinet."

Shokhin then gives his forecast of what the compositon of the new Cabinet would be:

"It is known that First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets will be remaining first vice premier. The long, drawn-out discussion between Fedorov and Zaveryukha has to end with the resignation of one of them." He says he could not say who might replace Gaydar on the economic portfolio: "I doubt it would be Yavlinskiy, because that would entail a long period during which the prime minister and the new father of reforms would have to get to know each other and learn how to work together." Yavlinskiy, he says, criticized Gaydar for many months, and his reforms would be different anyway.

Shokhin goes on to say that people with previous economic experience, like Soskovets and people who wish to continue reforms, should work together. Shokhin says he was given the CIS portfolio, but he rejected it. A ministerial post is not enough to deal with such a wide remit,

he says, you have to have wider powers. He says he was also offered the economics portfolio, but says he cannot give his final answer until he knows the identity of the deputy prime minister in charge of macro-economic affairs. He concludes by saying: "To be honest, I cannot say whether I will remain in the government, although, to be honest, it is more interesting to work in the government than in the Duma, as far as I am concerned."

Shakhray Explains Acceptance of Ministerial Post

LD2001154194

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1415 GMT on 20 January carries a report by Mayak correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinskiy on the work of the State Duma.

Ruvinskiy questions the wisdom of the proposed bill on the status of deputies, as well as the reasons behind some of the government's decisions, such as the refurbishing of the White House and moving government offices there at a considerable cost to the taxpayer. He then adds that Sergey Shakhray held an interesting news conference today at which he explained the role of his faction, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, in the Duma, and his reasons for accepting a ministerial post.

Shakhray says: "For the first time in three-and-a-half years, an opportunity—this is a very gentle, preliminary assessment—an opportunity has arisen for a coordinated activity of the legislative and the executive powers in the area of regional policy. Representatives of our faction in the State Duma are heading three committees: the Committee for Matters of the Federation and Regional Policy; the Committee for Matters of the Commonwealth and Compatriots; and the Committee for Local Self-government. In fact, the entire regional spectrum is covered by these committees in the State Duma.

"The position of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord is also very influential in the upper chamber—the Federation Council. My acceptance of the post of minister for nationalities and regional policy was influenced by another consideration that is very important to me. Our analysis shows that 1994 will be a very difficult year with respect to interethnic relations. There is a threat of interethnic and regional strife and even conflict. In this situation, it would have been very easy to feel insulted by the downgrading from the status of a deputy prime minister to the status of a minister or to find another plausible reason—since the administration provides numerous opportu ties to do so—and to resign from the government having adopted a position of a constructive or non-constructive opposition and criticism. For me, such a position would be unacceptable from a moral and professional point of view. As long as there is an opportunity to influence regional policy, a chance to avert or minimize the negative consequences of possible conflicts, I will continue to work."

Shakhray's Work in Reshuffled Government Questioned

LD2101203494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Ex-Vice Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray has made it clear he had to refuse the post of nationalities and regional policy minister he had been offered. "If the situation when vital issues of regional and nationality policies are solved without participation of the government member responsible for these issues remains, I will not be able to work in the cabinet," he told INTERFAX today.

According to well-informed sources in the staff, Shakhray is virtually debarred from solving regional issues. For instance, the president transferred the responsibility for monitoring talks with Tatarstan on concluding a bilateral treaty on power-sharing from Shakhray to Vice Prime Minister Yuriy Yarov.

It was Yarov and the head of the presidential staff, Sergey Filatov, who held a conference with the regional leaders without asking Shakhray to join them. Without his participation and despite his recommendations, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held consultations with a representative of the Chechen president, M. Mugadayev, on Friday.

INTERFAX learned that Shakhray did not participate in the first meeting of the reshuffled government. Prior to this, he put forward two conditions for his joining the government, i.e. his ministry's direct subordination to the head of the government and membership in the government presidium. However, he has never received an answer to the demands.

Russia's Choice Pessimistic on New Cabinet

LD2101133994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1252 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—"The Russia's Choice faction has not yet decided on whether it should oppose all the government or not, but, in general, it has little optimism concerning the cabinet's new composition," ITAR-TASS was told today by faction member Kirill Ignatyev.

In his opinion, the new cabinet will prove to be a government of inflation. This is why the Russia's Choice faction cannot assume the responsibility for all its work. "The faction," Ignatyev said, "will apparently oppose some steps of the government, maybe even many, while supporting only two areas—privatisation, for which Anatoliy Chubays is responsible, and the international policy.

"When we recommended Andrey Kozyrev, who is a member of the Russia's Choice movement, to stay on in

the government, we were guided by the conviction that the Zhirinovskiy policy called for a serious, competent and balanced alternative, capable of preventing extremism from getting the upper hand," Ignatyev stated.

Economist Pavel Bunich, also a member of the Russia's Choice faction, told ITAR-TASS that the the formation of the new cabinet tended, without doubt, to reduce the vector of economic reforms. But this, in his opinion, could partially produce some rather sound results. "The point is," Bunich said, "that inflation was slightly checked by means of both sound and unsound means. Combatting inflation by not paying wages to people was an impermissible method, while the restriction of credits and subsidies to poorly functioning enterprises was a positive measure. It will only be for the good of the nation if the new government manages to do away with this harmful aspect of combatting inflation," the economist believes.

"Radicalism's attenuation in this sphere should be welcomed," he added. "However, regretful though it may be, the scales may be tilted further towards greater inflation," Bunich stressed. "Today," he believes, "there is a state of temporary balance. There is now an axis between the president, premier, and chairmen of the two chambers of the parliament. But as soon as inflation soars up, attempts will immediately be made to find a scapegoat. The parliament will point to the government, and so will the president. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the question of the cabinet's inefficiency will be raised within a matter of four months from now. At present, the situation within the government largely depends on the behaviour of the premier. Whereas formerly we used to claim that it depends more on Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov, today we are witnessing the emergence of a one-man theatre."

Leader of the Russian Communist Party faction Gennadiy Zyuganov told ITAR-TASS that a very difficult struggle was being fought over the new government. "At least two loyal associates of Gaydar—Anatoliy Chubays and Andrey Kozyrev—are now holding key posts in it," he added. "It remains to be seen whether the new line will prevail, the line aimed at stabilising and normalising our work, when workers and commodity producers will be encouraged, or we shall again get a compromise hybrid, which will not yield anything positive," Zyuganov stated. In his opinion, this is the crux of the ongoing struggle. "For the time being, it appears that the pragmatic line is getting the upper hand," Zyuganov stated.

Burbulis Warns Yeltsin Could Be Isolated

LD2101171994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1536 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko and Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan—"The most alarming thing of all happening in society is the real danger for the president of the Russian Federation becoming isolated from those who were professionally involved in implementing democratic reform and from their support," Gennadiy Burbulis, a State Duma deputy from the Russia's Choice Bloc, told ITAR-TASS correspondents in an interview.

"It is necessary to persuade the president that unless he relies on a clear and definite support from reformers, he risks finding himself in isolation," he said. "In that case, serious shocks may occur, including the hysteria around a possible resignation of the government." We must do all we can to prevent Boris Yeltsin from becoming alienated and isolated, he added.

Burbulis considers that the government, with its present composition, "has the resources and the country has the professionals to continue reform-oriented policies." As for the reform strategy itself, "it is in danger but not fatally so."

Burbulis did not rule out that "many work collectives might seriously express their discontent" in April and May. However, the president and the government are in a position to prevent this happening. "A search for mechanisms of social and professional rehabilitation of the workers who are under threat of lay-offs should start today," he stressed.

Gaydar Calls For Reconstruction of Democratic Movement

LD2201175794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1635 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow, 22 January—Today Yegor Gaydar made an appeal to the participants of an assembly of Moscow's democratic community for a serious reconstruction of the democratic movement.

He made a speech in which he explained his reasons for leaving the government. Yegor Gaydar gave as one of his reasons for resigning the government's adoption of a decision to allocate $500 million toward the construction of a new parliament building. In his words, "To carry out a policy envisaging the adoption of such decisions is to go beyond the bounds of morality."

Yegor Gaydar believes that the disagreements that were clearly visible in the work of the government over the past year were linked to the fundamental question of "what kind of Russia we want to have." He explained that the reformers favored a "cheap and moderately sized state that serves society," and in particular, reducing the state apparatus and bringing to a minimum the number of government functionaries. However, there exists another approach in Russia as well, he said. This is "a strong, powerful, and expensive state, which

will intervene in all spheres of public life and will have a powerful apparatus of functionaries merging with a new emerging bourgeoisie."

Nevertheless, Yegor Gaydar said that Russia's Choice was ready to support any constructive decisions by the government.

Answering a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent on the future work of Anatoliy Chubays in the government, Yegor Gaydar said that "it will be difficult for Chubays to work." He explained that "the privatization process has gathered a certain momentum, and if people begin actively and systematically to wreck it, it will nevertheless continue until 1 July, when privatization checks expire." Yegor Gaydar expressed the hope that Anatoliy Chubays "will do all he can to fulfill our obligations."

The participants at the assembly supported the creation of a New Civic Movement. It will be formed on the basis of Democratic Russia. The adopted manifesto of the New Civic Movement [Novoye Grazhdanskoye Dvizheniye] proclaims the need "to build a civic society by peaceful means, improve the socio-economic situation of working people, and ensure a normal standard of living for ourselves and our children."

Lev Ponomarev, co-chairman of the Democratic Russia movement, said that the movement's founding conference should be held as early as the beginning of March.

Gaydar Comments on Yeltsin, Russia's Choice

LD2101133494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The president wants to continue the reforms but has to adapt to reality, in particular the December election results, former deputy prime minister Yegor Gaydar, who leads the Russia's Choice group in parliament, told INTERFAX.

"If the democrats had been united and had run the election campaign better, the president would be in a better position now," he said.

Gaydar, who intends to concentrate on parliamentary work now, emphasized that Russia's Choice had to formulate a clear-cut position for itself. "There was uncertainty about the position of our parliamentary group when it could not be said for sure if we are in power or in opposition and we were held responsible for decisions which we did not make," he said. Now, he said, the group was in constructive opposition and could criticize the cabinet.

Gaydar dismissed rumors of a split in the group. Only two men, Andrey Makarov and Boris Fedorov, left for the December 12 Union, a group "which votes almost the way we do." He thought that for a group of 78 this did not amount to a split.

Commenting on the latest Duma decisions Gaydar said: "It is funny that the Duma discussed so thoroughly the well-being of the deputies and 'lavish' provisions for them were advocated by the communists and other left-wing parties. Despite the resistance mounted by Russia's Choice and my own speeches they secured a resounding victory in this issue."

Chernomyrdin's Future Seen Tied To Economic Results

PM2401105394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 8

["Editorial viewpoint": "Viktor Chernomyrdin Doomed to Take Responsibility for Fate of Reform"]

[Text] At a news conference on Thursday [20 January] Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin announced the composition of his government. Three times he gave an assurance that the new Cabinet of Ministers would "not retreat from the adopted programs and will make no changes to the reform policy."

But did the premier actually have a clear and consistent reform policy in the past that would justify his talking of continuing that policy? No, radical economic reform was linked above all with the name of Yegor Gaydar, who shouldered the full burden of responsibility for implementing government policy but who had of late essentially had no opportunity to seriously influence that policy. The social fulmination about "shock therapy" bypassed the premier and was aimed directly at Gaydar as the father of reform and in whose shadow Oleg Soskovets, Oleg Lobov, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, and other industrial, financial, and agrarian lobbyists—who had been appointed by Chernomyrdin to key posts—flourished. Without concealing their aspirations with market rhetoric, many of them (Lobov, for instance) openly talked of the need to return to a centralized economy and to revive planning and state regulation. But the presence in the government of Yegor Gaydar and people in his team allowed the premier, while distancing himself from the radical reformers and their activity, to talk, as now, about the existence of a firm and consistent policy of fundamentally transforming the economy.

But if there are no deviations from this policy, as the premier assures us, then what does he mean by fighting inflation—as he has announced—"not with monetary means but with other means"? What should we read into the intention to distribute state subsidies "more effectively" and to repay all the debts of the military-industrial complex, the agricultural complex, and the budgetary sector? And will there really be no "soft loans handed out right and left" if the premier is nonetheless planning to issue them "selectively"?

Judging by the composition of the new government, which reflects an evident and seemingly difficult compromise between the premier and the president, the "period of market romanticism," as Viktor Chernomyrdin put it, is indeed over. Exactly what is meant by

the market "realism" to which the premier is clearly more inclined will become clear in the next few months. But, one way or another, the head of the government will now have to assume full responsibility for the fate of reform. If this new stage in building the market economy ends in hyperinflation and a Russia-wide political strike prompted by it, then the prime minister will have to be held responsible. Him above all.

Federation Council's Abdulatipov Praises Cabinet Changes

LD2101161394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1403 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Commenting on Yegor Gaydar's and Boris Fedorov's resignation, first deputy chairman of the Federation Council Ramazan Abdulatipov declared that with the help of the prime minister the president "has demonstrated sound sense—which he lacked during the implementation of reforms—courage and principle."

In his interview with Interfax Friday, Abdulatipov expressed the opinion that Yeltsin decided to give up further radicalization of reforms because these moves could pose a threat to economic transformations themselves. He also pointed out that the monetarist policy pursued from Moscow irrespective of regional peculiarities, including republics within the Russian Federation, threatens Russia's integrity.

"Both the prime minister and the president understood this principal issue. That is why they have corrected the composition of the government, and, God bless them to correct the reform course," said Abdulatipov.

Abdulatipov believes that Gaydar and Fedorov specifically slammed the door before their resignation in order to have "a site" to return to the government. He explained that according to experts' forecasts, 1994 will be a year of hard consequences of the errors in the sphere of economic reforms "and both Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov know this quite well." "That is why Yegor Gaydar will be able to say six months from now, 'it was better when I was in power,'" he said.

To this effect Abdulatipov declared that neither Yegor Gaydar nor Boris Fedorov had enough courage "to face" these problems. "That is why they have placed all expected difficulties on Viktor Chernomyrdin's shoulders, a bull carrying the Russian economy," he underlined.

Abdulatipov indicated that the period to verify reformers' honesty had started after Yegor Gaydar's resignation. "If they (leaders of Russia's Choice) are in favor of reforms they will occupy the most constructive position with respect to the Cabinet's activity. If they are not interested in the reforms' success and attempt to impose their representatives on the reformers' group, then Russia's Choice could become a wild critic of Chernomyrdin's government," declared Abdulatipov.

Lack of Reform Strategy Seen as Cause of Panic

PM2101105294 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by observer Aleksandr Golts under the "Topic of the Week" rubric: "Reformers Come and Go, But What Is Left for Us?"]

[Text] This week has brought evidence of a universal revival of Russian national traditions. Not only our country, but the whole world has been engaged in speculation: Who is going to occupy the ministerial offices in Moscow in the end? As is the custom, as the Christmas holidays approached, everyone started trying to frighten each other. And very successful they were, too.

It is said that the blackest day in the history of the Tokyo stock exchange was the day of Stalin's death. On that occasion shares fell by hundreds of points and there was ruin on a mass scale. Naturally, Gaydar's resignation cannot be compared to a "father of the peoples" departing this world. But it too had an explosive effect. There was a disastrous fall in the ruble rate and a sharp increase in prices within the country. The rate of the West German [as published] mark against the dollar fell markedly. As did the currencies of the states with the closest economic links to Russia. Naturally, as always at a time of instability, gold prices rose rapidly.

The simplest explanation for what happened is that the threat of the departure from the Russian Government of the people they call reformers is causing doubts about the continuation of the course of reforms. In short, it transpires that industrial and financial circles, both in our country and elsewhere, did not have too much faith in assurances from the Kremlin that the policy of reforms will continue.

But surely the point here is not speculation about whether or not the reforms will continue. The government crisis is making people think about what these reforms, now in their third year, actually consist of. This is no idle question. After all, if the purpose and strategy of the reforms were obvious, then reactions would have been prompted by changes in that strategy (about which nothing is yet known), not in the composition of the government. But, as was the case 40 years ago, both for citizens of Russia and for the world in general, this country's economic policy is unpredictable. And this leaves no alternative but to think in terms not of the policy, but of specific individuals, be it Pavlov, Gaydar, or Chernomyrdin, whose actions in specific situations can be predicted, at least to some extent. And when those people go, the panic starts.

Maybe that is in fact the chief weakness of the Russian reforms. Because these reforms do not constitute a concrete program. They are a highly individual mix of slogans and reactions to developing situations in the economy. I realize that Gaydar and his team, when they took over the management of the economy, had no time for strategy. A situation close to chaos prevailed in the

country: barter, empty stores, ration cards. The reformers found a lever with which to lessen that chaos—price liberalization. And they tried to implement that liberalization as strictly—not to say cruelly—as possible. Basically, all the long-term loan bonds which past governments had given out to the population were scrapped.

As a result, by bringing about a considerable fall in living standards, the reformers managed to bring domestic prices into line with world prices. This promptly uncovered a fact which our economic isolation had concealed for a long time. Namely, that virtually all sectors of our industry are cost-based and not competitive. It was not a conspiracy, but the operation of objective laws unleashed by the reformers, which made us see our economy in its true light. It emerged that the majority of goods produced in Russia are not only worse, but more expensive than those produced abroad. That if you are guided solely by the economic expediency of today, it is far more advantageous to put large padlocks on virtually every sector. And to export oil, gas, and other raw materials, and buy all you need with the funds thus earned.

But Russia is not a Persian Gulf state. Although nowadays even there they are trying to diversify the economy, making use of the funds earned from oil sales. Our own reformers stopped short of what should in fact have been the essence of the reform—restructuring of the economy. I cannot say whether this was a strategic error or whether they simply could not do it, because of the fierce political struggle which has become one of the most important factors in our economy. In any case, it transpired that hope was pinned mainly on the idea that the required restructuring would take place of its own accord, under the influence of objective market laws.

Yet the reformers knew that spontaneous market forces brought the Western world to crisis in the early thirties. Since then the governments of developed countries, which have always had market economies, have not let go of the economic helm. And if we have decided to enter the world market, it was of fundamental importance for the reformers to decide exactly what we were taking to that market. That is, to decide exactly which sectors, if not today, then tomorrow, are capable of producing goods that will be in demand. And then to support those specific sectors, not every sector. Today, when this kind of support is mentioned, for some reason it immediately prompts alarmist talk of concessionary credits and subsidies which the government is going to start handing out right and left without the reformers' supervision. Those who have political and personal influence know how to raise the threat of strikes or simply to shout loudly.

I agree that such credits do in fact stimulate only one area of production—the printing of money that is worth less and less. But maybe this abnormal situation occurs because our captains of industry are simply disoriented. They do not know which sectors, apart from the fuel and energy complex, Moscow considers priorities. If they had some idea of that, they would be able to plan their own strategy right now. Curtail one area of production and try to start up another. Move free capital into sectors with a future. And citizens would not be in a state of total confusion, not knowing where to go with their vouchers.

After all, credits are not the only thing in the world. You could support priority sectors through tax concessions, or even not demand tax from them at all. Thereby promoting an influx of Russian and foreign capital. That is, try to do everything that is done by economic departments in the countries whose example we are trying to follow. It would be the height of impudence for me to embark on a concrete analysis of an economic program. That is what the professionals should be doing. Instead of trying to frighten each other with talk of impending chaos. A citizen has a right to know what the reforms really mean for him personally, apart from rising prices, declining living standards, the threat of unemployment, and being splashed with mud from the wheels of the proliferating Mercedes. If his sphere of activity has no future from the government's viewpoint, he should have been told this long ago. Along with a suggestion of what speciality—other than selling sausages in the square outside the station—might bring in a stable and honest income.

Heaven knows, I have great respect for Yegor Gaydar, who possesses a combination of determination and intelligence that is rare in Russian politicians. But I do not want my well-being to depend on whether he or anyone else is still in the government. I want to be able to plan my own life. But I can only do that if I know what the state wants to do.

Yavlinskiy Comments on 'New-Look' Government

LD2201042794 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0300 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] I don't know if we can describe what's currently happening in the government as a sharing-out of portfolios, but it certainly is being reformed. These reshuffles are causing a great deal of debate. Today we have the opinion of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. Here's what he thinks about the new-look government.

[Begin Yavlinskiy recording] As far as the current government and its sentiments are concerned, then I can say that it is typical of the governments that the Soviet Union had. It's a typical government, consisting of absolutely different people, most of whom have no legitimacy whatsoever because they're not elected and didn't even run for election.

The second factor is that this is a government that has no policy program. The problem, however, lies not in this but elsewhere: the fact is that I am very concerned over what the current government represents in the basic situation that today, this year, is beginning to emerge. [end recording]

Those words were said by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy at a news conference. My colleague Vyacheslav Osipov was there, so over to him.

[Osipov] To continue our discussion about the government: when Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the decree on the new composition of the government-cabinet, he had already received several days earlier a letter from Grigoriy Yavlinskiy in which the member of the State Duma set out a new concept for structuring the government. On the basis of it, Yavlinskiy proposed making the government responsible for inflationary processes. At his news conference, the parliamentary faction leader set out the reasons for the country's economic recession. One of them, he believes, lies in mistakes made during privatisation: using miscalculations in the way this is implemented, workforces are directing all profit into consumption rather than production, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy thinks. He dwelled in particular on the complete refusal to extend soft loans. This only fuels inflation and causes further decline in the ruble rate of exchange. As regards this, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy commented as follows:

[Begin Yavlinskiy recording] The falling exchange rate is without doubt an inflationary factor, but bringing the rate into line could have a positive impact for a while on our industry. Therefore, if you hear gung-ho claims in February that things are getting rather better, then that will be a temporary phenomenon linked to the fact that the rate of exchange is falling and imports are becoming less profitable than they were before.

My last remark: You know of the Belarus agreement on currency union. Even the sharpest critics of this agreement, those who are most dissatisfied with it, reckon that the cost comes to about 1.5 trillion rubles, a sum we cannot afford. I want to say that this sum cannot even compare to the debts, for example, that have built up to agriculture, the military-industrial complex, and others. [end recording]

New Cabinet Seen Isolated, Politically Doomed

MK2201102094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 1

[Anna Krayevskaya, Yevgeniy Krasnikov report in the "Power" column: "The New Government Consists of the Old One, While the Latter Has Not Been Particularly Successful in Implementing Reforms"]

[Text] Signs are that Viktor Chernomyrdin's reformed government is being assigned an unenviable role. The sharp jump in inflation in the first quarter of the year is quite obvious to all. This is being said by such different people as monetarist Boris Fedorov and his antagonist, Leonid Abalkin. An explosion is in the cards, and no government composition will be able to prevent it. In this context it is very indicative that the "driving force" behind the reforms, Yegor Gaydar, and their chief ideologue Boris Fedorov have decided to "wash their hands," without any longer tying themselves by participation in the cabinet. This produces the impression of a move calculated well in advance. It is also characteristic that in making preliminary terms for his presence in the government, Boris Fedorov acted not covertly, as was the done thing on Staraya Ploshchad, but publicly, informing journalists in detail about the nature of his interrelations with the premier. Now that the radical democrats have disavowed any responsibility for the state of things in the Russian economy, it is quite obvious that the new government will be declared the main culprit for the general disintegration. A corresponding directive has already been issued by Mikhail Poltoranin. Commenting on cadre reshuffles in the government, Poltoranin described them as the advent of "a criminal- political mafia grouping," forecasting with confidence that the present cabinet will leave before May at the latest, under the threat of a Russia-wide political strike. The former head of the Federal Information Center does not use his words lightly, and apparently in the very near future one should expect the beginning of a massive propaganda attack. One can confidently predict that the ex-ministers will be fairly actively using the parliament rostrum to charge the government with ignoring the people's hardships. Naturally the president himself will not be subject to critical attacks.

Therefore the new composition of the Chernomyrdin cabinet is in fact a list of "politically doomed people" whose reputation in the next few months will most likely suffer serious damage. It is not accidental that well-known politicians did not hurry to take charge of the bottomless ship. The clever Yavlinskiy seems to have seen through Gaydar's design to lure aboard the sinking ship one of his main political rivals in working out reform strategy, and therefore stipulated his participation in the government by a number of evidently unacceptable conditions.

Only "Shakhray party" leaders, who have failed to get enough candidates in the Duma, but on the other hand, succeeded in both falling out with the democrats and losing the president's favor, have agreed to offer their shoulders to Chernomyrdin.

Formally Chernomyrdin can celebrate victory. There are no more opponents in the government. The trouble, however, is that the new cabinet has actually "hung in the air:" Behind the White House walls, it is effectively deprived of organized political support. There is no political center at present, while the opposition will never forgive Chernomyrdin his unqualified support for the president during the September-October coup. Moreover there are no reasons that could force politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia or the Russian Federation Communist Party to take on responsibility for the government's actions.

The sole guarantee for the existence of the Chernomyrdin cabinet is Boris Yeltsin, who would apparently want neither to seek support exclusively among the democrats nor to increase the political weight of the

State Duma, granting it the power to approve the premier. Even so these guarantees for the existence of the reformed government will hardly be sufficiently strong or long lasting.

Filatov Outlines Presidential Administration Reform

LD2201131994 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] The document on the reform of the presidential administration apparatus will probably be signed next week, Sergey Filatov reported to an ITAR-TASS correspondent.

According to Filatov, at the moment its work with the Federal Assembly needs to be intensified. In connection with this, a new structure is being set up to work in this area with factions and deputies' groups. Among other areas of the presidential administration's work in need of improvement, Filatov also mentioned the increase of the control functions over implementation of edicts and instructions issued by the president, improvement of the analytical service and relations with the media. As Filatov noted, the document stresses the important role to be played by the department engaged in working with the territories. In his opinion, the analysis of the preelection campaign and elections has revealed various shortcomings in the work of local presidential representatives. As Filatov reported, in future, the candidates for the post of presidential representatives will have to be approved by heads of the local administration.

Yeltsin Releases Defense, Security Adviser Volkogonov

LD2401110994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1020 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree today releasing Dmitriy Volkogonov from the post of adviser. He was an adviser on defense and security matters and chairman of the president's commission investigating the disappearance without trace of foreign citizens and of Russian citizens missing in unexplained circumstances outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation president's decision was made in connection with D. Volkogonov's election to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly, the Russian Federation president's press service reports.

Yeltsin Decree Abolishes Federal Assembly Commission

LD2001174694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1708 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on Thursday to abolish the apparatus of the Federal Assembly which was set up to handle organisational questions until the new parliament begins operation.

The government has been instructed to set up, in cooperation with the presidential administration and the apparatuses of the State Duma and the Federation Council, a commission to employ the staff of the liquidated body, the presidential press service said.

Newspaper May Be Sole Official Government Paper

LD2101203094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] In the near future the newspaper ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA will probably become the only official newspaper of the government. As Interfax learned in the government, this resolution is likely to be signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

At the same time the former government newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, which declared independence in early January, will be "made free" without any state subsidies. However, in expert opinion, this decision may cause a conflict between the government and the State Duma, which will most demand the return of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA.

In early October last year the former newspaper of the Russian Supreme Soviet was reorganized by its then general director Pavel Gurin, former press-secretary of Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA problem will be probably discussed at a meeting between Chernomyrdin and Speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin, which is expected to take place this week. If they reach a compromise another solution is possible, whereas ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA will return to the parliament and ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI to the government of the Russian Federation in a reorganized form and under the title DERZHAVA.

Otherwise the Duma will have to create a new newspaper of its own which would require additional multi-million expenses, which is is unlikely in the present economic situation.

Letter Calls For Zhirinovskiy's Prosecution

PM2101160194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Appeal from Kronid Lyubarskiy, first deputy chief editor of NOVOYE VREMYA, to Russian General Prosecutor Aleksey Kazannik: "General Prosecutor's Office Is Studying the Possibility of Criminal Proceedings Against Zhirinovskiy"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office Administration for Oversight of Compliance With Laws on Federal Security and National Relations is completing the study of appeals from citizens and public organizations demanding that criminal proceedings be instituted against Vladimir Zhirinovskiy for propaganda

of war in his book "The Last Dash to the South" and in interviews and television appearances.

These documents include an appeal from Kronid Lyubarskiy, the well known defender of human rights and first deputy chief editor of NOVOYE VREMYA, to General Prosecutor Aleksey Kazannik, which we publish today.

I notify you that citizen Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy, born 1946, has committed a crime under Article 71 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code: "Propaganda of War." As is well known, the text of the article states: "Propaganda of war, in whatever form it may be conducted, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of between three and eight years."

The circumstances of the case are as follows. The "Pisatel" limited-liability company and the "Bukvitsa" publishing cooperative produced a book by citizen V.V. Zhirinovskiy entitled "The Last Dash to the South" in a print run of 75,000 copies. The book was signed to press 28 September 1993 and printed at Moscow Printing Plant No 13 (30 Denisovskiy Street, 107005 Moscow) as order No 456.

In the book the author propagandizes the unleashing of aggressive war against Russia's neighbors Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. It is this, it transpires from the text, that is reflected in the very title of the book.

In particular, the book says:

"I have already begun to develop my own geopolitical concept. I don't want to give it my name, the Zhirinovskiy formula, say, but the last 'dash' to the south and an outlet for Russia to the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea are really the task of saving the Russian nation" (page 63).

"The idea emerged of the last 'dash'—last because it will probably be the last repartition of the world and it must be carried out in a state of shock therapy, suddenly, swiftly, and effectively" (page 64).

"The last 'dash' to the south. I dream of Russian soldiers washing their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and switching to summer uniform forever. Lightweight boots, lightweight trousers, short-sleeved open-necked shirts with no tie, lightweight caps. And a small modern Russian assault rifle produced by the Izhevsk plant. These assault rifles are much better than UZI's. So any platoon of Russian soldiers can impose order anywhere" (page 66).

"...we will make this last 'dash' to the south. We badly need it, it is medicine that we must take. Medicine is not always sweet. Some people in Kabul, Tehran, and Ankara may not like this. But millions of people will feel better as a result" (page 67).

"Our Army will perform this task. This will be a method of ensuring the survival of the nation as a whole, it will be the basis for the renaissance of the Russian Army. New armed forces can be reborn only as a result of a combat operation. The Army cannot grow stronger in military commissariats and barracks. It needs a goal, a task" (page 70).

"The pros of carrying out this operation considerably outweigh the cons which may naturally be perceived. And the Russian Army also needs this so that our guys can flex their muscle, tired as they are of 'hazing,' instead of sitting around in barracks, in the depths of Russia, waiting for the end of their term of service, not knowing where the enemy is, who the adversary is, or what they need to prepare themselves morally and physically for. This would be a cleansing for us all" (page 75).

"May Russia successfully accomplish its last 'dash' to the south. I see Russian soldiers preparing for this last southern campaign. I see Russian commanders at the headquarters of Russian divisions and armies tracing the itineraries for the movement of troop formations and the destinations of the itineraries. I see aircraft at airbases in southern districts of Russia. I see submarines surfacing off the shores of the Indian Ocean and landing ships approaching shores along which Russian Army soldiers are already marching, infantry fighting vehicles are driving, and huge masses of tanks are moving. (The italics are V. Zhirinovskiy's.) At long last Russia completes its last military campaign" (pages 142-143).

It is perfectly obvious that the above remarks constitute every indication of a full-blown crime under Article 71 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code.

There are grounds for believing that this is not the only criminal episode on the part of V. Zhirinovskiy. Practically all the mass media reported V. Zhirinovskiy's statements regarding the possibility of delivering nuclear strikes against Japan and Germany and his threats to "give them a new Hiroshima" and a "new Chernobyl." V. Zhirinovskiy made these statements orally, so they are not documented. However, it should not be difficult to find journalists who witnessed these episodes and to check whether these criminal episodes did indeed take place and, if so, in what circumstances.

On the basis of the above I ask you to open a criminal case against citizen Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy under Article 71 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. The crime envisaged by this article ranks among particularly dangerous state crimes. Consequently V. Zhirinovskiy's actions affect the vital interests of all citizens, myself included, since they jeopardize everyone's personal safety.

The election of V. Zhirinovskiy as a State Duma deputy, which, incidentally, took place after he committed the crime, cannot serve as grounds for refusing to open a criminal case. As is well known, this question has already been the subject of judicial consideration at the trial on the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case in relation to defendants A.I. Lukyanov and V.A. Starodubtsev.

At the court sitting 5 January 1994 the presiding judge, A.T. Ukolov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Collegium, explaining his refusal to terminate the criminal case regarding Lukyanov, cited Article 98 of the Russian Federation Constitution. According to this article, the immunity of Federal Assembly deputies is not universal but limited and consists merely in the fact that deputies "cannot be detained, arrested, or searched unless detained at the scene of a crime, nor can they be subjected to a body search except as provided by federal law in order to guarantee other people's safety." The fact that deputies enjoy immunity does not preclude the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of preliminary and judicial investigations regarding a deputy.

The General Prosecutor's Office did not protest this decision by the Russian Federation Supreme Court Military Collegium and therefore showed solidarity with it. Since the criminal prosecution of State Duma Deputy A.I. Lukyanov and Federation Council Member V.A. Starodubtsev has not been stopped, then, in accordance with the principle of citizens' equality before the law (Article 19 of the Russian Federation Constitution), nothing can be a barrier to the criminal prosecution of State Duma Deputy V. Zhirinovskiy.

If the question of arresting V. Zhirinovskiy arises in the future, the Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office can ask the State Duma to strip Deputy V. Zhirinovskiy of his immunity under Article 98 of the Russian Federation Constitution.

I do not know V.V. Zhirinovskiy's place of residence, but it can easily be established via the staff of the Russian Federation State Duma.

I await your reply within the legally prescribed deadline.

Respectfully

[Signed] K. Lyubarskiy

Zhirinovskiy Dreams of 'New Axis'

PM2401123194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 2

[Ravil Zaripov "Reportage from LDPR Headquarters": "'We Are Like the CPSU Central Committee Buro!'"]

[Text] Sretenka Street, old Moscow. This place has now become a magnet for journalists. The reason for this is not the smooth, romantic curve of the ancient boulevard covered with a Christmassy carpet, nor the monument to Nadezhda Krupskaya in a white cap pulled down over her eyes. The reason is an old building giving onto Sretenka or, rather, its inhabitants. The top two floors of the four-story building house the headquarters of LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, whom some people call a buffoon, others the new "fuehrer," and yet others the savior of Russia's national idea.

...I encountered the first cordon in the vestibule, right after the entrance doorway covered in posters bearing the leader's portrait. Two dashing guys dressed in army peacoats carefully examined my journalist's ID card. "Fourth floor. Do you have an appointment?"

A broad marble staircase with broken edges to the steps and a gaping empty shaft in the middle (all that is left of the elevator). A guard outside the door. Through it I could see another checkpoint: a table, a chair, and a man approximately 50 years old. A not very affable welcome. "About 40 of you guys have already arrived. Go to the organization department." The department was in a muddle. "Have you spoken with Viktor Vasilyevich Kobelev?" "Yes." "Then go to him," a blond woman waved me away. The senior checkpoint man raised the "barrier," but, just in case, he gave me an escort.

For your information. The Sretenka building has been leased by the LDPR for approximately two years. It mainly houses the party's apparatus, broken down into departments: organization, transport and economic, agitation and propaganda, youth, and others. In all, there are approximately 25-30 people on the staff. Here, too, are Zhirinovskiy's waiting room and office and the premises of the Moscow organization's leaders. Work with regional organizations is conducted from here.

The higher council meets regularly—once every two weeks—in the Sretenka building. It is the team which decides political directions and the strategy and tactics of the struggle. "We are like the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," LDPR First Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Vengerovskiy explained to a journalist. The "LDPR Politburo" was reelected a year ago. To all appearances, the work of the special services is one of its chief spheres of interest. Thus, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy is in charge of the party's secret service and is drawing up a project for a "Russian Intelligence Service." Deputy director of a Moscow scientific research institute (and a graduate of Moscow Aviation Institute and the Foreign Trade Academy), he has made a careful study of the history of the MOSSAD—Israeli intelligence. Sergey Abeltsev, another council member, is responsible for counterintelligence issues and the creation of defense structures. He is currently working as deputy chairman of a joint-stock company based on one of the largest collective farms in Moscow Oblast. He has had a military education.

Despite the higher council members' fine-sounding titles and the garish publicity surrounding their spheres of activity, Zhirinovskiy's real right-hand man has the modest post of deputy chairman of the LDPR. Although also a member of the "Politburo," Viktor Kobelev keeps in the shadows. But he is the man who is "boss" of the headquarters, in charge of all its activity. It is Viktor Kobelev who tightly coordinates the activities of the party (approximately 120,000 members), as was clearly manifested during the election campaign.

The original LDPR candidates' list contained 160 names, which were reduced to 147. The candidates'

average age is 46. The list contains just nine women (the first of them occupies only the 32d position on the list). In terms of profession half of the first 60 names (the actual number of deputies' seats) are economists, jurists, entrepreneurs, or journalists. Persons engaged in physical labor make up no more than 10 percent.

The LDPR's federal list includes representatives of half of the regions of Russia, although the regions' representation is patchy. Muscovites make up half the list (80 percent of the first 60 names). The following are represented by several candidates (in decreasing order): Vologda, St. Petersburg, Pskov, Nizhniy Novgorod, Voronezh, Krasnoyarsk, Komi, and Udmurtia. The LDPR has its strongest positions in northwest Russia, the Volga region, and central Russia. It is weak in the south, in the Urals, and beyond the Urals.

A brief conversation with the building's "boss" proved profitable. He agreed to the idea of a reportage. Could I see Zhirinovskiy? He was leaving for the airport in an hour, and there were lots of journalists wishing to see him. Maybe I could go in for a few minutes with those who had been standing in line.

"Viktor Vasilyevich, the boys and I have gotten hold of 30 tonnes of gasoline. You have to give a woman a little gift." "OK, go on. Then you go!"

The presence of a journalist plainly did not fit in with the "nerve center's" operation. I was given to understand that it would be more convenient if I waited in the waiting room.

Initially the youth policy department somehow won people over. Particularly as the "Zhirinovskiy Rock Store" was located behind the stairs between the building's first and second floors. The range included black "metal" jackets, T-shirts, posters of hard rock stars, LDPR symbols, and...a constant din from loudspeakers. But here, behind the office door, it is all quiet. The young men in the department obviously do not get their clothes from the "rock store"—their clothes and their hairdos are neat and tidy. From their conversation: "I am working in the security service now. Here is my valid ID card." "That's OK, that's good. We will register you, and then we will be in touch." Obviously, people were not being received into the Young Pioneers or the Boy Scouts. A young man evidently wanted to join "Zhirinovskiy's falcons" and was demonstrating his professional suitability.

From closed sources. For official use. The election results in the closed precincts of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Security showed that, on the whole, the mood of the power ministries' personnel is no different from the sympathies of the majority of Russia's population. Moreover, the overall voting results in the closed precincts are still more depressing for "Russia's Choice" than in the country as a whole. On average, in closed precincts in Defense Ministry subdivisions the LDPR got 34 percent of the votes, the Communists 9 percent, and "Russia's Choice" 11 percent respectively. It is characteristic that the opposition got the largest number of votes among servicemen serving in "hot spots" (the Dniester region, Tajikistan). The LDPR got the smallest number of votes (19 percent) among Black Sea Fleet personnel, and the largest number (49 percent) among personnel of the Northwest Group of Forces. At the same time the LDPR garnered 31 percent of the votes among Military Space Forces personnel and 32 percent among servicemen in Strategic Missile Forces units.

"...Have you read my book 'Push to the East'? Read it."

Zhirinovskiy's office is very different from the other rooms. Here you will not see ill-assorted furniture or the worn oriental carpets laid in the waiting room. A plush sofa and chairs are ranged along the wall. Above them hang reproduction portraits of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Nakhimov, and Ushakov. An icon in the corner. Behind the chairman's chair is a picture depicting the outline of Russia with Alaska adjacent to it. Over all this hovers a falcon with a fluttering ribbon banner: "Freedom, LDPR, Law."

The office's chief feature is an old-style T-shaped oak table in the middle of the room. It is surrounded by carved chairs covered in dark velvet with raised roses on it. The unusually tall and pompous chair backs are surmounted by heraldic triangular shields with a watchtower carved in the center. An oak bookcase is in the same style—a stand with carved doors. (According to the bosses, all this was made by a party member, a master cabinet maker). The book "Through the Cordilleras" lies on the case. The overall picture is completed by a political map of the world.

The LDPR leader is in his element.

"We are against preserving the CIS, just as we are against recreating the USSR. If anybody wants to join Russia, they are welcome, only with the rights of a territorial unit: a province or oblast. No national-state formations.

"In Europe we have an alliance with Germany, because it is a major country. But Poland lies between us, and there are problems there. I know the mood in Germany—to get back eastern Prussia, but that is part of Poland.... These, however, are Polish-German problems.

"We are pro-Europe. As regards India, for example, it is our strategic ally in the East. We must set up a new axis: Germany-Russia-India. We will resolve the question of the Kuril Islands jointly with the Japanese...."

The conversation took place under specific conditions. Floodlights were suspended from above, behind the LDPR chairman's chair—two on each side, directed at the visitor. The strong, concentrated light created the illusion of being either on the stage or in the office of a Lubyanka investigator in the thirties.

[Zaripov] Are you worried about the problem of Zhirinovskiy's physical removal?

[Zhirinovskiy] No, because there is no getting away from fate. Lincoln had to be killed, so they killed him. Kennedy—they killed him. Palme—they killed him....

[Zaripov] But you have guards.

[Zhirinovskiy] O-o-oh! Twenty counterintelligence officers who have been through Afghanistan, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region. Excellent guys; they handle all types of weapons. (According to Vengerovskiy, men who once guarded Brezhnev are Zhirinovskiy's personal bodyguards—R.Z.). Half the people in my office are guards. Even at night I have a guard by me. If necessary, they will blow up this entire building. [Zhirinovskiy ends]

The conversation ended on this optimistic note. Zhirinovskiy broke off his "stream of consciousness," which is almost impossible to do from the outside. The silence which was on the point of ensuing was broken by the voice of his secretary, coming through the half-open office door: "Mind, you have to pay to speak with Vladimir Volfovich. Three minutes cost $100." A mental calculation left me in no doubt: The possible cost would easily pay for a ticket to, let us say, the Cape Verde Islands. It was high time to retire home, to the motherland.

'Fatherland' Bloc Holds Founding Conference

LD2301151794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1311 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] The political bloc Fatherland held its founding conference in Novosibirsk on Sunday [23 January] and proclaimed its election program: to protect the political and economic interests of ethnic Russians. The elections to local government bodies are scheduled for March 27th.

The bloc includes the Novosibirsk branches of Constitutional Democrats, of the Liberal Democratic Party, and of the National Salvation Front, as well as representatives of the local Cossack community.

A leading member of the bloc, Aleksandr Lyulko of the Cossack community, told Interfax that Fatherland gathered all parties and movements from Novosibirsk Region opposed to the present government and president.

According to Lyulko, the bloc hopes to win the upcoming elections to local government bodies. "The victory won at December's elections by the Liberal Democratic Party shows that the Russian people, particularly those who live in Novosibirsk Region, are attracted by national-patriotic, not democratic, ideals," he said.

Pro-Democracy Groups Form New Civic Movement

LD2401120594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1052 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Pro-democracy groups meeting in Moscow on Saturday announced creation of a new Civic Movement.

They issued a manifesto saying the democrats sustained a crushing defeat in last month's general elections.

For the past two years, it says, pro-democracy groups have supported the new establishment and the president though being aware of their weakness and mistakes. "But we were also aware of something even worse than that—the establishment's growing indifference to the electorate," says the manifesto.

The authors of the manifesto speak of a dramatic change with "alienation between the government and the people reaching any acceptable limits."

"Amid continuing hardships caused by economic crisis, this is fraught with social upheavals," it says.

The authors called for an alternative policy of reforms to the benefit of the people.

The manifesto says the country still has a chance to build a civilian society peacefully, create a robust middle class, redress the plight of hired workers, and give each honest man an opportunity to ensure a decent standard of living for himself and his family.

Economic Issues

Yeltsin Advisers Resign Over Policy Disagreement

LD2101204494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Economic advisers to the Russian government Anders Oslund of the Stockholm School of Economics and Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University have sent a letter to President Yeltsin saying they refuse further work.

The two experts spoke of not wanting to help the Russian government further because "the Prime Minister-declared aims are entirely out of line with our personal views." They fear that with the arrival of the new Russian government, the situation will exacerbate following further inflation, already among the world's highest.

Pointing to austerity measures carried out by Estonia, Latvia and Poland, which succeeded in curbing inflation, Oslund and Sachs expressed the hope for a successful reform in Russia. They also spoke of wanting to work on a personal basis with reform supporters and a new generation of Russian pro-market economists.

To avoid a diversion from the course of reforms, the new government ought to include competent people not

lobbyists such as Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, Oslund told Interfax. Oslund and Sachs have worked for the Russian government since 1991.

Chernomyrdin Says Tough Financial Policy To Continue

LD2401142094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1405 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin tried to dispel predictions that the economic policy of the new government may result in hyperinflation and said that the tough financial policy will continue. He also hinted that the government may agree with producers and trade unions on a temporary price and wage freeze.

"The tough financial policy will not be eased to any degree. Let nobody count on that", Chernomyrdin told reporters before leaving for Omsk on Monday.

"No radical turns are planned" in the course of reforms, the prime minister said and added that the government would adhere to the programme of transformations which was adopted last August and approved by the president.

"Nobody has changed the programme of reforms which was adopted last August 6 and approved by the president. No changes were introduced to it when (Yegor) Gaydar came to the government in September 1993. He accepted it and agreed with it", Chernomyrdin said.

He also said that he does not plan to fully abandon monetarist approaches to reforms. "But time has come to use also non-monetarist methods in solving our economic problems", according to the prime minister.

The latter include, in particular, agreements between the government, trade unions and producers on fixing prices and on "establishing for a certain period of fixed wages", according to the prime minister.

"There are many other ways capable of improving the situation", he added, but did not elaborate.

The prime minister denied press reports about his contradictions with the president and said he had no disagreements with Boris Yeltsin either on the course of reforms or on the personnel policy in the government.

"I always agree the main, basic directions of the work of the government with the president. He has to know them and will know them", Chernomyrdin said.

He objected to attempts to discredit the new Russian Government even before it began to work and added that the main part of the government had been preserved.

He also denied allegations that he faced opposition in the government during 1993. "I am not a schoolboy. I would not tolerate it. If they mean Gaydar and Fedorov, I believe they had no problems working with Chernomyrdin", the prime minister said.

New Cabinet Heralds End to Stabilization

PM2101180594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Article by Mikhail Berger: "In Memory of the Policy of Financial Stabilization"]

[Text] Three hours after the premier's news conference on the new government Finance Minister Boris Fedorov announced that he did not think he could remain in the cabinet.

So the policy of financial stabilization is now absolutely officially dead. Prematurely, without having achieved much of what could and should have been achieved. The deceased had been weak, of course, and was a lot of trouble for people, but some future hopes were pinned on it.

"Granny," Korney Chukovskiy's young heroine asked, "when you die will they bury you in the ground?" "Yes," granny replied. "Deep?" "Deep." "Good, so I will be able to play with your sewing machine as much as I like."

No doubt the "sewing machines" of the Main Administration for the Production of State Bank Notes, Coins, and Medals will be chattering away for all they are worth very soon. The Central Bank has already placed an order for the first quarter—the volume of money to be printed exceeds the entire amount of cash available last year. We also know that 100,000-rouble [R] bills have been printed and the likelihood is that we will soon have them in our hands. It is perfectly clear that the printed bank notes will not be languishing in bank storerooms. Viktor Chernomyrdin, as head of the new-look cabinet, promised first to pay any money owing to farmers, the military-industrial complex, and budget-funded sectors. According to the most modest estimates, that is R10 trillion, not counting the R10 trillion the government was already intending to spend in the first quarter.

Debts have to be paid, of course, but who, aside from the agrarian lobby, forced us to be beholden to the farmers at utterly absurd prices? Who is forcing military expenditure to remain at a level that is only appropriate for a country at war? It is clear that the claims by Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, who has already prepared a decree on agriculture worth R26 trillion, are incompatible even with the moderate financial policy the now former finance minister had agreed to.

If the finance minister says he cannot cooperate with the head of the Central Bank, while the premier does not see any reason why Gerashchenko should go, it is easy to guess who will remain in the boat. It should be remembered that there remains yet another principled opponent of Gerashchenko in the government—Anatoliy Chubays, the last Gaydarite. He was one of the most

vigorous critics of the Central Bank chief by virtue of the latter's operating a system of the reciprocal offsetting of state enterprises' debts, while Gerashchenko responded by saying that the "little Chubayses" were hindering normal operations. If the problem of which of them remains and which of them goes recurs in the future, it is easy to predict who will be favored.

So, having left the cabinet practically bereft of those who designed and executed the former policy, Chernomyrdin announces that the course of reforms is unchanged. If the unchanged course consists in a switch from monetarist to nonmonetarist methods of combating inflation, as the premier promised, then there will certainly have to be different people in the government to continue it in that way. Although, it is rather difficult to imagine what the premier's new principles for combating inflation will be like in practice. Price freeze? Stronger state levers to influence economic activity? All this is very much akin to free medicines, concerning which it is said that free treatment means no treatment.

Gaydar's former colleague, former Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray, who went to Chernomyrdin last May to try to persuade him to bring Russia's [former FRG Economics Minister] Erhard back into the government, now says that his vice premier colleagues are leaving the government to avoid being held responsible. Shakhray himself remains—presumably because he is not afraid of his responsibility for interethnic conflicts?

As for responsibility, why, one wonders, is it only the premier's deputies that are being blamed for all the policy failures? What about the premier himself, who has led the government for 13 months now—has he nothing to do with it, and don't the results of the elections, which provided the political grounds for the reshuffle, affect him at all? Why not? Was he obediently carrying out Gaydar's will even during the period when he was absent and therefore is not responsible for the result? But if he was an independent leader, why does he not share the responsibility?

It appears that our economy is on the brink of major changes, back to the old days. Fedorov has aligned himself with Gaydar, who a week before had said that he found it impossible to be a party to such changes. Maybe Fedorov will be one of the leaders of Irina Khakamada's new "Union of 12 December" Duma faction. Maybe he will head the banking subcommittee and hound Geraschenko from there. But the move by the reformist wing from government to parliament is unlikely to have a major effect on the body's work. Although one can hope that the liberal-agrarian-communist majority in parliament will have few quarrels with the present government and the long-awaited peace will be established between the two hostile branches of authority. But what will become of the economy?

Shokhin Urges Economics Ministry Role in Reforms

LD2101182494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1703 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] In an exclusive interview with INTERFAX today, Russian Economics Minister Aleksandr Shokhin said that the Economics Ministry he heads should play the key part in shaping up the strategy of reforms.

Shokhin believes that the Economics Ministry should not only calculate the effects of economic decisions, but also "thrust quite explicit variants of economic policy on the government."

Following the changes in the government's structure and personal composition, the ministry should take up coordinating the policies towards both domestic and foreign investments, Shokhin said. Therefore, the functions of the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development which earlier attracted foreign investments must be transferred to the Economics Ministry.

In addition, the ministry will focus on the maintenance of financial proportions in the economy and access to the world market, according to Shokhin.

Commenting on Boris Fedorov's resignation, Shokhin noted: "Boris Grigoryevich put himself in quite an uncomfortable position by making a number of wittingly uncompromising demands formulated in quite an indelicate manner."

Fedorov made the resignation of Vice Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha and Central Bank Chairman Viktor Geraschenko a condition to his work in the reorganized government.

"It seems to me that the main thing Boris Fedorov could demand from the president and the prime minister was pursuing a certain course of financial policy and make this a condition to his stay in the government only," the minister said.

"If Boris Fedorov sincerely believed that Geraschenko and Zaveryukha hampered the reforms, the need for Fedorov's presence in the government as a counterbalance to these people must be even stronger," Shokhin is convinced.

"I do not think that the life of the present government may shorten due to the absence of Gaydar and Fedorov," Shokhin pointed out adding that "everything will depend on the line the cabinet will be pursuing."

Gaydar Hopes Economic Achievements Will Not Be Lost

LD2301171394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Choice faction in the State Duma, has expressed hope that the

new Cabinet of Ministers will not do things that will quickly wreck the economy.

Speaking at a democratic meeting in Moscow, Yegor Gaydar said that reformers in the government had seen Russia as a state that could serve society. In his words, this approach envisaged cutting down the state apparatus and minimizing officials' right to divide and distribute; and reformers did achieve some degree of success.

Yegor Gaydar noted that by the time he left the government, the average salary in Russia had reached $100 a month, a large trade surplus had been achieved, and large stocks of grain to last until the next harvest had been amassed. Hence, dependence on grain imports has decreased sharply, the free market is beginning to work, and shortages have been fended off.

Yegor Gaydar said that if the situation becomes critical, members of the present government might try to lay the blame for it on the reformers.

He declined to comment on reports that Mikhail Gorbachev's former consultants, Leonid Abalkin and Nikolay Petrakov, have been drafted in to adjust the economic reform.

Gaydar Discusses Ruble-Dollar Exchange Rate

LD2401102694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0956 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Robert Serebrennikov]

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—"Abrupt jumps of the dollar exchange rate against the ruble on the Russian currency market last week were due to the uncertainty about the government's policy," Russia's Choice leader Yegor Gaydar said in an exclusive interview today.

Gaydar said the present exchange rate is being artificially maintained in the country.

"In December the Central Bank of Russia intervened with its own currency resources to prevent the ruble from plummeting," Gaydar said. "The main factor which determined the favourable dynamics of the ruble exchange rate consisted in a combination of high interest rates against the low pace of the money mass growth and relatively low inflationary anticipation," he said.

One component of this situation is no longer there since the inflation anticipation has skyrocketed. "If the second component—the low pace of the money mass growth—collapses, the dollar exchange rate will keep jumping from time to time," Gaydar said. But if the government departs from a tough credit and monetary policy, the drop in the ruble exchange rate can become a dramatic long-term factor of the Russian economy, he said.

"I think one should be very prudent about attempts at maintaining the ruble exchange rate by copious currency interventions," Gaydar said. "It was very hard for us accumulate official state reserves starting from scratch in 1992 to 4.5 billion dollars. It would be too dangerous and irresponsible to squander them within a few days," Gaydar warned.

Military Issues

Ailing Grachev May Be Replaced by Kokoshin

MK2201142094 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 1

[Igor Lenskiy report: "The Last Parade Is Beginning?"]

[Text] According to reports received by your PRAVDA correspondent from a high-ranking officer at the CIS military staff, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is expected to be removed from office in the current government reshuffle. At first sight, this move appears unlikely given Boris Yeltsin's particularly confidential relationship with Pavel Grachev, whose 45th birthday the president celebrated with him in person. According to the source, however, the main reason for the expected ouster is the need, which has become overdue, to get rid of a person responsible in large measure for the 4 October bloodbath. In particular, the top brass has long been demanding that from the president. It should be added that yesterday Pavel Grachev was released from a hospital where he was treated for the exacerbation of heart disease. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry's press service, where we turned to for explanation, was concerned by Viktor Chernomyrdin's not mentioning the Defense Ministry chief in his news conference.

According to information from our confidential source, the Defense Ministry may for the first time be headed by a civilian, current Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, doctor of sciences, responsible for matters related to state-of-the-art military hardware and weaponry.

Grachev To Reorganize Defense Ministry

LD2101205494 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 21 Jan 94

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, has made the decision to reorganize certain structures in the Defense Ministry. The main directorate for work with personnel has been reorganized into the directorate for indoctrination and the main directorate for training and placement of cadres is to become the main directorate for personnel. The reorganization of these bodies is being undertaken to improve indoctrination, combat, and moral-psychological training and military education in the Russian Armed Forces.

Defense Ministry Debates Military Reform

LD2201031694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0200 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] The Russian Defense Ministry has held an expanded interdepartmental conference to discuss a concept of military-legal reform for the Russian Armed Forces.

It was noted during the conference that the purposes, goals, and stages of a military-legal reform should fit the concept for the structure of the country's armed forces and the principles of a democratic, law-based state. Therefore, they will be drawn up in accordance with the Constitution and the Russian military doctrine. It is planned to complete the drafting of a concept for military-legal reform in June 1994.

Defense Ministry Notes 'Difficulty' With Call-Up

LD2201114994 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0300 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Our correspondent Marina Chernukha attended a news conference at the Defense Ministry, which was devoted to the call-up into the ranks of Russia's armed forces.

[Chernukha] Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, admitted quite frankly that the call-up into the army is proceeding with great difficulty. Our main task is to maintain the minimum permissible level of service manning, he said. According to him the army at present is manned with only 54 percent of the privates and sergeants it needs. Meanwhile he still has hopes of raising this level by fall 1994 to 95 percent.

Kolesnikov considers that the Law on Military Service is to all intents and purposes not operating. This is shown in particular by the fact that last year about 20,000 young men were able to avoid their service for no good reason. A further 25 percent of the total number of potential conscripts are unable to serve for health reasons. The situation is to a great extent being rectified by the so-called contract men. At present there are about 120,000 contract servicemen in the army, and next year their numbers will increase by a further 150,000.

In conclusion, Mikhail Kolesnikov stated that by the end of 1994 the army will have been reduced to 2,000,000 servicemen, which is 100,000 fewer than the figure planned in the recent past. [passage omitted]

Conference on Defense Industry Conversion Begins

LD2401100594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0830 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—The Russian Government Academy is holding an international conference to discuss the defence industry's conversion to civilian production in the Russian Federation and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The conference was convened on the initiative of the non- governmental foundation "International Humanitarian Dimension", the Russian Government Academy, the conversion fund attached to the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences and some research and producing associations of the Russian Federation.

Representatives of the Federal Defence Ministry, scientists, researchers and Russian and foreign business people are taking part in the plenary session of the conference.

Its main aim is to establish horizontal links between investors and manufacturers of new products, as well as the centres for the creation of new jobs for former servicemen and their families.

The three-day conference will also discuss political aspects of conversion, the role of information in the development of businesses in Russia and other CIS countries.

Defense Industry Registers Drop in 1993 Output

LD2201105294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1816 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By BUSINESS-TASS]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—The output of Russian defence plants dropped by 19.6 per cent in 1993 as compared to 1992, including the production of civil goods by 14.1 per cent.

The production of consumer goods by enterprises of the State Committee for Defence Industries was cut by almost five times, sources at the committee told BUSINESS-TASS here today.

The rates of production recession gradually increased from September 1993; the December drop amounted to 28.2 per cent as against the annual drop of 19.6 per cent.

According to committee specialists, the overall defence production recession amounted to 42.3 per cent from December 1991 through December 1993 (a period of reforms), which may result in the soonest halt of some branches.

Official Denies Theft of Weapons-Grade Plutonium

LD2401104094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1024 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov sent a letter to Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, requesting to take adequate measures to prevent Interior Ministry staff members from making reports on the situation at the Atomic Energy Ministry, "which are based on fabrications and

fantasies without appropriate scientific examination and documented confirmation".

The letter was prompted by the fact that Interior Ministry officials made statements for some mass media, alleging that thefts of arms uranium, plutonium and even nuclear warheads from facilities of the military-industrial complex and the Atomic Energy ministry have become an ordinary thing.

Mikhaylov claimed that there are no facts corroborating thefts of arms plutonium and nuclear warheads from the ministry's facilities. If the Interior Ministry has such facts, they should be documented.

Federal Assembly

Yakovlev Named Yeltsin's Representative in Parliament

LD2401135294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1328 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 24 ITAR-TASS—Aleksandr Yakovlev from the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as his representative in parliament, the press service of the Russian leader said on Monday.

Yakovlev was born in 1927 and is doctor of law.

Aleksandr Maksimovich Yakovlev is not to be confused with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev who had been appointed by the president as head of the "Ostankino" TV network.

State Duma Discusses Reinstituting TV Program, Media

LD2101205894 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Excerpts] The State Duma has gone into recess until 1 February. Today, a day of work, the deputies finished forming the parliamentary committees. [passage omitted]

They also discussed resuming televising of the Parliamentary Hour program. Mikhail Poltoranin, chairman of the Committee on Information Policy and Communications, stated that the campaign against the State Duma in the mass media is an echo of the war which was waged between the fourth estate and the former Russian Federation parliament. In order to break this tendency, a number of measures must be carried out, the chairman said. In particular, a State Duma press center must be set up through which objective information could be fed to newspapers, radio, and television.

As for the Parliamentary Hour television broadcast, the committee thinks it would be pointless to have this in the form in which it emerged under the former Supreme Soviet. Many deputies disputed this stance, however, and as a result they made no decision on the matter. [passage omitted]

Return To Dedicated Parliamentary TV 'Impossible'

PM2401112794 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 1

[Stas Stremidlovskiy report: "This 'Hour' Will Not Solve Our Problems"]

[Text] It would seem that the "Parliamentary Hour" broadcast had died a sudden death, but... Yesterday morning at the request of Deputy Marychev (from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), the question of resuming the ill-fated "Parliamentary Hour" was included on the agenda. Apart from this, the faction comprising the Communists, Agrarians, Zhirinovskiyites, and "Russian Way" deputies' group and the "Women of Russia" affiliated to it issued a statement which says: "ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA ROSSII should once again become parliamentary publications of the State Duma."

"Trying to revive such a program is not the way to go. It was devised in order to wage the war between the two branches of power more successfully," Mikhail Poltoranin, chairman of the mass media committee, told your KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent.

[Stremidlovskiy] "Mikhail Nikiforovich, if the State Duma does nevertheless adopt a resolution to revive 'Parliamentary Hour,' how will you implement it?"

[Poltoranin] "But it is impossible to implement. 'Parliamentary Hour' cannot return in its previous form."

Mikhail Poltoranin said that his committee was elaborating a draft law on the provision of information on state organs. The basic thesis is that the state organs should collaborate with the mass media on a voluntary basis. It is easier with state television: It will be instructed to allocate some airtime for relaying parliamentary, government, or presidential news.

First Week of Federation Council's Work Summed Up

PM1901100994 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 2

[Lyubov Tsukanova article under the "In Parliament" rubric: "Federation Council: Parkinson's Law in Action"]

[Text] After one week's work, the upper chamber of parliament completed its first session Saturday [15 January]. Having roughly formed committees and appointed several chairmen, the Federation Council members went their separate ways (on foot and by transport) until 31 January. The previous day, Friday,

had been possibly the least quiet day: The list of committees was being approved, in other words our senators were deciding on the range of questions which they intend to tackle. Attempts to reduce the number of committees to a minimum were not crowned with success. Two trends were at odds: Toward reducing the list and, conversely, toward extending it—if not up to the number being proposed in the Duma, then close to it. The arguments of the supporters of the "minimum": The number of internal structures must correspond to the chamber's powers enshrined in the Constitution. They also tried to persuade people to take into account the small size of the corps of deputies of the Federation Council, compared with the Duma. The opponents emphasized the importance of state problems, which cannot be resolved without corresponding structures. The speaker played a considerable role in the outcome of the debate. At first he curbed the senators' appetites, but gradually he not only yielded to pressure from the "extenders" but also used his own levers of influence in order to support them. The levers are well known: A return to decisions not made earlier, repeat votes, "information," and commentaries (incidentally, in violation of the standing orders—for which several deputies reprimanded Vladimir Shumeyko).

As a result, two additional committees were set up: one on science, education, and culture, the other on agrarian policy. The possibility cannot be ruled out that at its next session the chamber will return once again to the "very important" question of a committee "on the norths," and there will certainly be a proposal to set up a committee to combat crime, and so on. It seems that the Federation Council, like any structure, will be inclined, according to Parkinson's law, to expand its functions and to complicate its internal organization.

The chamber will undoubtedly be organized also along political lines. Despite the chairman's firm intention to prevent the Federation Council from splitting into factions, it will hardly be possible to curb political differentiation. The Communists' representation here is strong (although officially 12 people ascribe themselves to the Communist Party), and the national patriotic idea has its adherents. The creation of groups along sectoral and professional lines (directors, farmers, and so on) and the forming of territorial blocs are possible. Understandably, all these deputies' associations, registered or unofficial, are needed to lobby for the real interests of large groups of the population. The point is that national interests should not get lost behind party, professional, and regional interests.

Federation Council Legislation Committee Chief on New Job

PM1901143594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Issa Kostoyev, chairman of the Federation Council Committee for Legislation and Judicial and Legal Reforms, by Yevgeniy Skukin; place and date not given: "Laws Must Operate With Precision"]

[Text] I tracked down Issa Kostoyev, newly elected chairman of the Federation Council Committee for Legislation and Judicial and Legal Reforms, who is chief of the Investigations Department of the General Prosecutor's Office and a state counsellor third class, during a break in proceedings. (For a while last year he was the Russian president's representative in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone.)

[Skukin] Do you intend to return to the Ossetian-Ingush problem—this time in your new capacity?

[Kostoyev] It will be time to extend the president's edict on the state of emergency in the conflict zone in a few days' time, and I, as chairman of the Federation Council Committe for Legislation and Judicial and Legal Reforms, will insist that a group of deputies travel to the trouble spot first.

[Skukin] Issa Magametovich, what matters within your area of competence are truly urgent?

[Kostoyev] It is essential to establish which power structures are to deal with what. The introduction of trial by jury has revealed Russia's all-around lack of preparation for civilized legal proceedings. Our laws are often ill-drafted and contradictory. A huge army of investigators from the former Security Ministry has been jettisoned, but not every lawyer is capable of being an investigator. These people won't be wasted; they are professionals, and they are going into commercial structures. Investigation, however, will suffer: Only 40 percent of crimes are being detected now.

[Skukin] What will you be seeking to achieve when you start your new job?

[Kotsoyev] I will be seeking firmly and persistently to ensure that when we draft Russian laws we include within them a mechanism for their implementation. Laws must operate with clockwork precision.

Rossel Complains of Government Pressure on Parliament

MK2101141594 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Jan 94 p 2

[Irina Vladykina report under the "Regions" rubric: "Eduard Rossel: Federation Council Was Subjected to Pressure. Sverdlovsk Oblast Deputies Want To Set Up 'Urals Group' in Federation Council"]

[Text] Eduard Rossel and Galina Karelova, Federation Council deputies from Sverdlovsk Oblast, spoke to journalists in Yekaterinburg on the results of the first meeting of the Russian parliament's upper chamber.

Eduard Rossel said that he was astonished by the undisguised pressure exerted on the deputies by the "top chiefs." The thing is that on the morning before the vote

58 heads of administration (they were lodged at the President Hotel, not the "Rossiya") were invited to breakfast with Mr. Chernomyrdin, where, to all appearances, they were given a directive to vote for Vladimir Shumeyko. The same went for representatives of the military-industrial sector, the deputy said. Given that 32 deputies from "Siberian Agreement," who had earlier decided to vote for Mr. Romanov, general director of an association from Krasnoyarsk, voted for Shumeyko, as a result the latter won by a margin of eight or nine votes.

Galina Karelova, who was elected chairman of the Russian Federation Council's social policy committee, sees the situation somewhat differently.

"I think there was an element of persuasion," she told the journalists, "but the voting was held by secret ballot, and administration heads are exceptionally independent people who do not seem to me very amenable to pressure from above. In addition, Vladimir Shumeyko managed to impress the deputies: he is very self- disciplined, restrained, and calm. He did not leave an impression of a man lacking firm view or convictions."

Both Eduard Rossel and Galina Karelova spoke out for setting up a deputy group comprising Federation Council members from the Urals. Mr. Rossel plans to create it on the basis of the Economic Cooperation Association of the Urals Region's Oblasts and Republics. Ms. Karelova thinks that this group could operate as a deliberative conference of deputies from the Urals that would help them hold a joint, mutually advantageous stance in parliament.

New Duma Chairman Rybkin Interviewed

PM1801124194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 3

["Exclusive" interview with Ivan Rybkin, newly elected Chairman of the State Duma, by Aleksandr Gamov; place and date not given: "Ivan Rybkin: A Man From Whom a Great Deal Is Expected? The Chairman of the Russian State Duma Believes: 'Black October' Must Not Happen Again. Ivan Petrovich Does Not Intend Quarrelling with Boris Nikolayevich and Hopes for Reciprocity"]

[Text] Ivan Rybkin, the chairman of the Russian State Duma, is inaccessible to the majority of journalists for the simple reason that they are not allowed into the hall of sessions, so it is very fortunate that he is my neighbor—the windows of our buildings face one another. It seemed to me that this was reason enough to meet one evening, have a drink, and have a neighborly chat. Especially since Ivan Petrovich did not object but only asked that we restrict ourselves to tea. Therefore, when I went to visit him at his home I did not take any champagne with me but took instead a jar of cherry jam.

The State Duma speaker met me in the entrance hall and appropriately enough was wearing carpet slippers. When he had brewed some strong, aromatic tea himself (it was late and his domestics were already in bed) and poured some jam into the dishes, I made the somewhat unfortunate gaff of saying rather inopportunely that the last time I had met with a speaker was also at night—in the White House at the end of September. Generally speaking we have not had much luck with speakers....

[Rybkin] Indeed, neither Lukyanov nor Khasbulatov had an enviable fate. But as for my fears about my own future and drawing parallels with my predecessors.... I can say only one thing: In those parts where I was born—the Khoper region—they respect somewhat different qualities in people. Consequently, when sitting in the chair of the leader of the State Duma, I do not feel timid and certainly have no fears for my career.

[Gamov] Ivan Petrovich, is it true that the Duma members intend creating a special deputies' commission to investigate the events of September and October?

[Rybkin] Let us not dodge the issue here—clearly some deputies do have that intention and with good reason. It was Talleyrand who said: "In a revolution no one is innocent. Everyone is guilty!" If it were up to me alone I would grant an amnesty to the participants in the events of August 1991 and September-October 1993. With the exception of those who committed flagrant crimes. That would be a necessary prerequisite for civil peace and accord, things which are very necessary to Russia now.

Society suffered a very serious blow after the October events, and so did parliamentarianism. In these conditions the State Duma and the Federation Council simply must cooperate as closely as possible with both the president and the government. I personally am firmly in favor of that. After all, we were elected not for our own sakes or for some ambitions that we may have but so as to establish stability, calm, and order in the country at last.

[Gamov] But how do you intend forming relations with the upper chamber? People are already describing the State Duma and the Federation Council as polar opposites....

[Rybkin] As of the present moment—Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko and I have already spoken about this—there are no insuperable obstacles between the State Duma and the Federation Council. In both chambers there are people from the same places with similar habits and outlooks. Their views, opinions, and convictions easily coincide with one another and I hope that they will adapt just as easily to the kind of professional draft laws that Russia urgently needs today.

Shumeyko and I also discussed the possibility of close cooperation between deputies from the two chambers on questions affecting the set of draft laws on the economy. Today the legislative base is lagging behind events in the economy. For a very long time we criticized industrialists for the fact that they forgot which words are associated with the noun "industry"—earning a living, perhaps? Now they understand those words—but in what

sense? Billions of dollars are still flowing out of the country. Some people suggest resorting to tough administrative measures to prevent that. But I think that first of all we must give our industrialists an economic incentive to keep their money in Russia so that it can work for the good of the country. Although in those places where there is flagrant theft going it is necessary to use authority, of course.

Generally speaking I support a strong authority in Russia. But in my view that can only be achieved when all the branches of power are working in conditions of mutual support. Even those who consider themselves political opponents cannot live without each other today. The time for a Russian version of the Moncloa pact—the pact which once dragged Spain out of the most dire crisis and transformed it into a prosperous country—passed long ago. In Volgograd we once managed to work out that kind of agreement. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA wrote about that, by the way—that pact of local significance is still operating there today. But it was difficult to do that on a Russia-wide scale—the ability and desire were lacking. But I believe that all is not yet lost.

There is a simple piece of what I would call peasant philosophy which I find encouraging. It runs like this: Where there is harmony there is prosperity, too. I know that the overwhelming majority of members of the State Duma and the Federation Council feel the same way.

[Gamov] Listening to you talk it sounds as though the speaker's chair is the domain not of higher education professors but of peasants from the land....

[Rybkin] It is best to ask Khasbulatov himself why things did not work out for him in parliament. Especially since I do not want to portray myself as a simple peasant. Our present parliamentarians and leaders of the State Duma and Federal Assembly have experienced something which neither the deputies of the former parliament nor its speaker had experience of—I mean "Black October." I believe that it was a painful experience for the president and the government, too. The events which unfolded last fall are a grave warning to us all. If we draw the correct conclusions from all that happened we will of course benefit greatly. We are simply fated to achieve accord!

[Gamov] You know, Ivan Petrovich, that I have attended sessions of the Duma, I compared it with the previous Supreme Soviet and it seemed to me that elements of buffoonery are appearing in the Russian parliamentary system...

[Rybkin] That also worries and alarms me. But in the present situation this is inevitable. Deputies are seeking to make a statement about themselves, they are anxious and that is why there is a somewhat tense atmosphere and a certain eccentricity here.... But do not forget that in the old Supreme Soviet there were 252 people working with 126 people holding sessions in each of the chambers, whereas now there are 450 deputies. By the old standards that is a whole congress! And trying to make this mechanism work efficiently and smoothly from the very outset is very difficult.

Incidentally, I would like to make use of this occasion to tell the representatives of the Russian and foreign mass media not to take offense at us. We are not allowing Duma sessions to be filmed at present and certainly not to be broadcast live because we have the usual routine work to get through, the running-in period, as it were. This is hardly of interest to the outside observer. But I hope that this will not take long. The factions and committees are beginning work....

[Gamov] But what then?

[Rybkin] Our program of legislative activity is very extensive. The Russian President's Legislative Proposals Commission and our deputies' commissions have worked hard to draw it up and many Duma members came to Moscow with a whole set of drafts and proposals. All these things are being processed and considered.

Incidentally, I would like to warn people that it is certainly not the frenzied activity of sessions in the Duma that will decide the fate of draft laws. Factions and committees are the main structural units of lawmaking, this is where we intend to do the main "fine-tuning" work on documents. In this regard our fundamental premise is that the factions express the intentions of certain groups of voters and the ideas of coordinating the interests of all strata of the population will be implemented through them. But the Duma will have to meet in session four to five hours a couple of times a week to adopt the final decisions.

If you look at it closely you will see that we do not have all that much time.

[Gamov] Indeed....

[Rybkin] The first month of our term as deputies is already over, if you discount the three months spent on the new election campaign at the end of the term that leaves us with 12 months. Our task is to make the maximum use of that time so as to highlight those top-quality draft laws which relate first and foremost to the development of the economy. We must restore its manageability as soon as possible and at the very least neutralize the worst consequences of the crisis.

[Gamov] Do you also intend trying to influence the president and the government as the Supreme Soviet tried to do?

[Rybkin] The situation in society is difficult, there is a major social differentiation in progress: People have divided into the very rich and the very poor, one-half of the country's population is below the poverty line and around 10 percent are in desperate conditions.

The president is right when he says that it was dire necessity above all which brought people out into the

streets in the fall. We must remember that. Taking all this into account, of course, we intend to influence the formation of the government, its line of conduct, and the process of implementing the economic program—but within the framework of the Constitution, nowhere else. I believe that far more significant influence can be achieved through mutual understanding. After all, if people insult one another and order each other about there will be no progress.

The most important thing is not to cross the line where opposition turns into enmity and opponents into enemies, when people forget the reason why they began the argument in the first place. That is the most dangerous thing.

Calls For Pardoning Putschists

MK1901115094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Ivan Rybkin Supports the Idea of Amnesty"]

[Text] State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin supports the idea of amnestying the protagonists in the 19-21 August 1991 and September-October 1993 events in Moscow "with the exception of those who have committed an obvious criminal act." Mr. Rybkin is convinced that "this would be a necessary prerequisite for civil peace and accord."

Comments on Meeting With Yeltsin

LD2101181594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1703 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin wishes the State Duma success in its work and assures that he will support it in every possible way, Speaker of the Lower Chamber Ivan Rybkin said. He informed the deputies on Friday [21 January] about his meetings with the president and with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin the day earlier.

Rybkin pointed out the constructive character of his talks with the president. He said Yeltsin expressed readiness for permanent interaction with the State Duma and suggested holding regular meetings with the chamber's speaker at least once a month.

Rybkin said that he had discussed with the president the State Duma's location. The chamber's speaker noted that the State Duma will receive the facilities which formerly belonged to the Supreme Soviet. Rybkin mentioned "a wonderful building which has a total area of not less than that of the current building of the State Duma or of the building of the former Supreme Soviet, and which is much better equipped." However, he refrained from answering a question what this building is, saying only that he would not like to talk about it now and that "there are many choices."

The speaker of the State Duma informed deputies that the president had signed a decree disbanding the earlier formed staff of the Federal Assembly and forming independent staffs of the Council of Federation and the State Duma.

Commenting on the two-hour meeting with Chernomyrdin, Rybkin said that the State Duma would be given the institute of comparative science of law of the former Supreme Soviet. He also said that on Friday the premier planned to hold a conference with participation of all services in Moscow in order to discuss the acceleration of the restoration of the buildings housing the State Duma now. Up to 500 construction workers will be sent there.

Duma Refuses To Discuss Freeing Rutskoy, Khasbulatov

LD1801163694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1411 GMT 18 Jan 94

[by ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—Deputies of the Russian State Duma have refused to discuss the liberation of Aleksandr Rutskoy, Ruslan Khasbulatov and others arrested on charge of involvement in the Moscow October revolt.

The proposal put forward by Deputy Leonid Petrovskiy from the Communist Party faction was supported by 145 parliament members. Petrovskiy claimed their arrest and custody violates Russian legislation.

State Duma Adopts Provision on Committee Activities

LD1801194494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1807 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] On Tuesday [18 January] the State Duma adopted a provision on its temporary regulations regarding activity of its committees and commissions.

According to this document, the State Duma forms its committees "on the basis of proportional representativeness of deputy associations." The State Duma determines the number of each committee, "which should be not less than 12 and not more than 35 deputies."

The provision says that every deputy, except the chairman, his deputies, and leaders of deputy associations and deputy-members of the government, should be in one of the Duma's committees.

A committee's session is considered valid if more than half of the total number of its members are attending the session. Decisions are adopted by simple majority of votes given the number of deputies attending the session.

Duma To Discuss Government Activities Every Friday

LD1901103294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0808 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—The Russian State Duma will devote one hour every Friday to discussing the activities of the gvernment and the Agrarian Party plans to support its leader and Deputy Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha before the new composition of the government is announced.

The Duma decided on Wednesday [19 January] that it will devote the last hour of each Friday to discussing the work of the government which lawmaker Georgiy Zadonskiy said would allow the lower chamber to "quickly react to various decisions of Viktor Chernomyrdin's team".

The lawmakers are also going to discuss on Wednesday a statement of the Agrarian Party on the current situation in agriculture and plan to do that before a scheduled meeting of the president and the prime minister who are to determine the new composition of the government.

The president and the premier stumbled over the candidacy of Finance Minister and Marketeer Boris Fedorov who said he might remain in the government only in case Zaveryukha is dismissed.

Zaveryukha is responsible for agricultural policy in the government.

Duma Members To Discuss Salaries, Privileges

LD1901141494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1221 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] At their session on Wednesday, Duma members intend to discuss a temporary statute on their activity and funds to ensure it.

According to the document, on all matters of their activity legislators must be "received without delay by state and local administration officials and by factory and office managers." They can demand that "any violations of the law, rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens be eliminated, and that the officials to whom a lawmaker's demand is addressed immediately adopt appropriate actions."

A lawmaker's monthly salary will be 90% of what a federal minister is paid. The Speaker receives 40% above his salary for chairmanship, and his deputies, committee chairmen and other senior Duma officials receive 25% on top of their wages. A bonus for "intensive" work done will amount to 50% of a legislator's salary. Veterans are entitled to a 40% increase to their pay.

Cabinet members working in the Duma get nothing for their parliamentary duties.

Legislators are entitled to free travel across Russia by plane, train, car, or ship and on all means of public transportation, except taxis.

A lawmaker should mail letters and telegrams as government reports.

A Duma member without permanent housing in Moscow gets within 3 months an apartment for residence with his family during his time in office. The flat is not subject to privatization.

A parliamentarian receives a diplomatic passport to be valid for his entire term in the Duma.

According to the document, if the Duma is dissolved, its members receive allowances for the period before their powers expire, based on their monthly salaries.

Lawmakers will be allowed to transport property to the place of their permanent residence free (containers of up to 10 tons).

A legislator can have three assistants, one of them to help him in parliament, the others—in his constituency. The assistants have monthly salaries as well.

More on Draft Decree

PM2001124794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Sergey Chugayev report: "Duma Determines Deputies' Pay"]

[Text] The State Duma began its 19 January morning sitting by adopting as a basis the draft decree on ensuring the activity of deputies of the Federal Assembly's lower chamber.

The document indicates, in particular, that Duma deputies must enjoy the right to be immediately received by the leaders of organs of power at all levels and are entitled to demand that they eliminate violations that have been identified, while for their part the leaders of organs of power must eliminate the violations.

A considerable proportion of the draft decree is devoted to questions of material support for legislators. For instance, it is proposed to establish for Duma deputies a monthly salary of 90 percent of a federal minister's salary. That is, around 270,000 rubles at present. However, additional payments will make up for the lag in relation to ministerial pay. All deputies will receive presumably monthly a 50-percent additional payment "in view of the special nature and intensity of work." There will also be additional payments for particular posts. The State Duma chairman gets [an additional payment of] 40 percent of a deputy's salary, and his deputies and the chairmen of Duma committees and subcommittees get 25 percent. There is also provision for long-service payments—40 percent. In addition, all deputies are reimbursed for expenses associated with legislative activity to the tune of 10 minimum salaries.

Duma deputies, like their predecessors, will have free use of all types of transportation apart from taxis and will have the right to get tickets without waiting in line and to wait for the required forms of transportation in the former deputies' rooms.

Diplomatic passports will be issued to State Duma deputies for their entire term of powers.

As for housing, the draft decree envisages allocating legislators from outside the city official housing within three months, but only for the period during which they exercise a deputy's powers and without the right of privatization.

The document also takes into account the possibility of dissolution of the Duma. In this case deputies must be paid a one-shot grant for the entire period remaining until the end of the term for which they were elected. They must also be granted free return to their home and the free shipment of up to 10 tonnes of baggage. Final adoption of the decree is planned for the evening sitting.

The main topic of the first half of this Duma workday was discussion of the draft decree of the Federal Assembly's lower chamber on the plan of legislative work.

Overall this day in the State Duma is again going fairly quietly. Routine work is proceeding. At the same time State Duma security services are tightening security measures since a REUTER correspondent was reportedly detained in possession of a pistol on the balcony of the Duma meeting hall. Apparently it was a gas pistol.

Duma Official Presents Plan for New Legislation

LD1901144594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1252 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—The first stage of the constitutional reform has virtually been completed with the adoption of the new constitution. It is necessary now to adopt federal laws registering the new political reality in Russia, first deputy speaker of the State Duma Mikhail Mityukov said on Wednesday. He presented to deputies of the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly the plan for Duma's legislative work.

Mikhail Mityukov noted the need of consolidating legislatively real parliamentarism that is forming in the country. It is based on clear separation of power and interaction of all branches of power. In this connection it is planned to draw up laws that will create a legal base for the State Duma of the future convocations.

The first deputy speaker of the duma said that the plan includes federal constitutional laws, among them the laws on the referendum, on the government of the Russian Federation, on the judiciary reform in Russia and on the powers, the procedure of forming and the activity of the constitutional court of the Russian Federation.

Mityukov described the present civic code as outdated. He said the part of the civic code containing its general principles has already been drafted and will be submitted to the State Duma.

He said the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly is to adopt new code on taxes, as well as the criminal code, the criminal proceedings code, the labour and land codes, as well as the code on the family and marriage. The Duma is also to adopt laws on political parties and trade unions. A great number of laws related to the economic sphere are also to be adopted, Mityukov said.

Much attention is given to legislative acts whose adoption will make it possible to realise complex problems of federalism in Russia, Mityukov believes.

Mityukov also stressed the need of adopting legislative acts in the area of international politics and foreign economic activity, including the law on international afgreements. The first deputy chairman of the State Duma believes that the plan of legislative work stretched far beyond the term of the present Duma, so it is necessary to adress priorities. Mityukov said the adoption of new laws will promote the policy of reform. In this connection he noted that many draft laws being drawn up by the former Supreme Soviet were obviously populist and therefore inflationary, and that their implementation led to the worsening of the economic situation.

Duma Debates Plan for Legislative Work

LD1901161394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1540 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Attempts of some members of the Russian State Duma to steer the debate on the draft plan for its legislative work into the "political channel" did not meet the support of most chamber members. The discussion proceeded in a businesslike atmosphere.

The deputies, who took the floor during the discussion, arrived at the conclusion that the vast legislative programme, submitted by People's Deputy Mikhail Mityukov, had to be examined in detail and finalised in Duma committees.

This refers primarily to the package of economic legislations. Deputy Sergey Kalashnikov, moved to hear a government report on the concept of the economic reform. He claimed that the economic policy, conducted by the cabinet in recent years, "completely overlooked the human factor". The speaker stressed that "Russia needs workable economic laws that will not merely discharge populist functions". In his opinion, it is necessary, first and foremost, to map out the main directions of the social policy, to elaborate laws on employment and on the minimum consumers budget.

Deputy Sergey Glazyev moved to discuss primarily the presidential decrees submitted to the two chambers of the parliament. He stressed the need for clearly determined priorities in drawing up legislations. This idea was backed by other MPs. Deputy Lyudmila Zavadskaya described as deplorable the lot of women and children in Russia. She stressed that these problems needed legal regulation. Deputy Nikolay Kotov believes that the Duma should adopted first of all laws governing the work of the agro-industrial complex, land relations, and also the taxation police and social insurance.

Deputy Aleksandr Piskunov insisted that questions linked with the military service and participation of Russian troops in peace- keeping actions abroad brooked no delay. Several deputies moved to revise the conversion programme, to bring legislative acts in line with the new Russian constitution. Deputy Viktor Ustinov tabled a motion to elaborate primarily a bill on the restoration of the constitutional court.

Duma Refuses To Support Agrarian Party Attack on Reformers

LD1901141094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1341 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—The Russian State Duma refused on Wednesday [19 January] to discuss the statement of the agrarian party in which it attacked the financial, investment and credit policy of Finance Minister Boris Fedorov and former First Deputy Premier Yegor Gaydar which, it said, triggered collapse of agriculture.

The Duma said the statement contained "arbitrary and subjective assessments of the current situation in agriculture".

By proposing the statement the Agrarian Party, evidently, wanted to support its leader and Deputy Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha before the president and the prime minister agree on the new composition of the government.

The president and the premier stumbled over the candidacy of Fedorov who said he might remain in the government only in case Zaveryukha is dismissed.

Zaveryukha is responsible for agricultural policy in the government and supports the interests of collective and state farms. Fedorov became his arch rival after refusing to provide subsidies to state-run agriculture.

At the same time the Duma adopted a statement which recommended the government to consider in five days the problem of financing agriculture in 1994 in order to increase production and stabilise its development in conditions of a market economy.

State Duma Calls for Agro-Industrial Program in 5 Days

LD1901184294 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] At the initiative of the group of Agrarian Party deputies, the State Duma has advised the government to adopt a decision within the next five days on the functioning of the agro-industrial sector during the current year. The resolution was adopted by the State Duma after a second vote on this issue, taken after Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Choice group, called on his colleagues to approve the document, INTERFAX reports.

The agrarian group circulated a statement on the state of affairs in the agro-industrial sector. This says that the state still owes farmers over 1 trillion rubles for produce purchased from them, including over 600 billion rubles for grain.

Adopts Decree on Agro-Industrial Complex

PM2001092594 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Jan 94 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "State Duma Recommends"]

[Text] Yesterday the State Duma adopted a decree recommending that the government examine within five days the question of the conditions for the functioning of the agro-industrial complex in 1994 including the solution of the problem of financing the economy's agrarian sector. These measures should be implemented, the decree stresses, with a view to creating the necessary conditions for building up the production of agricultural raw material and food and ensuring the stabilization and steady development of the agro-industrial complex under market economy conditions.

At the same time the chamber refused even to examine the statement prepared by the agrarian faction containing subjective, arbitrary assessments of the present situation in the agro-industrial complex and claiming that "the state of collapse in agro-industrial production is the result of the government's incorrect policy with regard to the agrarian sector of the economy and the grossest errors and blunders in financial, investment, and credit policy."

Deputies Comment on Opening Work of State Duma

LD2001132594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1301 GMT 20 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The State Duma has made quite a good start. The main problems are ahead. They will arise during the discussion of draft laws. The division of forces in the lower chamber is not yet final.

This is the opinion of deputies of various political orientation in the State Duma, expressed to ITAR-TASS.

"The Duma vacillates between utter uncontrollability and too rigidly controlled decision-making of heads of groups," believes Vasiliy Lipitskiy, head of the People's Party of Free Russia, who was elected from a one-seat constituency and who has not joined any faction in the Duma. He believes new factions may be formed. Many deputies regret that the Duma does not have clearly defined centrist forces "which could balance the struggle which leads to shaky compromises," he said.

Another independent deputy, Irina Hakamada, general secretary of the Party of Economic Freedom, believes that the forming of new groups of deputies is inevitable. The "Union of December 12" being formed by Hakamada and a number of her supporters will soon amass 35 members and will become eligible for registration.

She refuted the supposition that the new group will be a subsidiary of Russia's Choice bloc. "We are closer to market reforms than anybody else, regardless of party affiliations," she said. (It should be noted Gaydar said that his group discussed more than once reinforcing the Union of December 12 with members of Russia's Choice bloc).

Sergey Baburin, elected from a one-seat constituency, said that 17 people so far applied for Russia's Path group that he is forming. The group will exist de facto even while not registered. He said other people with patriotic leanings are in various party factions and in the "New Regional Policy" group. Baburin, the leader of the Russian National Alliance, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that "the patriotic forces relinquished key committees to Russia's Choice bloc and its supporters." Nevertheless he believes there is every chance that the Duma will be effective legislatively if it is effective politically.

"The Duma has shown that it is effective," said Vladimir Isakov, elected on the slate of the Agrarian Party of Russia. Isakov, who was one of the most remarkable representatives of the opposition in the former Supreme Soviet, believes the new parliament has been able to avoid the main pitfall, that of being bogged down in organisational matters for weeks. He said the package vote on the list of deputy speakers and heads of committees was a reasonable compromise that made it possible to avoid wasting weeks on voting on appointments.

Assessing the alignment of forces in the Duma, he said that it is split approximately in half with the left opposition having a slight edge. Neither of the factions, nor any of the sides has a guaranteed majority. So compromises should be sought. Extreme decisions will not be passed.

Isakov said the main danger is that no decisions will be passed on key problems of reform in the lower chamber. "We have not yet tackled these matters," he said.

There are differences among deputies on the draft laws on the economy and the question of the media," said Kirill Ignatiyev, representative of Russia's Choice faction. He believes the structure of the Deputies Corps has already been determined. It has two extremist wing (the right wing—LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and the left wing—communists and agrarians) and the centre which is formed of Russia's Choice and other democratic factions.

He said there is no complete unanimity in the centre. Russia's Choice, the group of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord and the Union of December 12 mainly vote in the same way, while members of Yabloko and the new regional policy group all vote differently.

Speaking highly of professionalism and proper conduct of Speaker of the Duma Ivan Rybkin, Ignatiyev predicted that a political alliance of Viktor Chernomyrdin and Ivan Rybkin will gradually form. The government without reformers will rely on the parliamentary majority which will include the extreme left—communists and agrarians, part of the "New Regional Policy" faction and part of the group of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, he said.

Leader of the Democratic Party of Russia group, Nikolay Travkin, believes the Duma has a high potential in organising itself. He believes this was shown by the fact that it had completed the formation of working bodies on the fourth day of work.

Travkin believes not a single political trend can earn half the number of votes. This has a positive aspect as an irresponsible decision will not be passed by the Duma in a rush.

Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, representative of Yabloko group said the voting on a package in electing the leadership of the lower chamber and heads of committees had been an achievement. Heated debates in the Duma immediately subsided. People realised that there is an opportunity for actual specific work.

Shostakovskiy believes that during an intermission of plenary meetings, when work is conducted in committees, the role of factions will decrease for some time. "Nothing could be worse than continued political clashes and overly politisation. If this were so, it would be an end of Duma, he said. The chief task at present is to draw up a programme of the legislative activity of the Duma and of each of its committees, Shostakovskiy believes.

Duma Panel Will Amend Supreme Soviet Draft Military Bills

PM2001150194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 94 p 1

[Vladimir Yermolin report: "The Defense Committee Will Start Work on Legal Support for Military Doctrine"]

[Text] The Defense Committee will start work on legal support for the military doctrine. That is, the fact is that the package of drafts [narabotki] of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Questions and of other committees which devoted attention to the Army will be set in train. Although corrections are undoubtedly inevitable.

Sergey Yushenkov also voiced the hope of close contact with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense on questions of lawmaking. This is necessitated, in particular, by the recently adopted military doctrine, which is in need of a "legal superstructure."

The Duma members spent Tuesday afternoon clearing up questions of the standing orders. Once again, just as on the previous day, a proposal was made to "set free" Aleksandr Rutskoy and Ruslan Khasbulatov. Precisely 145 deputies came out in favor of including this item on the agenda, with 151 against it. The proposal did not pass. Nor did the next one—to examine the reasons for closing down the well known "600 Second" news program. But the Duma members were unanimous on the proposed construction of a new parliamentary complex costing $500 million—such costly construction is not timely. Yegor Gaydar ("Russia's Choice") and Valentin Kovalev (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) made a corresponding statement in the lobby, thereby setting an example of factional unity "on fundamental issues." It is proposed to resolve the State Duma's housing problem by redistributing the capital's administrative buildings.

In fact, the incident with the parliamentary complex may be regarded as the first challenge to the government, as a test of the strength of the opposition members' coalition.

On Wednesday the Duma members examined and approved the plan of the State Duma's law-drafting work. It was proposed and defended by Mikhail Mityukov, under whose leadership the plan was drawn up in the Legislative Proposals Commission under the Russian president.

Duma Defeats Proposal To Adopt Statement on Government

LD2101091994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0833 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary corespondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—The Russian State Duma turned down on Friday a proposal to adopt an official statement on the new composition of the government, but agreed to discuss the situation in former Yugoslavia and consider the resumption of the "Parliament Hour" tv programme which the former legislature introduced to advocate its anti-presidential views.

The Duma will also consider the composition of the geopolitical committee headed by a representative of the party of nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. It is the only out of 23 committees which the Duma failed to approve on Thursday [20 January].

Duma Extends Agenda, Addresses Yugoslavia

LD2101133394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The State Duma extended today's agenda at its morning session. Lawmakers decided to examine at 14:00 the draft of a statement on the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

As Speaker Ivan Rybkin announced, a report would be made by Sergey Lavrov, a deputy foreign minister since the First Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin had not returned from Yugoslavia yet.

Lawmaker Vyacheslav Marychev (St. Petersburg, the Liberal Democratic Party) requested debates on the resumption of the TV feature entitled "Parliamentary Hour." His request was met.

Marychev criticized media, above all TV, for their coverage of Duma discussions.

At LDP leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's demand, the Duma will return to the issue on the make-up of the parliamentary committee on geo-politics.

It is the only committee whose composition has not been endorsed by the Duma so far. Most legislators are displeased with the fact that of the 13 committee members, 9 are LDP officials.

Lawmakers disapproved a motion to elect a fifth vice-speaker from among the members, elected in one-mandate constituencies.

Regulations on Deputies Living, Working Conditions Approved

LD2101140594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1228 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—The State Duma (lower chamber of the Russian Parliament) adopted the temporary regulations on working and living conditions of legislators at its morning session on Friday [21 January].

According to the regulations, lawmakers enjoy the right to be received immediately by heads of government organisations. The legislator's ID card is a document granting him the right to pass freely to any body of state authority as well as any enterprise, office or organisation.

Parliamentarians have the right to demand that violations of laws, rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens be removed without delay.

The regulations also say that the lawmaker's monthly cash remuneration includes a bonus for special nature and intensity of work, a long-service bonus and other bonuses in compliance with operating legislation. The lawmaker's monthy salary is equal to that of a federal minister.

State Duma members struck out an item from the regulations today, saying deputies who are members of the federal cabinet, may receive their pay envelopes only at the lower chamber.

Legislators are entitled to medical and every-day services enjoyed by cabinet members.

The regulations note that legislators enjoy the right of free travel by air, rail, road and water in Russia as well as by all types of city passenger transport, except taxi. They also have the right of obtaining travel documents without waiting.

Duma members in the city of Moscow and the Moscow region are provided with office cars assigned to them permanently.

Lawmakers with no permanent residence in Moscow are provided with flats for the term of their work at the Duma. However, they cannot be privatised.

Pending the receipt of a service flat, the lawmaker is provided with a separate hotel suite or, at the legislator's wish, cash compensation necesary to conclude a contract for hiring a living premise in the amount equivalent to the cost of living at a two-room suite of a four-star hotel.

The legislator receives a diplomatic passport for the entire term of his duties. The deputy is also granted an annual paid leave of 48 workdays. He receives an allowance for medical treatment amounting to two monthly salaries.

To perform their duties, parliamentarians are provided with offices at the State Duma building as well as at constituencies where they were elected.

The lawmaker may have up to five assistants. He independently defines the number of his assistants and the size of their remuneration within the wage fund for assistants.

The Duma also adopted a decision later in the day under which the Russian Government is instructed to take appropriate measures to implement the regulations which come into force today.

Duma Speaker Conveys Yeltsin Support, Wish To Cooperate

LD2101141694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1339 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin conveyed wishes of successful work to the state Duma (lower chamber of the Russian parliament) at a meeting with him on Thursday, state Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin told lawmakers at the morning session of the lower house on Friday.

Rybkin noted that the president assured legislators that the chief executive will give every kind of support to the Duma.

Describing the talk with the president as detailed, substantive and constructive, Rybkin stressed that Yeltsin expressed readiness for constant cooperation with the state Duma. Meetings between the Duma speaker and the president will be regular, at least once a month.

Rybkin informed deputies that the talk focused on cooperation between the chief executive and the state Duma in law-making activities. The president stressed that the division of powers does not mean their estrangement, Rybkin said.

"We shall be guided by this principle during our work at the state Duma," the speaker stressed.

According to Rybkin, they also discussed material and technical aspects of the state Duma's work as well as working and living conditions of legislators. The speaker noted that the president reaffirmed: Lawmakers will be provided with all necessary things for their work.

Rybkin informed deputies that all buildings and services of the former parliament will be transferred to the Russian parliament fully or for temporary use. The president instructed the business administration to hand over all necessary services to financial and economic administrations of the Duma.

This question was also settled in principle with the Russian Government, Rybkin added. He told parliamentarians about his two-hour talk with Viktor Chernomyrdin, which was held also on Thursday.

The premier said that the Duma will receive back the institute of comparative jurisprudence, one of the most important institutions which will be returned to the lower chamber.

The question was also raised about completing all repairs at the building of the former townhall which is now occupied by the state Duma. The president informed the speaker that he gave appropriate instructions to the government to complete repairs at the earliest.

Rybkin also said that the Duma would receive an appropriate number of other spacious buildings and installations in the capital, although he did not specify which ones. He only noted that buildings are good both in floor space and quality and in no way inferior to the previous ones.

The speaker informed deputies that a working staff of the state Duma would be formed. He told lawmakers

that the president, on his suggestion, signed a decree disbanding the temporary staff of the Russian Parliament and establishing a permanent staff of the state Duma.

State Duma To Break Until 1 Feb

LD2101152594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1505 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan—As of tomorrow, the State Duma is taking its first time out and is interrupting sessions until 1 February. Deputies will go home to brief their electors on the initial steps of the Federal Assembly's lower chamber. As regards parliamentary committees, they will continue their legislative activities.

State Duma To Discuss Amnesty for Some Prisoners

LD2401090394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0823 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 24 (TASS)—A draft resolution of the State Duma on declaring an amnesty for some categories of prisoners not creating any special danger for society will be discussed by the parliamentary committee for legislation and the reform of the judicial-legal system, First Deputy Chairman of the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly Mikhail Mityukov told ITAR-TASS.

The draft resolution is being submitted to the State Duma by President Boris Yeltsin.

Mityukov pointed out that the draft resolution had not yet come to the State Duma and explained that, in accordance with Article 103 of the Russian Constitution, the declaration of an amnesty is the prerogatve of the State Duma. "Naturally, the president has the right to initiate an amnesty act, which means that he has the right to submit a draft resolution on this issue for the consideration of the parliament's chamber," he said.

Mityukov described the mechanism of the discussion of the document by the State Duma: after the committee for legislation and the reform of the judicial-legal system gives its conclusion, the draft resolution will be submitted to the chamber's council and after that it will be discussed at a plenary session of the State Duma.

"It is difficult to forecast the results of the examination of the draft resolution by the State Duma, but I think we cannot do without a discussion. Important events in the life of the country, such as the adoption of a new constitution and major anniversaries, have always been accompanied by the declaration of an amnesty. The question arises, however, what will be the limits of the amnesty," he said.

In the opinion of Mityukov, "maximum caution should be displayed in such situations, especially taking into consideration the current crime situation in conditions of the weakened law and order in the country."

Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen of Duma Committees Elected

PM1901113794 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Oksana Petrunko report: "'Party Bosses' Share Everything Out: Twenty-Three Committees Set Up in State Duma"]

[Text] The four deputy chairmen of the Duma represent four different factions, and the list of candidates for the posts of chairmen and deputy chairmen of Duma commissions was organized on the same principle. All these apparatus posts were allocated among Russia's Choice, Yabloko [Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc], the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES], the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR], the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], the "New Regional Policy" [NRP], the Communists, Zhirinovskiy's followers, and the Women of Russia. The Women of Russia have obtained the opportunity to chair the Committee for the Affairs of Women, the Family, and Childhood. Yabloko occupies the leading positions on two committees (but what committees!): The Committee for International Affairs (V. Lukin) and the Committee for the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances (Mikhail Zadornov). Aleksey Mikhaylov, who is deputy chairman of the Committee for Economic Policy, is also from that bloc. Members of the NRP association have become chairmen of three committees. The PRUA and APR and the Communists chair two. Russia's Choice has chairmen on four committees, including defense (Sergey Yushenkov) and information policy and communications (Mikhail Poltoranin). However, the makeup of their deputy chairmen—that is to say, Communists and deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] and APR—raise doubts about the strength of Russia's Choice on those committees. The LDPR has installed chairmen on five committees.

A proposal to vote for each committee individually did not find support. However, the ritual of candidates presenting themselves and their programs did begin. I think it is a great pity that television is not broadcasting the sessions of parliament now. The election of the State Duma apparatus promised to be instructive as regards the candidates' character and potential. Sergey Glazyev (chairman of the Committee for Economic Policy, DPR) was single-minded and businesslike. Mikhail Lemeshev (LDPR) was approved as chairman of the Committee for the Environment in his absence. Vladimir Isakov (APR), chairman of the Committee for Legislation and Judicial and Legal Reform, proposed creating the "most sophisticated system of legislation in the world" through computerization. You will recall that not so long ago there was half-joking discussion of whether the stress on the first syllable of "nachat" ["to begin"] will become the

norm. Lyubov Rozhkova (NRP), chairman of the Committee for Education, Culture, and Science, launched a new philological tendency: Quoting Franklin, she twice referred confidently to him as Veniamin. And, admittedly, Fedor Roosevelt and Misha Faraday might well extend the bounds of Russian knowledge, might they not?

Eight potential committee chairmen spoke that day. The pointless procedure was cut short by a deputy's address: "The 'party bosses' have already shared everything out, that's enough time wasted, let's vote." And voting did take place, demonstrating once again that every opportunity for independent deputies to influence the work of the committees has been removed.

Parliamentary Defense Committee Chief on Tasks

LD1901161994

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1315 GMT on 19 January broadcasts an interview with Sergey Nikolayevich Yushenkov, head of the parliamentary defense committee, by an unidentified correspondent. During the interview Yushenkov is asked to describe the committee he heads. He says that currently 18 people representing various parties are on the committee, almost all of them with military experience. Among them, he says, are Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Piskunov, one of the leaders of the former Supreme Soviet's defence and security committee, Colonel General Yuriy Nikolayevich Rodionov, former deputy defense minister and currently deputy chief of the Armed Forces Inspectorate, Colonel General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, and Georgiy Grigorovich Lukava. The committee's main task, according to Yushenkov, is to "restore officers' prestige" with particular reference to restoring the role of the Russian officer and gentleman. He adds that welfare issues, military doctrine, and army reform are among other questions the committee wishes to deal with, ensuring that the army is "on a proper level of combat readiness."

Yushenkov then lists other committees headed by Russia's Choice members.

Commenting on the fact that some government members have decided to focus on their Duma duties, Yushenkov says it will affect the work in the new parliament: Democrats have about one-third of the votes, or perhaps a little more. About 40 to 42 percent of deputies oppose the president and the government, he says, adding that "the battle now will be for those who are undecided." Those who succeed in enticing them will probably get majority in the State Duma, "although it seems to me that not a single competing group will get a stable majority," Yushenkov says. He goes on: "As for members of the government leaving the government, it is due to the fact that it is not possible to continue with effective reforms. Moreover, since mid-December Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov have, in fact, been unable to influence the financial stabilization, nor have they been able to influence in any effective manner any other decisions connected with the economic or welfare sphere and that is the reason why they left that government, together with Ella Panfilova and this will, of course, make itself felt on the work of the State Duma." Gaydar, he says, will now be a more active participant in parliamentary proceedings—yesterday he was applauded for opposing the squandering of taxpayers' money on the building of new premises for the Federal Assembly.

Yushenkov concludes his interviewe by noting: "I think that the truth that the center of power is currently being shifted in the structures of executive authority from the president to the prime minister is becoming more and more obvious—it is a fact which must be taken into account in further activities."

List of Standing Committees of Russia's State Duma

LD2001210194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1944 GMT 20 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The State Duma of Russia's Federal Assembly approved on Thursday [20 January] the composition of 22 standing committees. The make-up of the 23rd committee, for geopolitics, was not approved. Originally, it was planned that the committee would consist of 13 people, including nine members of the ultra nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

Following is the list of committees approved on Thursday:

The Committee for Legislation, Judicial and Legal Reform—chairman Vladimir Isakov (Agrarian Party of Russia),
The Committee for Labour and Social Support—chairman Sergey Kalashnikov (LDPR),
The Committee for Health Protection—chairwoman Bella Denisenko (Russia's Choice),
The Committee for the Ecology—chairman Mikhail Lemeshev (LDPR),
The Committee for Education, Culture and Science—chairwoman Lyubov Rozhkova (New Regional Policy),
The Committee for Women, the Family and Youth—chairwoman Galina Klimantova (Women of Russia),
The Committee for Budget, Taxes, Banks and Finances—chairman Mikhail Zadornov (Yabloko),
The Committee for Economic Policy—chairman Sergey Glaziyev (Democratic Party of Russia),
The Committee for Property, Privatisation and Economic Activity—chairman Sergey Burkov (New Regional Policy),
The Committee for Agrarian Issues—chairman Aleksandr Nazarchuk (the Agrarian Party of Russia),
The Committee for Industry, Construction, Transport and Power Engineering—chairman Vladimir Gusev (LDPR),

The Committee for Natural Resources and Nature Exploitation—chairman Nikolay Astafyev (LDPR),
The Committee for Defence—chairman Sergey Yushenkov (Russia's Choice),
The Committee for Security Affairs—chairman Viktor Ilyukhin (the Communist Party of Russia),
The Committee for International Affairs—chairman Vladimir Lukin (Yabloko),
The Committee for the Commonwealth of Independent States and Ties with Compatriots—chairman Konstantin Zatulin (the Party of Russian Union and Accord),
The Committee for Nationalities Issues—chairman Bair Zhamsuyev (New Regional Policy),
The Committee for the Federation and Regional Policy—chairman Sergey Shapovalov (the Party of Russian Unity and Accord),
The Committee for Local Self-Government—chairman Anatoliy Sliva (the Party of Russian Unity and Accord),
The Committee for Public Associations and Religious Organisations—chairman Viktor Zorkaltsev (the Communist Party of Russia),
The Committee for the Organisation of the Work of the State Duma—chairman Vladimir Bauer (Russia's Choice),
The Committee for Information Policy and Communications—chairman Mikhail Poltoranin (Russia's Choice).

Duma Committees To Continue Organizational Work in Recess

LD2401120194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1052 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] The State Duma members will spend this week in their constituencies while chairmen of parliamentary committees will recruit staff, obtain premises and install telephones, computers and faxes in them.

In particular, the Security Committee has no premises or telephone number, its Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin told Interfax.

The Legislation Committee has to draft a plan of legislative activities for the Duma and will have no recess.

Vladimir Isakov, its chairman, told Interfax Monday that the State Duma deputies had significantly amended the plan that had been submitted by the legislative commission of the president's office and the two plans had to be reconciled.

The Information Politics and Communication Committee chaired by Mikhail Poltoranin has to report on the state-controlled mass media, in particular television coverage of parliament activities.

Numerous deputies, notably the liberal democratic group, think that the Parliamentary Hour TV program has to be resumed under the title of The Federal Assembly Hour. Poltoranin himself believes that the equal representation of all branches of authorities can be achieved by a law now being drafted by the legislative commission of the president's office.

Duma Committees Seen Likely To Intrude in Foreign Policy

MK1901140094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Mikhail Karpov article under the "Power" rubric: "Duma and Russian Federation Foreign Policy. It Will Not be Very Simple for Yeltsin and Kozyrev To Continue Their Course"]

[Text] The Russian Federation foreign minister does not tire of reiterating that Russia's foreign policy is that of the president. This postulate, however, does not appear all that self- evident now that Duma committees have been formed. At least four of them—on international affairs, CIS affairs, and geopolitical questions—may, and more probable than not, will, insist on at least having their opinion be considered. The latter committee will go the longest way of all. At least because its head and one of his deputies—Viktor Ustinov and Mikhail Sidorov—are representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and this party, perhaps, did not indicate any agreement on a single question with the Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign political course. It is maintained that the very creation of the committee on geopolitical questions is a payback to the Liberal Democratic Party for the foreign affairs committee chaired by Vladimir Lukin, former Russian Federation ambassador to the United States. But he too has a Liberal Democratic "shadow foreign minister" for his deputy, Aleksey Mitrofanov.

Lukin, however, is known for his strained relations with Kozyrev which may undoubtedly negatively rub off on the committee's reactions to the actions of the minister who, as Kozyrev himself maintains, is strictly following the president's policy. But Russian parliaments traditionally do not do what the president says and the Duma has no special grounds to alter the ingrained habit.

The committee for security is led by Viktor Ilyukhin, a Communist prosecutor, who was going to take Mikhail Gorbachev to court, hence one should not expect any special cooperation. All the more so because the committee chairman will, one would think, find support from one of his deputies, Nina Krivelskaya, representing this same Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

There are no representatives of the Russian Federation Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia among the leaders of the fourth committee, for CIS affairs. But they are undoubtedly to be found among its members. Indeed, relations with the "near abroad" are of real interest for these parties, and their view on these relations once again diverge from those of Yeltsin and Kozyrev.

Thus, all the prerequisites are there for a more clearly defined standoff between the Duma and the president,

and his foreign minister, in virtually all areas of foreign policy. The parliamentary committee will surely approach geopolitical questions from neo-imperial positions, something that its chairman's deputies, Yuliy Gusman of Russia's Choice and Aleksey Piskunov of New Regional Policy, would hardly countervail.

One does not have to explain the way the Communists see Russia's security, and this approach means opposing all disarmament processes and initiatives. One should also remember that Ilyukhin was going to take Gorbachev to court for the disintegration of the USSR; consequently he has a corresponding attitude to the CIS and Russia's partners that augurs nothing good. It may hamper all efforts by Zatulin's committee.

Kozyrev has always been accused of pro-Americanism. The same can easily be ascribed to Lukin for his ambassadorial past. Demagogues have never passed up such a chance, and I do not have to remind you whose ranks are chock full of them. Apparently, no foreign policy question is going to be perused solely by one certain committee. Each committee will try to have its say on a matter, which would spark differences between them. It would be sensible for Yeltsin and Kozyrev to play on these differences if only they pay attention to the voice of parliament at all. There is a third option—to adjust the Russian foreign policy course taking into account parliamentarians' opinions. But then it may radically alter the course itself. That would have very serious consequences both for Russia and the world.

Party Leaders Expect State Duma To Be Short-Lived

MK2001090094 Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No. 3, 19-25 Jan 94 p 3 (Signed to press 18 Jan)

[Roundup of interviews with Aleksandr Chuyev, chief of the Russian Christian Democratic Party; Vladimir Lysenko, cochairman of the Russian Federation Republican Party and member of the "Yabloko" faction; and Gleb Yakunin, cochairman of Democratic Russia: "Party Leaders on State Duma's Work"]

[Text] **Aleksandr Chuyev, chairman of the Russian Christian Democratic Party Political Council**

[ROSSIYA] Did your party contest the elections?

[Chuyev] Of course. We nominated 108 candidates, but the Central Electoral Commission ruled that we did not collect the 100,000 votes in our support required for registering our bloc, although we disagree with that. Yevgeniy Fedorov, our candidate from Leningrad Oblast, was elected in a one-mandate district, and another two deputies, who were elected as independents, have raised the question of joining our party. For us, the elections continue. I personally and another two representatives of the Russian Christian Democratic Party are running for the Federation Council in Chelyabinsk Oblast. In addition, we will participate in municipal elections in Moscow. We hope that two or three of our candidates will make it.

[ROSSIYA] Which faction at the State Duma will express your interests?

[Chuyev] Hard to say, but definitely not "Russia's Choice." In all likelihood, it will be a faction of independent deputies, because there are people there who sympathize with us. We may also form our own group there. There are deputies whose views are close to ours in the Russian Democratic Reform Movement and in Sergey Shakhray's Party for Russian Unity and Accord.

[ROSSIYA] What do you think about the State Duma's future?

[Chuyev] Unfortunately, it will be even less effective than the previous one. All decisions will be blocked by large factions.

Vladimir Lysenko, cochairman of the Russian Federation Republican Party and member of the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" faction

[ROSSIYA] From the first day, everyone has been urging constructive work at the State Duma. How real is that?

[Lysenko] Given the list of demands published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by opposition electoral blocs requesting that the Belovezhskaya Forest agreement be abrogated, the president's actions in September-October be deemed as criminal, the results of the vote on the Constitution be reviewed, and so forth, this is an unlikely prospect. Large blocs are politicized throughout, and they are intent on achieving their own objectives. Zhirinovskiy is dreaming about the presidency, and the communists will try to deal the final blow to Yeltsin and the current government lineup. They will try to force a vote on starting an impeachment procedure against the president, because in this case the latter will not have the right to dissolve the State Duma. Here a dramatic tug-of-war may break out. Either Yeltsin will manage to dissolve the Duma on the basis of Article 111, or it will demand impeachment. My fears may not materialize, however, because the interests of Zhirinovskiy and the communists do not fully coincide.

[ROSSIYA] Does your organization have a package of legislative initiatives?

[Lysenko] So far we have not been able to agree one page of our political statement. It concerns the Constitution. Some argue that it should be accepted as a political reality, while others demand that we should go to court so that it will rule its adoption as unlawful. On other matters we are unanimous. We oppose the commissions about which I spoke earlier. We believe that we should deal with the rules of procedure and with committees.

[ROSSIYA] Will your faction be able to preserve itself?

[Lysenko] Everything will depend on whether the faction will pay heed to the parties on whose bandwagons these deputies entered the Duma.

Gleb Yakunin, cochairman of the Democratic Russia movement and member of the "Russia's Choice" faction

[ROSSIYA] How do you assess the future of the State Duma?

[Yakunin] I think it will be ineffective owing to substantial political differences. It will hold on for hardly a year. But at least it must resolve the fundamental question—to demystify Zhirinovskiy's party and the man himself. To show the people that they made a mistake in electing him. To demystify his team made up of state security and Main Intelligence Administration officers and so forth. I think that Lukyanov and Kryuchkov must shed light on the subject.

Lukin Interviewed

PM2001144194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, head of the State Duma International Affairs Committee and a leader of the "Yabloko" bloc, by Vladimir Mikheyev, date and place not given: "Vladimir Lukin: I Know What Must Be Done But I Do Not Know Where"]

[Text] Vladimir Lukin is head of the State Duma International Affairs Committee and a leader of the Yabloko bloc. He preferred the parliamentary platform in the "house on the embankment" to his former residence as Russian ambassador in Washington.

"According to standing orders the committee must consist of at least 12 people and at most 35 and must be formed on the basis of the proportional representation of the factions. In my view this principle is important, but it must be combined with the deputies' professional qualities," Vladimir Lukin replied in an interview for IZVESTIYA.

[Mikheyev] Presumably, Ambartsumov, Adamishin, and Sheynis have a good chance of a place on the committee. They are all on the Yabloko faction's list.

Opinions of them may vary but they are eminent specialists in international relations, Lukin noted.

[Mikheyev] Asked the other day whom you would like to see as your successor in Washington, you virtually repeated the aphorism that "the most important thing is that it is a good man"....

[Lukin] In the term "a good man" I include a combination of professionalism and ethical norms.

[Mikheyev] Will you find a place on your committee for Deputy Kozyrev?

[Lukin] Ministers do not take part in the work of committees, in my opinion this will be stipulated in the standing orders. But if he prefers to concentrate on work in parliament, then why not? He is a professional.

[Mikheyev] How will your work be organized?

[Lukin] We do not have the conditions to satisfy even our most minimal requirements in this building. We do not have the premises.

[Mikheyev] Do you intend waiting until parliament's $500 million "castle in the air" is built?

[Lukin] Why? To put it mildly, this solution is untimely. But since the Constitution proposes that we have a working parliament it is necessary to create the conditions for it. My view is that for a committee chairman a car is not a luxury but an essential means of transport. As for salary, there are rumors that everyone will be paid the same, from the chairman of the Duma to the deputy chairman of a committee. I do not know what the figure is.

[Mikheyev] The impression created is that you still do not feel that you have special powers, that you have the reins of power in your hands....

[Lukin] In my opinion, the whole Duma does not have the reins of power. I know what must be done but I do not know where.

[Mikheyev] What do you, as chairman of the foreign affairs committee, see as the priorities of Russia's foreign policy?

[Lukin] At a time of crisis Russia's foreign policy must ensure every condition possible for overcoming the crisis. There is the creation of a favorable export climate. The rate of the ruble against the dollar is falling, it cannot be stopped, at least not long term, by financial manipulations; consequently it is necessary to export, it is necessary to earn hard currency. At the summit, for example, progress was made on the sale of Russian uranium to the United States—we must continue in that vein.

Another area is to ensure the physical security of Russia and its citizens by diplomatic and economic methods so as not to have to resort to other methods. That is connected with the former Union republics.

[Mikheyev] Is there a complete coincidence of views between you and President Yeltsin?

[Lukin] I have never had disagreements with the president on foreign policy. I have been asked how I regard the "new thinking," to which I replied—I do not know of any "new thinking." There is only right thinking or wrong thinking. The right thinking amounts to defending our national interests, which precludes two methods. The first is offering tender kisses and one-sided concessions. The second is howling and barking like a dog, which unites everyone in a coalition against us.

'Union of 12 December' Gaining Strength in Duma

MK1901113094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Sergey Parkhomenko report: "Union of Offenders Against the Residency Qualification"]

[Text] As things stood yesterday evening, the organizers of the independent Duma group "Union of 12 December" were short, as Deputy Andrey Makarov stated, of the consent of five colleagues to clear the margin (35 members) established by parliamentary rules to get the new association officially registered. There is almost no doubt that the masterminds of the "Union..."—deputies Aleksandr Braginskiy, Irina Khakamada, and the already mentioned Mr. Makarov—who had managed, in less than a week's time, to double the number of their supporters, will successfully clear this last hurdle as well. Already now they hold 22 applications from deputies who intend to join their group, and eight verbal assurances from colleagues who are ready to write such application "even today."

True, deputies Braginskiy and Khakamada had to approach nearly all the existing factions: starting from Russia's Choice, they turned in sequence to the leaders of Yabloko, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the Democratic Party of Russia, and finally Vladimir Medvedev's New Regional Policy with a request to delegate voluntarily their supporters to the new group. Let us note that their efforts met with the least understanding precisely in Russia's Choice, and it is from there that a considerable number of deputies finally fled to Khakamada's colors.

The greatest sensation among such deserters was produced by Boris Fedorov, who was absolutely enraged—as one can conclude from the series of interviews he gave on Sunday and Monday—at the fact that Yegor Gaydar's decision to renounce participation in the new government had been preceded by consultations with all sorts of people rather than with the closest cabinet associate. As is known, Choice paved the way to parliament for this same Makarov or, say, Mikhail Kisilev, who told journalists yesterday he was changing his faction allegiance.

It is enough to state even these samples: "Russia's Choice has passed up the chance to create a 'satellite faction' linked to it by strict and long-term commitments of joint activities in parliament. The "Union of 12 December" is now being born despite, rather than thanks, to it. The good-natured parting words like Yegor Gaydar's phrase, "We have nothing against the new faction, and will obviously form a block in a friendly manner with them," appear belated and not quite sincere. Essentially, though, leaders of "Choice" should not have special reasons for fears: it is not Communists, really and truly, that Choice will have to take cues from in important voting.

One must assume that the skeptical attitude by the leaders of Choice to the efforts of Mr. Braginskiy and Mrs. Khakamada was based, it is easy to guess, on the unpleasant memories of the cruel scandal thrown at them by a group of supporters in the course of the famous conference at "Lesnyye Dali" [holiday spot near Moscow] shortly before the opening of the Duma session. Several recent members of the movement's Executive Committee spoke at that time against appointing Yegor Gaydar head of the faction, and supported the candidature of Gennadiy Burbulis. Mr. Burbulis for that matter preferred to be shy and say nothing, and Andrey Makarov led the riot.

It is not surprising that, getting the wind of the latter's efforts (which had been carefully concealed by him until recently) to split off some deputies from the "maternal faction," observers were awaiting a statement from Mr. Burbulis on supporting this initiative and maybe on taking over the functions of leader of the "allies." But on reflection, the splitters finally convinced each other that it is not quite decent for deputies elected on party lists to violate the political residency qualification by so quickly and easily going back on their election commitments. This triumph for common sense was helped by, among other things, fears of the Duma's impending approval of a law on deputy status: no potential defector is guaranteed that the law would not incorporate a norm on the automatic transfer of the seat of a deputy showing a bent for disorderly political contacts to the candidate next on the party list.

Formulating, so far unofficially, the position of their group, organizers of the "Union of 12 December" are speaking especially often about their disagreement with the creation of what Mrs. Khakamada described as "Duma politburo," in the shape of the council of the leaders of factions and the already elected chairman of the chamber. "The agreement on the inadmissibility of whatever compacts with the Communists and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia has been broken by the heads of Choice," stated Deputy Makarov in an interview for SEGODNYA. "The package agreement on electing leaders of the Duma and of its committees has become a model of bargaining in a situation where all bargaining is out of place. The genius to strike bargains has been shown in the most graphic manner by Mikhail Poltoranin, who received direct powers to do that from Gaydar himself.

Federov May Join 'Union of 12 December'

LD2301093694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] Boris Fedorov has said that he will join a State Duma faction of liberal and reformist character called the "Union of December 12." Radio Liberty reports that he understood that he might remain in the shadow of Gaydar without the support of people who hold the same views. Irina Khakamada, the leader of this union, believes that Fedorov is a man who has a clear program.

Yavlinskiy Suggests Emergency Measures for Inflation

LD2101164294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1545 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Oleg Velichko and Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—Leader of the Yavlinskiy- Boldyrev-Lukin faction and economist Grigory Yavlinskiy suggested a program of emergency measures against the inflation and production recession at a news conference at the State Duma today.

He informed correspondents of a forecast, according to which the inflation may run out of control by fall 1994 to reach 50 per cent and the production recession may be equal to 52 per cent of the 1989 level. 1989 was the last year of production increase.

Speaking of priority measures against the inflation, namely a possibility to control the inflation at a level of 20 per cent in 1994, Grigory Yavlinskiy stressed the need to bring the dollar exchange rate in correspondence with the inflation dynamics. He said the government should be responsible for the exchange rate dynamics, which means the soonest conclusion of futures deals on sales of hard currency at a certain exchange rate.

The economist warned the government against the policy of easy- term credits and direct subsidies. He said they should immediately lower the interest rate under administrative regulation of the credit amount.

Another priority is crucial changes of a policy on benefits for exporters. He said Russia cannot allow hard currency to flow abroad. He said 15 billion dollars flew abroad in 1993 alone.

He offered the government to cancel the tax on exchange rate difference and said everyone having hard currency accounts should not pay for the inflation, for which they carry no direct responsibility. Yavlinskiy said the cancellation of this tax may help to prevent money outflow.

The economist suggested to free statistics bodies from government control.

Yavlinskiy told ITAR-TASS his faction is ready to form a government capable of fulfilling this program within eight to nine months.

Zhirinovskiy's Faction Third in Strength in Duma

LD1901095794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0724 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—The Liberal Democratic Party of Ultra-Nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, which won elections to the new Russian legislature on a party list, failed to enjoy the same success in one-seat constituencies and thus became the third strongest faction in the lower chamber, according to information made public in the Duma on Wednesday.

It registered 63 lawmakers and Sergey Churkin is the secretary of the faction.

The Russia's Choice and the faction of independent lawmakers overtook Zhirinovskiy.

The Russia's Choice has registered 76 lawmakers headed by Sergey Yushchenkov, while the independents united in the "New Regional Policy" faction with 65 seats and Gennadiy Kalistratov as the coordinator.

The Agrarian Party is the fourth in the list with 57 lawmakers headed by Secretary Nikolay Kharitonov.

The Communists come fifth with 45 seats, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord has 30 lawmakers, the Yabloko Bloc of Grigory Yavlinsky - 27, the "Women of Russia" - 23 and the last is the Democratic Party with 15 seats.

First Week of State Duma's Work Reviewed

PM1901110394 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 1

[Vladimir Isakov "Parliamentary Diary" article: "They Want To Sneak Around the Back..."]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Duma dealt with fairly mundane questions in its first week, but anybody who follows parliamentary life will be aware of their importance. When beginning the work of a newly elected organ, it is, of course, necessary to agree on a quorum. Views, naturally, differed. "Russia's Choice" insisted on a two-thirds quorum, and moreover demonstrated on the very first day that it intends to use the "right of the minority" to disrupt sittings. The other side proposed that the quorum be set at 50 percent of the deputies, as this will render the work of the Duma more stable regardless of the changing moods of deputies and factions. The majority of votes was cast in favor of the second option.

The next question derives from the very same series: Which should be the base number to calculate the majority of votes required to adopt a decision? There would seem to be nothing to debate here—the majority should be calculated on the basis of the number of deputies actually elected to the Duma (444 people). But there are those who, referring to the Constitution, demanded that six non-elected "dead souls" also be added to this. The discussion was so tricky that even "Russia's Choice" was split over it and failed to arrive at a unified opinion. But again, common sense prevailed—the Duma finally voted to calculate the majority on the basis of the number of deputies actually elected.

During the very first sittings, as if on a photographic plate, a polarization of the deputies' corps became evident. When one part of the hall applauds and rises to its

feet, the other remains sullenly silent. And vice versa. It is somewhat disconcerting to see the entire right-wing sector of the hall react gleefully to inaccuracies and blunders, and rejoice when a decision is thwarted for whatever reasons. There is no "constructive collaboration" in that.... A parliament in which they do not have a guaranteed majority is no good to them. So from the outset the task has been to disrupt and to wreck. Future developments are easy to predict: After waiting a short while, the faithful hounds from the mass media will be let loose, and then the issue of dissolution "in view of the opposition to the president" will be raised everywhere.

Basic decency has already been abandoned in the "democratic press" even today. The president is being urged to "demonstrate firmness" and to put pressure on parliament (it has to be assumed that hitherto he has demonstrated extreme lenience.) He is urged not to give the deputies apartments (let them live in a hotel for two years), and to restrict their travel opportunities. There is open rejoicing at the impotence of a parliament from which all premises have been confiscated and all backup services withdrawn.

Matters are taken even further by Mr. Shumeyko, who, as the elected speaker of the Federation Council, at his first press conference declared a readiness to divide and isolate the State Duma in the event of "dire need": "It is possible to cooperate with those deputies of the Duma who are indeed concerned about the state, and adopt laws directly here." (That is, in the Federation Council, bypassing the State Duma.) It is no secret to Mr. Shumeyko that "this will be a certain violation of the Constitution." But if something is really wanted...it is even possible to violate the Constitution. So you see the type of authority which has been nurtured—it will not be hampered by a mere Constitution [ni v odnu konstitutsiyu ne vlazit]!

There is never a right time for disease and death. So it is that Ye. Gaydar chose not Saturday, and not Monday, but Sunday for his resignation announcement. Moreover, it is easy to understand why. Saturday was too early—the "big chief" from Washington had not yet departed. And the composition of the new Cabinet of Ministers was expected to be announced Monday. After this, who needs your "resignation announcements"!

Of course, the surprise announcement by the "father" of the Gaydar reforms, Mr. Ye. Gaydar, will generate, has indeed already generated, a mass of conjecture and commentary. But two assumptions are self-evident, and they can be expressed without fear of serious error.

The first is that Ye. Gaydar "and Co." leave the government at a time when dense dark storm clouds are already gathering on the economic horizon. Now is the time to abandon the bridge of the unreliable government ship. At the same time, with the very same childish directness with which under Chernomyrdin they once swore "terrifying oaths" of loyalty to reforms, they bequeath the reforms to the government, having finally thrown the contents of the slops bucket over them.

Second: Gaydar and his team are freeing their hands for the next presidential elections, at which they intend to emerge, like Aphrodite from the foaming sea, in all the radiance of untainted cleanliness: "Here we are, elect us!"

But every cloud has a silver lining. It will be useful for Gaydar to sit on the opposition bench in order to experience the full measure of insolence and extreme contempt with which the government meets any proposals and initiatives emanating from parliament. He will rewarded according to his deeds. We will see what happens after that.

Let us return to the parliamentary hall for a while. In the opening days, the issue of the type of ballot—open or secret—was the subject of fierce debate. Parliament's "democratic" part was all but foaming at the mouth in its attempts to prove that a secret ballot on any subject and as frequently as possible is a commitment to democracy, and the most important guarantee of the defense of the rights of the minority.

It is funny. I have as yet been unable to forget the time, three years ago, when it was proven with equal fervor that the most important guarantee of minority rights is the roll-call ballot, whereas the secret ballot was exposed as anathema, as cowardice, as a desire to conceal one's position from voters. Which is why it was enshrined in Supreme Soviet standing orders that the roll-call ballot may be used at the behest of one-fifth of the deputies, but on no occasion can the secret ballot be resurrected.

Why this U-turn? Least of all do I suspect my opponents of a lapse of memory or defective logic. If concepts are turned upside down, then it is probably for a reason. Maybe people are sick of publicity. And maybe there is some basis to the rumor that a "second key" has been fitted to the electronic ballot system, and that during a secret ballot (which by its very nature is impossible to verify) it brings about the required result....

It is exasperating to talk about this, but falsehood, deceit, and the desire to "sneak round the back" were brought into play from the very first days of parliamentary practice. It is normal and natural for people to adhere to different views. But can it be considered normal when an "extra" paragraph suddenly appears in an agreed document, and it just happens to be about a secret ballot at the behest of one-fifth of the deputies? When a respected professor and jurist known to the whole country, upon glimpsing into the hall, sees no raised hands, and hears no words of appeal addressed to him? And when there is a shortfall of just one vote to adopt the decision.... I cannot agree that politics is a dirty game. The dirt is brought into it by people—through their conciliation, their lack of principle, their readiness to achieve aims by any means.

In mainstream politics, the stakes are always high. It gives rise to a conflict of interests, frank and human passions, and it creates a very strong field of force, which masterfully arranges people along their invisible lines. In mainstream politics, there is always temptation—the ceiling of legal and moral requirements is lowered a little, deceit is answered with deceit, meanness with meanness, lawlessness with even greater lawlessness. And it is easy to jump back and forth across the barrier, to achieve victory. Behind an easy victory follows the next phase—"the final dash," when a subdued opponent is hunted down without any rules whatever. Then comes the celebration, the apotheosis of a victory which "will wipe the slate clean," burying the unsightly "details" beneath the waves of the general fever of the victors. Open baseness wears a mask of dignity, violence sets itself up as nobility, and falsehood preaches honesty. The phony carnival of an unjust victory....

Today, truth and honesty are on the side of the "left-wing" opposition. The sympathies and hopes of the honest, thinking, and feeling part of society turn to it. This is a great strength but also a great responsibility. These hopes must not be betrayed.

Emerging Trends of Duma Sessions Viewed

PM2101160594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 21 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Georgiy Satarov: "Pie of Power Already Feasted On..."]

[Text] So the State Duma deputies have spent exactly a week dividing up the pie of internal power. Two trends emerged at the very start of the session: The first was that the deputies were in no hurry to embark on a fierce political battle for the redistribution of power with the president and the government, but, on the other hand, they were making preparations, by arranging their Duma life in detail; the second was that on day one, without any preliminary maneuvers, the deputies launched into votes enabling them to determine the internal disposition of forces, since the size of everyone's slice of the pie depended on this to a large extent.

The first controversy was over two digits in the text of the provisional standing orders indicating the minimum permissible size of a faction. The communists, agrarians, DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], and LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] wanted the number 50, and their reason for that was a desire for organized and efficient work. The opposing flank and "independent" deputies insisted on a threshold of 14 deputies, advocating "freedom of association." In actual fact, there were two things here of great importance to the division of power. First, it was necessary to block the possible multiplication (including by means of division) of factions on the other political flank, which is important because of the natural factional representation norm both in the debates and in the various Duma components.

Second, combined with the obligatory order, which is intended to be enshrined later in the Law on the Status of Deputy and which involves strict factional discipline, the high threshold made it possible to form a strategic majority on the left flank. As a result of a two-sitting struggle and a series of votes a compromise figure of 35 deputies was reached as the basis for forming new groups and factions. It is interesting that it was when this matter was being discussed that the "main forces" started to come to the microphones.

There followed an equally fierce battle over other standing order norms of vital importance. In this case the left flank of the Duma succeeded in gaining powerful positions by passing norms whereby the quorum for opening a sitting was reduced to one-half of the total number of deputies, and this total number corresponds to the number of elected deputies. In the votes on these questions the deputies were obviously haunted by the specter of the Supreme Soviet.

The deputies' love of Aesopian language was most fully manifested in the discussion of two versions of the article in the standing orders determining the mechanism for the election of the Duma chairman. According to the first version, proposed by the standing orders group, the chairman would be elected by two rounds of secret votes; the two candidates who had obtained the most votes would reach the second round—a natural, generally accepted norm.

According to the second version, sponsored by the left wing, a straw poll would be carried out electronically. The reason for this was that it would be a high-speed operation. In fact, this mechanism would enable the very slightly larger left wing to block the passage of candidates from the opposing flank or center to the second round, which was successfully accomplished. As a result, I. Rybkin, who overcame Yu. Vlasov in the second round, won by a majority of half a vote in excess of one-half of the total number of deputies, since one of the ballot papers caused arguments in the tellers' commission amd its fate was decided by the Duma.

The initial days of the lower chamber's work revealed the disposition of forces to come, which had been predicted earlier and which is characterized by powerful flanks and a weak center.

On the left flank you have the coordinated bloc of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] (45 deputies, which was the figure given in the official registration in the Duma 12 January) and the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] (55). On a number of questions they are joined by the Liberal Democratic Party (63), the Democratic Party of Russia (15), "Women of Russia" (23), and several independent deputies, some of whom had gotten together in the "Russian Path" association headed by Baburin, Lukyanov, and Vlasov, which has not been registered yet because it does not have enough deputies (approximately 20 deputies).

The CPRF, APR, LDPR, amd DPR form the tactical nucleus of this grouping. What distinguishes all their actions is the amount of thought that goes into them and the high degree of preparation. The actions of their speakers and supporting deputies in the chamber are well organized. All this, creating, as it does, an atmosphere of confidence in their own strength, attracts to this grouping the votes of some wavering deputies amd enables them as a result to obtain in the Duma the votes of a small majority of the number of elected deputies.

On the opposing flank you have the fragmented "Russia's Choice" (76), the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc (25), the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES] (30 deputies, including the newly joined independents), and the unregistered "Union of 12 December" group of democratically oriented deputies, which has I. Khakamada as one of its leaders (around 20 deputies).

These factions are not organized and they are not coordinated, their preparations are poor, and their proposals suffer from poor reasoning. A typical example is the explanation that a quorum of one-half of the deputies is insuitable because it would lead to the adoption of laws by one-fourth of the deputies' votes. This logic was a gift for the communists, who made sure they took advantage of it by immediately reminding their opponents that that was precisely how the Constitution was adopted. It is not inconceivable that this false move might have influenced the outcome of the vote on this question.

We can confidently assign the "New Regional Policy" deputies' associaiton (65 deputies), headed by V.S. Medvedev, president of the Oil Workers' Union, to the central part of the spectrum in the Duma. Medvedev was one of the contenders for the post of State Duma chairman and got 145 votes in the straw poll.

Further events confirmed the instability of this structure in which neither flank has a sure tactical majority. This was manifested in a series of votes on the agenda, in which the proposals from the extreme left flank "to get to grips with the press," "free political prisoners," and so on did not get through. Which explains the desire of the majority of deputies to resolve the question of the distribution of committee posts as a single "package," on the basis of accords on the proportional allocation of seats, which was successfully implemented.

This could mean that the Duma has a certain constructive potential, which will be confirmed or refuted in the very near future. It must be added that, unlike the Supreme Soviet in the final months, where there was an atmosphere of bitter animosity, the atmosphere in the Duma in the initial days was that of a jolly sports festival. The first chairman, G. Lukava, had a lot to do with that.

Having sorted out the seats, the deputies will busy themselves with the standing orders and the Law on the Status of Deputy. Then we should see the start of the regular legislative work, primarily, one assumes, on federal constitutional laws. It is not inconceivable that in the interim the Duma will try to creep up on another pie of power, not in the Duma, but outside—in the state. What form this takes and what the results are will make it possible to answer many questions concerning the fate both of the authorities and of the state.

Dangers Seen in Idea of Separate Staffs

PM2101170594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Leonid Nikitinskiy article: "The Dilemma of the Speaker and the Enterprise Chief—Federation Council Entices State Duma Along 'Soviet Path of Development'"]

[Text] Having very promptly ratified the allocation of the posts of vice speaker and committee chairmen in the State Duma "as a package," the deputies demonstrated a fundamental capacity for agreement.

Clearly an important precedent has been set, and henceforth the majority of the most fundamental questions, including those linked with legislative work, will be resolved in the State Duma in a similar comprehensive manner. In this case the deciding factor determining the content of decisions will be the "weight" of the factions holding the preliminary consultations.

Now the main internal drama in the general development of the Duma will consist in the factions' battle to preserve and increase their size, insofar as it is the number of votes which a faction has at its disposal on each specific question which will determine its capacity within a specific bloc to influence its ultimate solution.

By definition, there can be no objection to political methods of struggle for votes on the part of factions: This is the normal mode of operation for a parliament. At the same time, apart from political means, apparatus means, which are concentrated in the hands of elected leaders (as we have already observed in the example of Khasbulatov's Supreme Soviet), may also be drawn into this battle.

In principle it is possible to entice deputies both by creating and distributing material privileges, and by creating advantages in work, including information advantages. For instance, Vladimir Isakov, who heads the key Legislation Committee in the Duma, can organize its work in such a way as to afford any deputy equal access to draft laws, or he can create effective advantages for members of factions close to him while impeding access to information for "outsiders."

In his election speech to deputies, and later in his "inauguration speech" to journalists, State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin stressed that he will try not to reveal his own political partialities in the post of speaker. He will deserve a medal if he manages to resist the temptations facing him and the pressure which will certainly be put on him, but the strength of such temptations goes without saying.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Shumeyko, his colleague from the "House of Lords," has demonstrated quite frankly that he does not intend to ignore apparatus methods of struggling for influence over members of the Federation Council. This has already been demonstrated in the story of his election, in which backstage talks with regional leaders played a significant role. And one of Shumeyko's first steps in his new post, according to information from well informed sources, was an appeal to the president to review his earlier guideline on creating a unified Federal Assembly apparatus.

At present this apparatus serves both chambers. Since according to the Constitution the main concern of the Federation Council is to be to approve (or reject) laws adopted by the State Duma, it can hardly be deemed useful or efficient to establish for the two chambers two completely autonomous bureaucratic apparatuses including duplicate expert departments, information services, libraries and codification departments, personnel departments, and, of course, economic administrations in charge of official apartments and dachas, cars, and luncheon vouchers.

On the other hand, the whole of Soviet history is in fact a history of the transformation of control over the apparatus into supreme state power and of the absorption by the apparatus branch of power of all the other traditional "branches," and in Soviet history purely distributive, bureaucratic functions triumphantly dominate legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Of course, it is difficult for Vladimir Shumeyko and other leaders who passed through the Soviet apparatus school to renounce this means of holding sway and these stereotypes.

In the light of such demands already stated by the Federation Council, the State Duma simply has no option but to put forward similar demands and to set about the de facto division of the unified Federal Assembly apparatus which has only just been hastily set up, beginning with the unique body of experts and ending with the auto mechanics. The first round of rivalry between the chambers for possession of the apparatus will probably lead to rivalry between the parallel apparatuses that are set up, and a war between the apparatuses may serve as one reason for a future war between the chambers.

Since the proposal on division is directed to the president, let's look at the situation as if through his eyes, or rather, the eyes this time of the presidential apparatus. On the one hand, "divide and rule" is an old apparatus principle proven throughout the centuries, and there is a not unfounded assumption that the initiative for division emanates not so much from Shumeyko as from the presidential administration. On the other hand, the presidential administration, which still retains the ability to monitor compliance with proprieties in a unified Federal Assembly apparatus to some extent, will probably lose this ability in the event of division.

This option for the organizational structure does, of course, have its advantages, which are that deputies will be more independent of the whims of the presidential administration. But as payment for this independence, they will immediately become dependent on their chambers' divided apparatuses, and this is clearly capable of inflicting significantly greater damage on the normal legislative process. At the same time, this will mean that Russians' longstanding dream of a civilized parliamentary speaker who merely chairs sittings neutrally and properly and is relieved of any kind of tiresome organizational or economic hassle can be written off. However great the desire of Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin in particular to distance himself from intrigues and politicking, he will inevitably be drawn into this by the apparatus that clings to him—it is beyond the strength of any human being to resist this on one front while simultaneously resisting political pressure from his own faction on a second front.

It is unlikely that the deputies will want to heed the advice of journalists, but it seems to me that the most sensible thing for both chambers would be to decline to have their own individual apparatus and to leave the solution of the bulk of organizational, information, economic, and purely everyday problems to representatives of the presidential administration monitored by them. There are also significant inconveniences and obvious risks in this, but at the same time it is, in my view, the only way to guard against the apparatus-distributive virus.

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin Meets With Tatar, Mari Presidents

LD2101135394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1221 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin held a meeting with Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaymiyev in the Kremlin on Friday. Development and legal foundations of relations between the republics were the main theme of the conversation. The need to speed up the drafting and signing of an agreement on the separation of powers was noted. Negotiations on this matter will shortly be resumed.

On the same day Yeltsin met with President of Mari Republic Vladislav Zotin and Chairman of the State Assembly of the Republic Anatoliy Smirnov. The participants on the meeting told the Russian president about the political situation in the republic after the adoption of a new constitution. Economic and social problems, specifically problems of regulating the population's employment arising during the conversion of the military-industrial complex were discussed, the presidential press office noted.

Interior Minister Yerin Visits Tatarstan

LD1901133494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1230 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin today left for Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, a constituent republic of the Russian Federation, to attend a summing up conference of local law enforcement bodies. Yerin, who is member of the Russian Security Council, was absent from today's meeting of the council.

In the course of the visit, the Interior Ministry's public relations centre reports, Yerin will meet leaders of the republic, will visit law enforcement establishments and units of interior troops, as well as local penitentiaries.

The minister arrived in the capital of Tatarstan on the same day.

Comments on Visit

LD2101100394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0923 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Sorokin]

[Text] Kazan January 21 TASS—"There were and there are no problems between the Russian and Tatar interior ministries," Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin told a news conference in Kazan on Friday. All efforts by national extremists to drive a wedge between Russia and Tatarstan are in vain, the minister added.

In the minister's opinion, everything should be done in a civilised way. A government decision between Russia and Tatarstan is being drafted now. It will define ways of delegating powers.

All this is being made to reform the Russian Interior Ministry. The first move has been made: The role of city and district militia departments was increased. Their powers were enlarged.

These departments were granted additional rights and, consequently, their duties were increased. Functions which city and district departments are unable to fulfill, are delegated to regional departments or the Interior Ministry. The entire ministry will be remade on such principles.

Yerin noted that he gave a news conference on last year's results for the first time. Although the crime situation remains difficult, there are some positive changes. Crime rate rose by 1.4 per cent over the past year, while in 1992 it was 24 per cent.

The rate of crime exposure is at the level of 50.6 per cent and for serious crimes—55.6 per cent.

The situation in Tatarstan is much better, the minister stressed. The general rate of crime exposure here is 60 per cent. The minister attributed this to special crime control measures taken by the republic for the second year running.

These measures should be thoroughly studied, the minister noted. In Yerin's opinion, Tatarstan outstripped Russian law enforcement bodies in taking initiatives in the sphere of crime control, which should be acclaimed.

Tatarstan Elections to Russian Parliament To Go Ahead

MK2201133094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "Provincial Chronicle" column]

[Text] Kazan—As of 1 February polling stations will be open for repeat elections to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly scheduled for 13 March. According to officials at the Tatarstan Central Election Commission, no changes are expected in the stations' operating procedures.

The coordinating council of the republic's sociopolitical organizations incorporating more than 30 groups issued a statement containing an appeal to renounce the repeat elections. The council believes that no elections "must be held until a treaty has been signed between the Russian Federation and the Tatarstan Republic."

Tatarstan To Sign Russian Accord Before Elections

LD1901191794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1526 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] A bilateral agreement on mutual delegating of authorities will be signed by Russia and Tatarstan on March 13, i.e. before the second round of elections to the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly, Tatarstan's president Mintimer Shaymiyev said speaking in Kazan on Tuesday.

Last December the elections to the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly did not take place in Tatarstan because of low turnout.

Chernomyrdin Arrives in Orel for Conference

LD2401121994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1152 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Likhopek]

[Text] Orel January 24 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Monday arrived in Orel, central Russia, to take part in a conference which will discuss measures to ensure fuller use of the agroindustrial complex in central Russia and better food supplies to the country as a whole.

The conference, which will be attended by the leaders of the federal bodies of power and administration heads of 18 central Russian regions and their deputies in charge of agriculture, is expected to hear the prime minister's first statement on agricultural policy after recent reshuffles in the government. Informed sources told ITAR-TASS that the conference is expected to result in a government resolution on working out a programme for the development of the agroindustrial complexes of the central Russian regions for the period up to the year 2000.

Today conference participants visited some agricultural enterprises in the Orel region and food-processing factories. They also had conversations with private farmers.

Sobchak: Petersburg To Pursue Autonomous Policy

LD2101192294 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Anatoliy Sobchak told journalists today that St. Petersburg will defend its rights as a subject of the Federation and pursue an autonomous policy, irrespective of what is happening in the Russian parliament, in particular continue with privatization and trying attract foreign banks and investments into the city.

St. Petersburg's mayor believes that the Russian Government has become economically disorientated. In Sobchak's view, in the conditions of the market it must, in the first place, work on the finance-credit system and the regulation of the cost of goods transportation inside Russia.

Komi Republic Assembly Views Draft Constitution

LD2101135494 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 24 Jan 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A draft new constitution of the Komi republic was the main subject of discussion at a meeting of the parliament's presidium with an increased number of participants. The draft tries to combine in the new basic law the principles of territorial sovereignty on the basis of Russian federalism. The articles on freedoms of citizens are being amended to bring them in line with universally accepted norms. A program for implementing the law on the Komi republic's state languages caused debates. The majority of lawmakers regarded a list of posts that require the knowledge of two languages, Russian and Komi, as a limitation of civil rights. No agreement was reached on a list of the premises that should be equipped with systems for simultaneous translation at the expense of the budget. A decision was adopted on selling oil shares to people residing in oil-extracting regions on a preferential basis for money and vouchers. A strict provision on a procedure for holding competition for the right to use Komi natural resources was approved.

Draft Constitution Published

LD2301072694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0654 GMT 23 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Syktyvkar, Komi Republic, January 23 TASS—A new draft constitution of the Komi Republic, northern Russia, prepared by a special commission at the republic's Supreme Soviet has been published in the local press for public consideration.

All state power bodies, public associations, labor collectives and inividuals are invited to submit their proposals and amendments to the commission, the Supreme Soviet presidium said in an address to the republic's residents, also released by the media.

All proposals must be submitted before February 2, 1994.

Under the presidium's decision, the draft constitution will be considered at the parliament's extraordinary session scheduled for February 15.

The draft reads that the Komi Republic is a democratic legal state within the composition of the Russian Federation. The draft nominates the multinational population of the Komi Republic as "the bearer of the republic's sovereighnty and the only source of the state power" which may execute its powers both directly, through participation in referendums and elections, and indirectly, through a system of state and local self-rule agencies.

In compliance with Russia' constitution, the state system of power bodies in the republic includes the state council, the head of the republic, the constitutional court, and a court system. Under the draft constitution, the state council is the highest representative and legislative body in the republic. The head of the republic is a "top official who directly leads the cabinet of ministers, which is the republic's highest executive power body".

Ingushetia Stabilized; Yeltsin To Visit 23 Feb

MK2201120994 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 2

[Natalya Abakumova report in the "Conflict" column: "The Ossetian-Ingush Talks Cannot Get Off the Ground"]

[Text] Vladimir Lozovoy, head of the provisional administration in the emergency rule zone on the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, has stated, according to INTERFAX, that the situation in the conflict zone has been stabilized and human losses minimized. True, this has called for several tens of billions of rubles in direct expenditures from Russia. Mr. Lozovoy described the Ingush side's position on the return of the refugees as "unconstructive." In his opinion, the Ingushi

are trying to force the relocation of refugees to Prigorodnyy Rayon in North Ossetia. "At the same time we have been very worried by the unwillingness of the Ossetian side to sit down at the negotiating table on this question prior to republican presidential elections," Vladimir Lozovoy noted.

Yesterday North Ossetia demanded the promulgation of a political and legal assessment of the October-November 1992 events in the republic's Prigorodnyy Rayon, as a result of which some 500 people died, before the presidential talks are to begin.

President Yeltsin, concerned about with situation in the conflict zone, stated at a meeting with representatives of the Almaz women's Russian-speaking movement that he intends to enforce the edict. Furthermore, according to Ingushetia's permanent mission in Moscow, the president is going to visit the republic on 23 February, the anniversary of the deportation of the Ingush people in 1944.

Impact of Sverdlovsk Oblast Reshuffle Viewed

PM1901135194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 2

[Vladimir Sanatin article: "Having Previously Overcome the Moscow Lobby, Boris Yeltsin Came Right Up Against Opposition from the Provincial 'Emperors of the Taiga.' In This Struggle It Remains Unclear at Present Who Will Be Able To Break the Ural Range"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—Many local analysts regard the change of governor in Sverdlovsk Oblast as a victory for one commercial and industrial clan over another. The 14 January announcement that the oblast's former government was resigning en masse was no coincidence. Yeltsin's decision to dismiss Rossel is thereby disputed. The conclusion: The Ural lobby is heterogeneous, and a new breed of politicians have emerged who can dictate their will not only in the government but also to the president himself.

The working career of Aleksey Strakhov, the oblast's new governor who has replaced Eduard Rossel, is quite standard: student construction detachments; the territorial administration of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply; Yekaterinburg City Hall. Recently he preferred to be the first deputy, in other words to control the essence of things while staying in the shadows. The rapid finish by the "gray horse" came as a complete surprise to the oblast's population....

Such a "demarche" by Yeltsin also came as a surprise to Eduard Rossel, who believed that the writing and publication of the constitution of the Ural Republic gave unlimited power to him and to those close to business circles. Yes, Rossel's protectionism with regard to firms such as "Inter-Ural" (90 percent of copper exports) and "Ural-Titan" (32 percent of all the world's titanium) gave Eduard Ergartovich the right to consider that he was de facto both the export-industrial leader and the political leader of the Urals. The draft constitution of the Ural Republic assigned to him his own security council, his own militia, his own court, his own banking support, his own foreign economic relations department.... That is, Eduard Rossel was becoming Akinfiy Demidov [18th-century industrialist] under the living Peter....

But, if you recall, Peter I sent Captain Tatishchev to found Yekaterinburg (to counteract the mayhem of the Demidovs). Now, 271 years after the Demidovs' dominion in the Urals, history has repeated itself.

It seems that the former governor did not attach great significance to Yekaterinburg City Hall's attempts to win back its agreed rights. Meanwhile, Yekaterinburg's industry, real estate, and advertising space are worth many firms blessed by Rossel.

Yekaterinburg's struggle against the arrogance of the oblast authorities began long ago. I believe that Arkadiy Chernetskiy and Aleksey Strakhov, first deputy head of Yekaterinburg, absolutely disliked the idea of the Ural Republic, in which they could remain "responsible for the capital's sewers." A huge proportion of the oblast center's real estate, including that leased by foreign consulates, would then have become the republic's property.

Now the entire government of Sverdlovsk Oblast is following Rossel in resigning! Yeltsin is being given to understand that, along with Rossel, he "dismissed" those who had been responsible for finances, transport, health care, and trade in the oblast ever since Boris Nikolayevich was first secretary here, in the Urals. Today it is stupid not to admit that the oblast lived thanks to these officials' years-long experience and colossal connections!

The president's circles believed that an opposition to the old industrial-monopoly and commercial clan would come into being in Yekaterinburg thanks to Strakhov's promotion. Such a struggle is better than one between the region and the center. Boris Nikolayevich is now getting—in the person of Rossel and his business circles—not only a sovereign-economic opposition but also a tough political one. It is paradoxical but, having previously overcome the Moscow lobby, Yeltsin came right up against the Ural lobby. Evidently, he must understand that this will be the case with every territory where "loyal colleagues and friends" remain.

Within a matter of days Eduard Rossel created the "Ural Transformation" nonparty sociopolitical association to nominate its candidacy for the Federation Council. Rossel is cunning when he calls his association a "nonparty" one. He simply did not want to associate his name with the Party of Consolidation, whose representative is Aleksandr Tikhonov, leader of the "Inter-Ural" Joint Venture. Precisely this party elaborated the new "Regional Development Concept," and it has the backing of the "Industrial Union" with the aggrieved military-industrial complex. "Ural Transformation" can be nonparty only in the sense of the treasury ruble's transformation into the nontreasury dollar....

The fight to the death is continuing. I believe that Sverdlovsk Oblast's old government will flow into the new commercial structures and substructures of Rossel's business circle. Strakhov will have a hard time. The monopoly will endeavor to leave him in the role of the oblast's chief supplier, for they never lived in the age of competition and will never tolerate it! In the Federation Council Rossel will promote the principle of Russia's territorial division as a counterweight to national-territorial division and might become a Russian national hero.

What will the nonparty Yeltsin do in this situation?

President of Chuvash Republic Sworn In

LD2101161094 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1348 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] Nikolay Fedorov, the first president of the Chuvash Republic—former Russian justice minister—took office in Cheboksary today. We promised to give you the details about this event, so let us listen to a report by our correspondent Yevgeniy Nikonov.

[Nikonov] Taking up office and placing his hand on the Constitution of the Chuvash Republic, President Nikolay Fedorov took the oath:

[Fedorov] "I pledge, in carrying out my duties as president of the Chuvash Republic, to observe the Constitution and laws of the Chuvash Republic, the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation, and to defend its sovereignty, to respect and preserve the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen, the rights of the peoples of the Chuvash Republic, and to conscientiously carry out the obligations entrusted to me by the people, which will be the guarantor of friendship and cooperation with all peoples, and to be responsible for my actions before the people."

[Nikonov] In his inaugural speech, in which he set out his political credo, Fedorov said that as president he would sanction freedom, knowledge, culture, and morality, and in the sphere of the economy he would support the people who are working and producing goods.

[Fedorov] "A politician can only become a professional and can only truly help Russia when we link him with the interests of the country's commodity producers and the will of the entities of the Russian Federation. The question is not so much one of dramatis personae as of the principle of shaping a mechanism to work out a policy that is answerable to the Russian people."

[Nikonov] On behalf of Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Fedorov was congratulated by Sergey Aleksandrovich Filatov, the head of the president's administration.

[Filatov] "Permit me, on the instructions of Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, to heartily congratulate Nikolay Vasiliyevich Fedorov, the first president of the Chuvash Republic on his election, his taking of office, and the beginning of his work, and to wish him all the best on this path although it will be a very, very difficult one. I have to say that we have lived through a very tough and dramatic year, a year that has seen everything—a crisis in the economy, a crisis of power, and a political crisis, and which, unfortunately, has ended in a dramatic way because of the fact, in the main, the structures of power have not been able to cope with the tasks and aspirations facing our country. It has to be said that the reformation of the power structures is under way, is continuing, and today the Chuvash Republic has also embarked upon the reformation of its own power structures, strengthening the authority of its executive structure."

Kaliningrad Official on Free Trade Zone

WS2101175094 Kaliningrad KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 94 pp 1,2

[Interview with Yuriy Matochkin, head of the Kaliningrad Oblast Administration, by N. Borovskaya; place and date not given: "It Is Easier To Win in Elections With Numbers; as Well as in Life"]

[Text] [Borovskaya] To begin with, I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of being elected a deputy to the Council of the Federation.

[Matochkin] Thank you.

[Borovskaya] How do you assess the results of the elections to the Council of the Federation in our oblast?

[Matochkin] The situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast is similar to that in Russia. However, we should study this situation, make conclusions, and weigh our mistakes.

The distribution of political forces during the elections in Kaliningrad Oblast is not so gloomy. In my opinion, despite a high percentage of voters who had supported Zhirinovskiy, the majority of our people favor reforms. The majority of the population have voted for democrats. They number some 75 percent of the entire electorate.

[Borovskaya] How can you explain why Kaliningrad citizens—despite all the complexities of our life—traditionally support democratic trends?

[Matochkin] I would not speak about our democratic traditions. If you remember, during the presidential elections our citizens voted not for Yeltsin but for Zhirinovskiy?

However, after August 1991, public opinion began to change. That means that reforms began to work. The results of the April referendum in 1993, as well as the December elections in 1993 proved this change.

[Borovskaya] Maybe our geopolitical localization is a factor.... Kaliningrad citizens see how the surrounding world is living, they believe that their life cannot be worse. Maybe this factor differentiates us from outlying Russian provinces?

[Matochkin] In my opinion, you are right. In fact, we see how people in other states, where radical reforms are implemented, live. This affects the state of mind, gives the impression of the irreversibility of changes.

[Borovskaya] Before the elections, you were hesitant either to run in the elections or to quit this idea. You do not regret your decision....

[Matochkin] I am used to working with numbers. I am not an emotional person. Speaking sincerely, we—the heads of the local administration—have found ourselves in a dubious situation. If, according to the Constitution, only one representative of legislative and executive branches could run in the elections, how should the acting leaders of the administration behave? If the electorate does not elect me, how can I remain in the same position?

Yes, I was hesitant. I understood that I was taking risks, and some of my colleagues persuaded me not to participate in the elections. Therefore, I studied the situation through poll results. When in the last decade of the elections I understood what category of population supports me, I felt more confident. I understood that I had a moral right to represent our oblast in the new Russian legislature.

[Borovskaya] I have heard that your people had facilitated your elections by neutralizing your opponent Leonid Gorbenko and by pressing our Duma Deputy Yuriy Voyevoda....

[Matochkin] From the start, we—Leonid Gorbenko and I—were in tandem. At that time, Shumeyko was not yet running in the elections and Gorbenko's rating was high. Over the last decade, everything changed. However, Leonid Gorbenko matched this situation perfectly well, and I had no reason to put him out of the elections.

On 7 December, I met with him and discussed the situation. All of a sudden, I received a phone call informing me that he had withdrawn his candidacy. It was a surprise to me. He had destroyed the planned situation. We knew who would receive his votes.

This turn of events was undesirable and sudden. I did not authorize anyone to talk to Leonid Gorbenko and if someone has taken the initiative, this is another case. In addition, I did not ask anyone to persuade Yuriy Voyevoda to withdraw his candidacy in exchange for my chair in the local administration. It is nonsense. How can you appoint an officer on active duty to a civil position?

[Borovskaya] That is clear. What about Shumeyko? We elected him according to his official post. We required a person in the government who could patronize the entire oblast. However, he can currently head the Council of the Federation. What will the oblast get from his election?

[Matochkin] He would be of greater use to us if he became a member of the government. However, if he becomes the chairman of the Council of the Federation, he could aid us in resolving the status of our oblast.

[Bo ovskaya] In my mind, we owe the rapid adoption of the edict "On Kaliningrad Oblast" to Shumeyko. Does this edict summarize our achievements in this sphere?

[Matochkin] Yes. Despite the fact that the edict has no word combination "free trade zone," it contains elements of "free trade zone" regulations, in particular, the lifting of export-import duty limitations and the introduction of tax breaks.

[Borovskaya] This edict has come into force from the moment it was signed, has it not? Is it currently being implemented?

[Matochkin] Yes, the edict has come into force. However, the mechanism for its implementation has not yet been developed. For example, what about customs duties? The value-added tax has been lifted, however, there are no regulations on how it should be lifted.

[Borovskaya] Who develops this mechanism: Moscow or Kaliningrad?

[Matochkin] All the documents are being drafted here. Later, they are sent to Moscow. We have to do a lot of work. For example, the issue of earmarking a tax credit for investments. What documents are required, who issues this credit, and so on. Such questions are arising on each and every issue. Each paragraph should be thoroughly developed, and the initiative is always in our hands.

How has the federal program for development of Kaliningrad Oblast appeared? I met with Chernomyrdin and said that we badly needed such a program. The Economy Ministry has allocated 170 million rubles to its draft. Researchers from the Central Research Institute for Economic Issues, who had been charged with drafting this program, have already visited Kaliningrad. By the end of March 1994, we should present this draft program to the government.

[Borovskaya] What does this program give Kaliningrad?

[Matochkin] We want to provide centralized financing to the sites that are of all-Russian importance, such as airports, seaports....

[Borovskaya] Under the former Supreme Soviet, attempts to receive our "own" law were enviously met by the representatives of other regions. Similar people will come to the Federal Duma....

[Matochkin] We hope for the wisdom of the new Duma. We are going to explain our position. Currently, we are

working on holding an international forum of Baltic states. It will be held in March in Sopot [Poland]. We invite representatives of all the oblasts of the North-West region and Central Russia to participate in this forum.

[Borovskaya] However, if your explanations do not help, what will happen then?

[Matochkin] Then, we will hold a referendum in Kaliningrad. The Council of the Federation will have to consider the viewpoint of the Federation. However, I am not a pessimist. Not a single initiative was left without the support of the president and the government. Deputies will debate this issue but the issue should be positively resolved.

[Borovskaya] Does this edict give our free trade zone any advantages before the other free trade zones of Russia?

[Matochkin] Are there any other zones? In the opinion of the international community, there are two such zones in Russia—in Kaliningrad and Nakhodka. We are in a more advantageous position than Nakhodka is. However, it has more natural resources and a larger territory. We have a bigger foreign investment sector—9.5 percent of the total sum of Russian foreign investments.

Our ports are processing 4.5 million tonnes of freight (St. Petersburg—15-20 tonnes of freight). We can increase this figure to 10 million tonnes, and our final goal is to process 30-40 million tonnes of freight.

[Borovskaya] Recently, Pavel Globa [famous CIS astrologist] has published his terrible prognosis of our near and distant future. What are your predictions at the beginning of the new year?

[Matochkin] I am not an opponent of Globa. Each of us has his own profession and earns money the way he can. However, we should become realists: If we begin to consider modern trends in the development of production, the tempos of collapse will decrease. I foresee the lowest critical level in 1994-95. We will not have worse times than we have already lived through. At the same time, two menacing specters are currently alarming me—the rise of unemployment and the bankruptcy of enterprises. We should take some measures, in particular, to protect small- and medium-size business which must create new jobs for the unemployed. We are establishing a fund to protect these small- and medium-size businesses so that people are able to get credits for building their own workshops. However, bankruptcy is not as alarming; it just means changing the owner.

By the way, I have data showing that Kaliningrad citizens not only look at consumer goods in our shops but they buy them. In nine positions out of 20, Kaliningrad consumption indexes are higher in 1993 than in 1992.

It is important not to frighten ourselves with various troubles. Then our life will become better. This is my New Year wish.

International Affairs

Kravchuk Views Trilateral Nuclear Agreement

LD2201015594 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1910 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] On 21 January, at a meeting with journalists, Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk commented on the results of the trilateral Moscow statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia concerning nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

[Begin Kravchuk recording] The thing is that we fulfilled the parliament's reservations. This is a very important element one cannot refrain from. [Word indistinct] the executive power was following the path of fulfilling the parliament's decisions, not blocking them. For example, we were agreeing to certain compromises, making certain concessions. [Words indistinct] Russia, the United States, Ukraine were doing this. In politics, this is the only way to act. Well, generally speaking, I expected there would be an opposition [words indistinct]. They had not yet read the documents but already thousands of them clung to the president and to all the executive authorities, so that if I were responding to this, one would have never seen me any more.

Already they label me as a traitor [words indistinct]. They say I betrayed the national interests [words indistinct]. I know there are people who always did it this way. But if a man who is a [word indistinct] or wants to be a [word indistinct] politician, and who strives toward this [word indistinct], then I would like the one who says this, who [word indistinct] big policy to ponder over the fact that, first, [words indistinct] policy is made when they read documents and, second, when they take into consideration the situation in the world, take into consideration the state of affairs [word indistinct] in the world, including Ukraine. [passage indistinct]

The one who speculates or calls not to withdraw nuclear weapons, to leave them in Ukraine so that Ukraine becomes a nuclear state, this can be qualified as follows: [words indistinct] independence to Ukraine, and our people [words indistinct]. This is why the only correct move by Ukraine is the move we make. [Words indistinct] not to lose our strength, not to ignore but, on the contrary, to protect Ukraine's national interests. But this protection can [word indistinct] if there are real opportunities and not just a wish. [words indistinct] the one who declares now so loudly that Ukraine must be nuclear and that it should not give up weapons, [word indistinct] makes Ukraine a hostage and sentences its people to death. [end recording]

Criticizes Opponents of Arms Treaty

LD2101180894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1703 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk says "those who offer Ukraine to hold back to its nuclear arsenal want the country to become hostage to the nuclear weapons signing a death warrant to the people of Ukraine". He was speaking in Kiev on Friday [21 January] while attending the national stock exchange.

Kravchuk said that by signing the three-nation nuclear disarmament agreement in Moscow, "we have met the conditions set by the Ukrainian parliament during the ratification of the Start-1 agreement." He said the government embarked on the road of implementing rather than blocking parliamentary resolutions and had to strike compromise and make concessions as it should be.

Envoy to Russia Calls Pact 'Great Breakthrough'

LD2401074694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0734 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Kiev January 24 TASS—Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, has described the tripartite Moscow agreement on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament as a great breakthrough not only for Ukranian, but also for Russian diplomacy. He took part in the Perekryostok programme, broadcast by Ukrainian TV on Sunday, which highlighted the forthcoming discussion of the agreement by the Ukrainian parliament, due to take place on January 25.

The Ukrainian ambassador stressed that Russia had approached the tripartite Moscow agreement realistically, acting as an equal and not senior partner during the settlement of the complicated problem. Kryzhanovskiy said that he supported the tripartite Moscow agreement on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament both as a diplomat and a Ukrainian citizen. "Nuclear weapons are not what our people need today. The problem for them is survival. If nuclear disarmament even involves compensation, the Ukrainian parliament should support the Moscow agreement," he said.

The same idea was expressed by Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, who also took part in the Perekryostok programme. He stressed that President Kravchuk had acted in Moscow on the basis of the resolution of the Ukrainian parliament in the part, dealing with the ratification of the START-1 Treaty. He pointed out that the participation of the United States in the Moscow treaty is a positive factor and a guarantee, and called attention to the importance for Ukraine of the fact that Russia agreed to provide maintenance to the nuclear warheads, deployed in Ukraine.

Parliament Official on Trilateral Nuclear Accord

LD2301121694 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0920 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] The trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of our state remains the focus of attention. If, in the world as a whole

this move is supported on a mass scale, in Ukraine attitudes toward this statement and its assessments are ambiguous. Our correspondent Petro Ostapenko met Oleksandr Tarasenko, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine's Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security, and asked him to express his attitude toward the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia.

[Begin recording] [Ostapenko] Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk and representatives of the executive bodies of power are saying today that the trilateral statement is the result and continuation, let us say, of the decisions by the Supreme Council on nuclear weapons. Oleksandr, what is your opinion? Is this true?

[Tarasenko] Well, this document still needs in-depth comprehension. First, it is called a statement, a trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia. How should we assess it today? Does it have a legal force as an international document and as an agreement, or is this just a statement? Upon studying it profoundly—yesterday our commission was considering this document—upon studying it profoundly, it can, in the long run, be qualified as an international agreement. In compliance with our current legislation—the Constitution first and foremost—and in compliance with the law on the president, on his plenary powers, the international agreements that Ukraine—that is, the executive power, concludes in the field of defense, military construction, military relations with neighboring and other states, are subject to mandatory ratification by the Supreme Council.

Why did I say that this document is an agreement and not a statement? Because, there is a supplement to the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia as of 14 January, and this supplement provides specific dates, the terms on which our strategic nuclear weapons should be fully deactivated, their number, and so on. This goes beyond the limits of the resolution that was adopted by the Supreme Council. What does this supplement stipulate? This supplement gives, for example, such parameters: Ukraine ensures the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons—that is, strategic air force, TU-160, and other aircraft carrying nuclear missiles, located on its territory, in compliance with its relevant agreements within the term of seven years as is envisaged by the START I Treaty and within the context of the statement by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on Ukraine's non-nuclear status, all the RS-22 missiles—to be more specific they are called SS-24—on Ukraine's territory will be deactivated within 10 months by means of removing their warheads. What does it mean?

You know that in two thirds of our silos launcher vehicles are filled with liquid fuel—that is, heptyl. The entire world already knows what kind of a liquid fuel this is. This heptyl is a super poisonous substance, and the launcher vehicle itself is even a bigger powder keg than the launcher vehicle and the warhead as a whole. Proceeding from this, Ukraine and its plenary bodies and persons must take into account their own interests, first and foremost, and not the interests of those who benefit from this unilaterally. I believe that the Supreme Council, either the present or the future one, should seriously ponder over this document, and it can be ratified only after its parameters are specified.

[Ostapenko] I am sorry to interrupt you. You have just read the item that has to do with all sides without exception. But nothing is said here about the Supreme Council resolution on the ratification of START I with reservations. It clearly stipulates that 36 percent of launcher vehicles and 42 percent of warheads are subject to elimination today. That is to say, these parameters have been extended to all nuclear [word indistinct].

[Tarasenko] Absolutely. They run contrary to the Supreme Council resolution. The Supreme Council resolution and START I envisage a percentage and here it talks about the complete elimination.

In this connection I would like to say the following, so that our radio listeners and our compatriots, our half-brothers, as they say, would know it: All those strategic nuclear systems located on the territory of Ukraine are targeted at certain objectives in the United States of America and relevant bases beyond the borders of the U.S. Correspondingly, approximately the same number of nuclear weapons are targeted at our territory. Well, this is military strategy and tactics, and there is nothing incomprehensible here. Everybody understands this: If you target me, then I target you. But this document should also envisage adequate moves on the part of the United States of America, and our control over this, because everyone will control us, control how we eliminate nuclear weapons, remove nuclear warheads, transfer them from Ukraine to Russia. The only thing envisaged here is that Ukraine will have the possibility of controlling Russia neutralizing the nuclear warheads. However, this agreement does not envisage what the United States will do with that quantity of strategic nuclear weapons that are targeted at us, and what will be Ukraine's role in carrying out control over this process, as far as the actions of the United States are concerned.

[Ostapenko] Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin declared that they would decode their missiles, which would then be retargetted at some deserted islands, or something like that. Ukraine's participation here is not envisaged, is that right?

[Tarasenko] Ukraine's participation here is not envisaged. Moreover, I disagree with such a stand, just as a citizen and just as an inhabitant of this planet Earth. If Ukraine eliminates these weapons, the former weapons of the Soviet Union, as is known, then the United States of America should eliminate and neutralize the same quantity of weapons. This is what we are talking about, not about retargetting at some other states, and so on. That is to say, there is no alternative in the world to

universal nuclear disarmament and appropriate actions by all nuclear states. This is what our politicians should insist on, and at this point I again repeat and emphasize that the given document needs in-depth comprehension in legal terms, in terms of international law. What obligations, what guarantees can we talk about? Because, they already guaranteed us something to a certain extent. Let us not mention any names today, because there has already been enough talk about this. Who is to blame and who, let us say, ordered the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine? Those are our weapons. They would have been of paramount importance for the defense capacity of Ukraine. However, we transferred those weapons and could not cope with these ones. Here we outwitted ourselves.

[Ostapenko] I know, Oleksandr, that you are familiar with the technical condition of the strategic nuclear weapons, missiles, and warheads located on Ukraine's territory. Today, in numerous interviews, the military say that it is difficult for Ukraine to service them, that Ukraine will be unable to service them, therefore, the sooner we deactivate and transfer these weapons, the better for Ukraine. What do you think about it, please.

[Tarasenko] You, Petro, probably touched upon a very important aspect of this problem. It is quite clear that nuclear warheads and their systems are the most sophisticated systems because they should be sophisticated as they guarantee the safety of a nuclear warhead itself and a silo as a whole. This is why there exists a practice in the world according to which the given warheads are serviced by the authors who manufactured them. The authors themselves can destroy them. There is no other process, as they say. In this respect, we could find a state that would do this [word indistinct] but we cannot do this without Russia because the one who will have access there should know what it is, and so on. Therefore, every launching system and, moreover, nuclear warhead has relevant terms which guarantee their safety, and systems. We cannot do this without Russia. Therefore, it is necessary either to have very specific, responsible bilateral agreements toward that end with Russia on ensuring periodic servicing of the warheads and the silos as a whole or to neutralize and transfer them after their guaranteed service life expires. There is no other way around. Also, it could be possible to do as follows: A certain number of warheads and silos could be dismantled without their periodic servicing after their guaranteed service life expires. This is the way to follow. This would be the most correct, most appropriate way. Following it, one should move from the warhead, from the head, as they say, to the tail. That is to say, to dismantle the entire silo and not just remove the warheads and leave the rest with ourselves. It would be the same kind of a powder keg. Therefore, the most correct way is to act in line with a stage-by-stage, unit-by-unit principle. Both the warhead and the launcher vehicle should be dismantled completely. This would ensure the highest level of security to our state.

[Ostapenko] One more, very important aspect, as far as this problem is concerned. Did you see the guarantees of Ukraine's national security in this statement and in the supplement, the guarantees that Ukraine and the Supreme Council were striving for and which all those living in Ukraine wish to have.

[Tarasenko] Undoubtedly, there are certain aspects and elements of security here. There are such provisions, and so on. But, as they say, history and mankind know instances when such guarantees were given, when there were agreements, but there was the Second World War despite these bilateral and multilateral agreements, and 22 million people died and the economies in a whole number of countries were destroyed. This is why one should rely on God but have his own mind, as they say. Both our military and scientific potentials should work toward ensuring our state security—not at the expense of nuclear weapons now but at the expense of other highly effective means. Such measures are being taken today. This is why, simultaneously with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, fulfilling that resolution by the Supreme Council, we should work concurrently toward ensuring the combat readiness of our Armed Forces. Our commission, together with military departments, is carrying out this work. [end recording]

[Announcer] Such is the attitude of People's Deputy Oleksandr Tarasenko, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security, toward the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev Urges Economic Ties

LD2101204794 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Nursultan Nazarbayev was warmly welcomed everywhere by Dnepropetrovsk oblast residents.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording, in Russian] During our negotiations with President Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk in Kiev yesterday, and during our conversation with chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast administration Pavlo Ivanovych [Lazarenko], we were saying how greatly our economic ties have diminished in these past few years! Last year alone, the trade turnover between Russia and Kazakhstan amounted to 1.650 billion dollars. Experts believe it should equal 5 or 6 billion.

Kazakhstan used to have terrific ties with Dnepropetrovsk oblast alone, and now they are reduced by 50 percent. What does it mean? No goods are supplied to Kazakhstan while people are losing jobs here. When no relevant products are supplied to us, we are unable to launch a certain production line. Everybody loses in the long run.

Now that we have recovered from euphoria and grasped the situation, we must gradually set up horizontal ties.

We must all now think how we can bring people together, how we can lift the border barriers, how we can establish freedom of movement, and how we can help each other's economies find their feet again? [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Communique on Visit

LD2101224594 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ukraine has made public a joint communique on the results of the official visit to Ukraine by President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev.

It says: During the negotiations between the presidents of the two friendly states, there was a profound and constructive exchange of opinions on a wide range of issues of bilateral cooperation and international issues of mutual interest. The sides stated the importance of the Kazakh-Ukrainian summit within the context of the further consolidation of the potential of bilateral cooperation and interaction on the international scene. The presidents of Kazakhstan and Ukraine expressed mutual understanding of the necessity of effective efforts aimed at consolidating the mechanism of the implementation of the agreements in various spheres of bilateral relations. The leaders of both states pointed out the urgency of diversifying the forms and trends of the trade and economic relations. In particular, issues were considered and a relevant agreement was signed.

Leonid Kravchuk and Nursultan Nazarbayev paid special attention to an in-depth examination of the tendencies in the present-day international situation and within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

On the results of an exchange of opinions on these issues the presidents signed a Declaration Contemporary World: Challenges and Dangers. While discussing the nuclear disarmament issues the president of Kazakhstan welcomed the signing of the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States of America on 14 January this year.

A Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, a Consular Treaty, a protocol on consultations between the foreign ministries and an number of other important agreements were signed in the course of the Kazakh-Ukrainian negotiations. The sides expressed their certainty that the signed documents would become a reliable contractual and legal basis of a mutually advantageous and equal cooperation between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

The leaders of both countries commissioned experts to continue work with the aim of signing a treaty on legal relations and legal support in civil and criminal cases and also agreements which would regulate the issue on the rights of national minorities and the problems of deported peoples.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev invited President Leonid Kravchuk to pay an official visit to Kazakhstan. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

'Text' of Joint Declaration

LD2201131794 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0100 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Declaration signed by President Leonid Kravchuk and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev on 20 January in Kiev]

[Text] On Friday 21 January, Ukraine's media circulated the following declaration issued jointly by presidents Kravchuk of Ukraine and Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan: Modern World, Challenges and Threats:

The 20th Century is drawing to a close, mankind is preparing to enter a new epoch of its development. History has accelerated its pace, making mankind both a participant in and an eyewitness to global—in terms of their consequences- - changes in the world structure. The world has become increasingly more open and interdependent.

The epoch of the two systems and military-political blocs' great confrontation has fallen into oblivion. The global community of nations has been joined on par by many peoples who have established their new independent states. Concurrently positive changes on the European and Asian continents have been accompanied by emerging new challenges and dangers: interethnic conflicts, which are becoming sharper; emergence of security vacuum zones; attempts to destabilize the newly independent nations from outside and setting the spheres of influence are among them. All these demand urgent and adequate measures and decisions.

While adhering to the principles of the world community and global security's indivisibility Ukraine and Kazakhstan believe that threats to any country's national security pose a danger for general security and peace the world over. The world's politics should be guided by axiomatic principles of one's own security through security of all and domestic stability contributing to global stability. Concerns which exist in the field of national security of a number of states may be eliminated only by way of estimating an inter-regional universal security system, extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok and including all the nations without exception. Such international organizations and institutions as the UN, CSCE, NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance Council and others play an important role in this process.

The concept of Partnership for Peace, which was endorsed by NATO member nations' heads of state, has great potential. Its realization will allow to expand the framework of stability peace and trust among nations. The past decade's major event was the establishment of new independent states on the former Soviet Union's territory. Wishing to construct new civilized relations among them based on sovereign equality, parity, good neighbourliness, noninterference and mutual respect are nations who have behind them a common long and thorny historical road decided to set up their commonwealth to assist each other in overcoming the hard

consequences of the totalitarian epoch and retain their good and mutually beneficial relations which really promote and consolidate friendship among our peoples.

The Commonwealth of Independent States has existed for over two years now. Its evolution has been difficult and controversial, with intermittent instability and crisis periods sometimes aggravating into sharp conflict situations. Yet the two years of the CIS existence may be referred to, with all the due responsibility, as having summarized the fact that global cataclysms and (?societal) turmoil on the former USSR's territory were avoided, which had been forecast by some politicians. The process of the new nations accedance to the world community was accelerated and foundations laid for consolidation of our major priceless gain, that independence and the right to dispose of one's own destiny.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan are both multiethnic entities intent on constructing their open democratic societies who base their development on retention and consolidation of interethnic and social peace and accord. We are aware of the tremendous significance of keeping civic and interethnic stability in our nations and other CIS member states and declare our full determination to further continue this course.

In view of this deep concerns have been generated by certain trends which have surfaced in the international situation both within the CIS as a whole and in some of its individual member nations. We have no right to shut our eyes to the fact that of late irresponsible forces have been active which are calling for the totalitarian regime's reanimation igniting interethnic strife, xenophobia, chauvinism, nationalism, and propagating destructive ideas which contradict the UN Charter and the CSCE principles.

These alien to civilized international relations phenomena have recently been condemned by foreign ministers of the CSCE member nations and the CIS heads of state. We declare with full responsibility that any support for aggressive national patriotism, imperial chauvinism, national exclusiveness, and intolerance which are being propagated by certain extremist political circles may result in destructive consequences of global dimensions. We draw the attention of all sober minded politicians, CIS peoples, the entire world community to the need of joining efforts in a bid to prevent further dissemination of ideas based upon propagation of fascism, calls to imperial expansionism and attempts at their realization which pose a threat not only to the new independent nations but to the entire world.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who have voluntarily chosen a road to getting rid of the most devastating and lethal weapons in human history, nuclear weapons, can not but feel deep concern over their security, which they do not think as possible outside the context of universal international security. We appeal to all interested nations and governments, democratic forces, and the world public to double their efforts directed toward construction of a safer and more stable world based on cooperation, mutual assistance, and deep mutual respect among nations.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan, acting jointly or parallelly [as heard] will strive for creation of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust, will engage in mutual beneficial trade and economic cooperation, and will make their weighty contributions to consolidation of regional and global security and stability.

The text of the declaration issued jointly by President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan.

National Affairs

Kravchuk To Maintain Constitution on Crimea

LD2101132794 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2210 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Kiev, 20 January—[passage omitted] Answering a question on whether he would use the right granted to him by the constitutional amendment adopted today allowing him to cancel acts by the Republic of the Crimea's bodies of executive power should they contravene Ukrainian laws and presidential directives, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said: If Crimea's bodies of power violate the constitution and laws of Ukraine, including the law of Ukraine on delimiting powers between Ukraine and the Crimea, I will undoubtedly bring all actions by Crimean authorities into accordance with state interests.

Security Service Chief Views Crimea Situation

LD2401075894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0725 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Kiev January 24 TASS—The Ukrainian leadership is seriously concerned over the character of political confrontation in the Crimea following the first round of presidential elections there on January 16. This anxiety was expressed in the Sunday analytical programme Perekryostok (Crossroads) of Ukrainian TV.

Perekryostok reminded people once again of the right, granted to President Kravchuk by the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Ukraine, to cancel resolutions of local government authorities running counter to the Ukrainian constitution (in the opinion of observers, the presidential elections in the Crimea are just the case), and gave the floor to Yevgeniy Marchuk, head of the Ukrainian security service. He described the situation as criminally dangerous and urged the rivals to act within the limits set by the law.

Taking into account the polarization of opinions in the Crimea itself over the future of the peninsula before the second round of the presidential elections, scheduled for

January 30, as well as the fact that .wo obviously political assassinations took place in the Crimea over the past month (Captain Andrey Lazebnikov, head of the press service of the Black Sea Fleet, was killed in Sevastopol last December and Iskander Mamedov, deputy to the Crimean parliament from the Crimean Tatars, died of wounds in Simferopol last Friday, following an attempt on his life), one cannot but agree that the concern of the head of the Ukrainian security service is well-grounded and his warning is timely.

Military Exercise in Crimea Provokes Protests

LD2201190094 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A large-scale military exercise by the Ukrainian Armed Forces is planned in the Crimea for the end of January. In connection with this, representatives of a number of Crimean organizations are pointing out that these maneuvers are being carried out just before the second round of presidential elections in the Crimea, scheduled for 30 January. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry press service has reported that the exercises set for January are planned and represent training for territorial defense.

Crimea Supreme Council Presidium Issues Appeal

LD2101162094 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2210 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Simferopol, 20 January—The Crimean Supreme Council Presidium has appealed to the peninsula's population in connection with the Day of the Republic of the Crimea. It is said in the appeal, in particular, that in the time that has passed (since gaining autonomy) the course taken toward the Crimea gradually attaining statehood has proved to be right. "With the interests of all the peoples populating the Crimea taken into consideration, a possibility for the Crimea to become a bridge uniting Russia and Ukraine, with and peace and civic accord on the peninsula preserved and not undermined, the will of the Crimeans, has been realized. Recreating the republic, adopting its own constitution, delimiting powers between itself and Ukraine, and signing economic agreements are all difficult but necessary means of creating preconditions for the Crimea to be economically independent. The elections of the president and Supreme Council of the Crimea will complete this rather short but important stage in the history of the Crimea. The future destiny of the republic is in the hands of the Crimeans themselves," the statement notes.

Crimean Republicans Threaten To Appeal to UN

LD2101182694 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1450 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Sevastopol—The coordinating council of the city branch of the Republican Party of Crimea [RPK] sent a statement to the presidents and parliaments of Russia and Ukraine on 21 January saying: "The outcome of the first round of presidential elections in the Republic of Crimea revealed the real balance of political forces which took shape as a result of the Ukrainian Government's antipopular policy based on unitarianism and nationalism." The statement also stresses that the presidential elections pose no contradiction to Ukraine's laws and constitution and are held in full compliance with the law "On division of powers between the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine." In the Republicans' opinion, this was also confirmed by Ukraine's Ministry of Justice in reply to a query whether Sevastopol had the right to take part in these elections.

The Sevastopol branch of the RPK said that the measures taken by the government and president of Ukraine to restrict Crimea's powers and the rights of the people of the autonomous republic may become the last straw which will spark off a big fire. If the Crimean people, who will be electing their president, see the expression of their will ignored, "we will have to appeal to the world community, specifically, to the United Nations," the statement says.

Crimea's Meshkov Interviewed on Election

Hopeful for Accord

LD2101132094 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1201 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Simferopol, 21 Jan—In a statement issued to the press, Yuriy Meshkov, the chairman of the Republican Party of the Crimea [RPK] and Crimean presidential candidate, emphasized in particular that President Kravchuk had his confidence, since he had not had any objections to holding the elections on the peninsula and apparently did not consider holding them to be illegal. Therefore, the RPK leader is hopeful he will be able to come to an agreement with President Kravchuk and develop relations between the Crimea and Ukraine in accordance with current legislation and the norms of international law. In the event of his election as president, Yuriy Meshkov added, one should not fear that interethnic relations would exacerbate.

Views Russia-Ukraine Relations

LD2101203394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1913 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The possible cancellation of the second round of presidential elections in the Crimea by the Ukrainian authorities will lead to a sharp aggravation of the relations between Ukraine and Russia, the leader of the Republican Party of the Crimea, candidate for the Crimean presidency from the bloc "Russia," Yuriy Meshkov, told Interfax. In his opinion, such a decision would be a violation of the international acts on human rights whose legitimate character is confirmed by the authorities in Kiev."

Meshkov believes that "the Russian State Duma in its present composition will react to such violations of human rights very tough putting Russia's state administration in an embarrassing situation." "It (the Russian administration —Interfax's note) will have to either agree with the State Duma and extremely heighten tensions between Ukraine and Russia, or oppose to the Duma's decision and bring closer early presidential elections," Meshkov stated.

The candidate pointed out that "neither this, nor that variant is desirable for Ukraine" hoping for that "Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, being a sophisticated and clever politician, will avoid making wrong decisions."

Meshkov met with the Black Sea Fleet commander, Admiral Eduard Baltin, in Sevastopol on January 21. The fleet's press service said the parties "discussed the results of the first round of presidential elections in the Crimea and the prospects for the developments in the region."

At the Crimean presidential elections on January 16, Meshkov canvassed a majority of votes and left behind his closest rival, current Crimean Speaker Nikolai Bagrov. The two candidates will race for presidency at the second round of the elections scheduled for January 30.

During the meeting, Baltin said that the fleet's command was ready to maintain a constructive dialogue with any party or movement which understand the fleet's problems and take them close to heart, the press service pointed out.

Views Black Sea Fleet Situation

LD2101224794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1749 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jan— "The decision for the Black Sea Fleet to remain Russian—and it must be fully implemented—does not raise any doubts," Yuriy Meshkov, candidate for the presidency of Crimea and leader of the Republican Party of Crimea, said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS today.

The leader of the Crimean Republicans, who won approximately 40 percent of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections, while speaking in favor of an independent Republic of Crimea "which would maintain multi-faceted ties with Ukraine and, independently of these ties, would determine the forms of economic relations with Russia," thought that the sympathies of the population of the peninsula are on the side of the "Russia" opposition bloc which he represents. Yuriy Meshkov pointed out that the rest of the votes were distributed between the supporters of the Communist and Russia Parties. He noted that "not a single external force is capable of upsetting our progress toward closer relations with the republics of the former USSR and uniting the Russian and Ukrainian peoples." Yuriy Meshkov is convinced that his voters would be able to consolidate their positions in the second round of the elections and ensure a victory in the presidential race for the leader of the Crimean republicans.

Replying to the ITAR-TASS correspondent's question about the reasons behind the increase in crime in Crimea since the murder of Andrey Lazebnikov, head of the Black Sea Fleet's press service at the end of 1993, Yuriy Meshkov said that these "are the consequences of the full atrophy of the present Crimean leadership and its inability to maintain law and order in the region." In the event of his victory in the presidential elections the leader of the Crimean republicans promises "to establish order and eliminate organized crime in the peninsula."

In Yuriy Meshkov's view, the implementation of the tripartite agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine signed in Moscow on 14 January by the presidents of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine, would make it possible "to significantly reduce tension in the world and contribute to strengthening nuclear security throughout the world."

Commenting on the removal of Ivan Yermakov from the post of the Ukrainian president's representative in Sevastopol, Yuriy Meshkov told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that this decision was made by the Ukrainian leadership "out of political motives." At the same time, he noted, "Yermakov who has been enrolled in the staff of the Black Sea Fleet, should be proud of this appointment." It is known that Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the fleet, issued an order on 20 December enrolling under his command the former representative of the Ukrainian president in Crimea.

Crimea's Bahrov: Secession 'Out of the Question'

LD2301195594 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] Crimea's secession from Ukraine is out of the question; [leader of the Republican Party of Crimea] Yuriy Meshkov's policy of promising people to take them into Russia's arms is a road to nowhere, Mykola Bahrov, chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, told the press. He urged people to take a serious view of the situation.

He said: The Helsinki Accords established the inviolability of borders fixed after World War II. There is an agreement between Russia and Ukraine reaffirming the inviolability of the two countries' borders. Finally, a trilateral agreement on nuclear arms elimination containing the same stipulations was signed in Moscow between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia. Ukraine received guarantees not only from the United States, but also from European states, the Crimean parliament speaker stressed. Only a naive person can think that Russia will risk violating these agreements, Mykola Bahrov said.

Crimean Official: Kravchuk Drafting Election Document

LD2401115194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1052 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk "is drafting a document on presidential elections in Crimea," the Crimean Majles leader Mustafa Jamilev reported to Interfax. In his words, Kravchuk is to assess the results of the first round of voting in Crimea shortly. The pro-Russian candidate Yuriy Meshkov won that round, collecting twice the number of votes (about 40%) than his runner-up Nikolay Bahrov, the Crimean Parliament's Chairman.

In Jamilev's opinion, the Ukrainian leadership "made several mistakes in regard to Crimea." The main error, according to him, was "Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as an autonomous republic after a referendum on January 20, 1991."

The Majles leader foresees possible conflicts in the peninsula, if Meshkov becomes president of Crimea. He called Meshkov "a hypocrite without principle" and said that "Kiev is aware of that." He revealed that "the Majles leadership has been in close touch with Kiev by telephone."

He believes that "Crimean chauvinists are backed up by some elements in Russia morally and materially." "To avoid tension with Ukraine," he stressed, "Russia should somehow restrain the Crimean separatists." One such measure, in his view, could be Moscow's pledge not to make territorial claims to Ukraine.

At a session in Simferopol today, Majles is to announce its position toward the second round of presidential elections scheduled for January 30 in Crimea.

Defense Chief Views Problems of Armed Forces

AU2401101694 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrainian No. 2 (44) 20 Jan-2 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by Army General Vitaliy Radetskyy, Ukraine's minister of defense: "Where Did You See an Army Without a Budget?"]

[Text] The building of Ukraine's Armed Forces has been under way for more than two years. It might seem that this is not such a long stretch of time. However, looking back and analyzing the path that has been covered, one can see with particular clarity not only all of our achievements, but also problems and shortcomings. I would like to consider some of them separately.

We inherited a considerable military formation from the former Soviet Army. However, in terms of structure and military equipment, it did not conform to those tasks that arose before Ukraine with regard to ensuring its own defense capability. At the first stage, we tried to reform those Union army forces into Ukraine's Armed Forces. However, later, it became clear that Ukraine needs an army that would not be a successor to any other army, that would possess characteristics reflecting the historical and national traditions, would be based upon its own infrastructure, and would take into account our states's specific geostrategic situation and other characteristics. As a consequence, we became convinced that it is not reforms that we must occupy ourselves with, but the building of our own Armed Forces. Of course, one cannot avoid problems in this demanding work.

Among the problems that I am particularly concerned with, the problem of the personnel occupies the primary position. In those decisive months when Ukraine was acquiring the status and the characteristics of an independent state, some people who did not really care about the state's sovereignty, but only wanted to keep their "cushy jobs," benefits enjoyed by the nomenklatura, and so on managed to get into the leadership of the Defense Ministry. Of course, they did not really bother to build the Ukrainian Army in the best possible way. We can now see the consequences of such work particularly well. We have been gradually ridding ourselves of the services of such people over the entire period of existence of Ukraine's Armed Forces and are still removing them.

We must adhere to one criterion: The serviceman's high military professionalism based upon the highest level of general and special training, his way of life, spiritual state, way of thinking, and activity. Competence, responsibility for the assigned task, and loyalty to Ukraine are those qualities that we must take as a basis for distinguishing a military professional from a time-serving dilettante.

The general public knows how many emotions erupted, in particular around the question of reforming military education. The Ministry of Defense and the head of the military education administration in person were criticized in the press for the errors, shortcomings, and distortions in that work. In many cases, that criticism was justified. Therefore, we need to put in much effort to rectify the situation. However, in my opinion, a new, more experienced and better qualified person must head this work and the main administration for educational work.

Many people remember the controversial reaction to the Ukrainian presidential edict on unifying the Air Force and Air Defense into Air Defense Troops. There were radically opposed opinions, and there was a real battle in the press. It was for a good reason. Today, it must be admitted that this step was untimely. Even despite the fact that, with the exception of Russia, China, and Romania, all other states of the world have these types of armed forces unified. I am sure that Ukraine must proceed to such unification gradually, in a balanced manner, and without haste, in order to avoid impairing our defense capability.

Well, for the time being, our Air Force and Air Defense function separately. The only acute problem that bothers them is the shortage of fuel.

Thus, the reform in military education, the attempt to hastily create Air Defense Troops, and the difficulties with building our own Naval Forces—these and a number of other objective and subjective factors could but hamper

the processes of building Ukraine's Armed Forces. The insufficiently skilled personnel and the shortage of money have further intensified the problem. Nor can one refrain from putting blame upon members of the Defense Ministry Military Board, deputy ministers, chiefs of administration, or commanders of the Armed Forces and military districts.

Yet another acute problem is the fact that we have not had a defense budget for two years. Precisely its absence has become one of the main reasons for neglecting such constituents upon which the state's defense capability is based: science, the military-industrial complex, and the army.

Today, those scientists who must work for defense are in a difficult situation—they must think of how to survive, instead of creating something new.

The situation at Ukraine's defense enterprises is not much better: Some of them stand completely idle, while at others, individual workshops and technological lines with most up-to-date equipment do not work. There are no state orders and no money. As a result, highly skilled specialists are leaving en masse. I could see that with my own eyes during numerous visits to enterprises of the military-industrial complex.

World experience indicates that armed forces must be built on the basis of the achievements of military science and the most expedient utilization of the possibilities of defense enterprises.

It is clear that for this we need funding. A separate fund for science, a separate one for the military industrial complex, and again a separate fund for maintaining the army. Of course, this will come up to quite a large figure, but we cannot do without large outlays if we want to be reliably protected.

Several variants of the defense budget have already been elaborated by corresponding specialists. The documents have now been submitted to the Ukrainian president. It is possible that Ukraine's Supreme Council will discuss and approve the best of them in the second half of January. It is true, though, that Ukraine's acting Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskyy is already insisting that the defense budget be reduced.

One often hears complaints about the numerical strength of Ukraine's Armed Forces. Some people say that the Army could be smaller and would, in that case, require much less money. At present, the Ukrainian Army has 533,000 servicemen. In accordance with world norms, the variant in which 1 percent of the state's population serves in the army is considered optimal. Therefore, all grumbling about the size of the Army is groundless. However, notwithstanding this, we are planning to reduce the Army to between 300,000 and 350,000 servicemen by the year 2000. This cannot be done in one go, as it is necessary to provide those servicemen who are demobilized with housing and work. Incidentally, many people are now willing to leave the Army. They are not satisfied with low salaries, delays with payments, problems with obtaining uniforms, and the absence of housing.... In 1994, the Army will be reduced by 90,000 persons.

The problem of introducing the Ukrainian language in our troops is not simple. This problem is further aggravated by the relatively small number of officers with a command of the language and by the absence of special military literature in the state language. It is only with the help of a sufficient financing of the instruction process and with a deep conviction on the part of our soldiers that they need to master the Ukrainian language that we will be able to get rid of the shortcomings fast and with good results.

It is necessary for every serviceman to be deeply convinced that he needs to study the language and the glorious history of Ukraine, its customs, traditions, and culture not only for his own general and spiritual development, but also in order to be proud of being the son of this land, of having grown on it and nurtured by it, for which he must ardently love it. The main thing is that he must be aware of the high honor of defending Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity with weapons.

Our army has recently been reproached for remaining aloof with regard to political activity. I must point out that this is not my own invention or whim. Ukraine's legislation has determined that total departmentalization of the Armed Forces is one of the main principles of building them. The Army is a state structure and, like in any law-governed state, it must adhere to the government's political line and not meander among the positions of various parties and movements. Isn't this right?

Many people are presently concerned about such serious problems as the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine and about the division of the Black Sea Fleet among Ukraine and Russia. It looks as if, this year, the question of strategic weapons will finally be resolved based upon the tripartite agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. Compensation has been promised to us for the tactical weapons withdrawn from Ukraine back in 1992.

As regards the Black Sea Fleet, the settlement of this problem is in the interests of both Ukraine and Russia. That is why this question must not be resolved through confrontation or by way of grabbing as much as possible, when economic and political difficulties are taken advantage of, but with mutual respect and through interaction and cooperation in this region between our two states.

In conclusion, I want to gladden the hearts of those parents whose sons will serve in our army: The restoration by the Supreme Council of the two-year long army service that led to a wave of misunderstanding among the civilian population is a temporary measure. This step was due to the complication that emerged last fall as a result of the simultaneous dismissal to the reserve of two categories of conscripts—both those who had served two years and those who served one and one-half years. Incidentally, even after the Supreme Council decision, the period of service will be between 18 and 20 months, and not a full two years.

One more thing: During meetings with the civilian population, I often have to answer questions on whether the Ukrainian people may now sleep peacefully. I assure you with all responsibility—our Armed Forces are capable of defending their people and Ukraine's independence.

Belarus

Troop Deployment Prompted by Anonymous Phone Call

WS2101201994 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1815 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Let us go back to a report by Ivan Gerasyuk and the explanation by Stanislav Shushkevich, who proposed to hear Major General Konstantin Platonov, deputy interior minister and the commander of Interior Ministry troops, today at a behind-closed-doors meeting. In spite of the proposal, Konstantin Platonov gave no official response.

Here is what Deputy Aleksandr Lukashenko, who had a phone conversation with Konstantin Platonov, told a BELINFORM correspondent. The general said that he received an anonymous phone call on Thursday [20 January]. An identified person threatened to apply terrorist acts against people's deputies if Interior Minister Vladimir Yegorov and KGB Chief Eduard Shirkovskiy did not resign. This is the reason Konstantin Platonov assumed responsibility and issued an order to put an Interior Ministry detachment on alert and move it, unarmed, closer to the Government House. When the call proved to be a hoax, the detachment was sent back to its permanent quarters.

Thus, the presence of an Interior Ministry battalion near the Music Comedy Theater is a true fact. However, there is still no official version on the incident.

There remain questions instead: Why was such an important decision adopted at the level of deputy minister? Why were Stanislav Shushkevich, head of the Security Council, and other decisionmaking officials, such as the interior minister and the KGB chief, not informed about the threat hanging over the deputies?

Shushkevich on Supreme Soviet Work, Reforms

LD2301210994 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1220 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Interview with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich by Yuliy Semenov of Ostankino Television, Lyudmila Telen of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and journalist Igor Rudometov; Shushkevich and Rudometov speak from a Minsk studio, Semenov and Telen are in the Moscow studio; from the "Live Dialogue" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Semenov] You know, journalists always look for something extraordinary to start a conversation, and I also propose to start our conversation with a scandal, although not with a scandal between you and me, of course—I hope that everything will be fine between us on the air—but with the political scandal which has stirred the Belarus Supreme Soviet over the last few days. [passage omitted] So Stanislav Stanislavovich, perhaps it is not a very pleasant topic for conversation, but today I think it is unavoidable. What is your attitude toward this situation?

[Shushkevich] Good afternoon, esteemed viewers. Esteemed Yuliy Aleksandrovich, of course this topic is not the best way to start a conversation, but we should be ready to consider any question. I have probably spent the last three days thinking about this question above all others. I would like to separate it from the essence of the accusations and so on and so forth, because they are different issues.

Here we have a very clear example of our inability to work in the new conditions, that is, when we become a truly legal state. We are seeing that law by telephone continues to operate in Belarus. That is, a sanction is issued over the telephone by the procurator general, and it seems to represent an authorization to act completely freely from then on. The parliament has been analyzing this situation for a long time, and I can say that yes, unfortunately written laws are being violated in the upper echelons of authority, the upper echelons of our law-enforcing bodies.

We sometimes ask why this or that law is not working, or why something is not happening; after all, the laws are written. There are structures that must make them known and structures that must study them and implement them religiously. And we are seeing the violation of those laws. That is unfortunately a fact, a sad fact, and it will serve as a bitter lesson for the whole Supreme Council, for the republic's law-enforcing structures, and probably for a wider group of people as well.

[Semenov] Do you see any legal problem here for the CIS as a whole? For instance, some states have agreements between themselves on legal assistance, others do not. You see, there have been cases when representatives of certain Central Asian countries have caught members of their own oppositions here in Moscow. Is there a possibility that tomorrow Azerbaijan will demand the extradition of Mutalibov and Vezirov in connection with the accusations that are being directed toward them? Is there a legal mechanism for such cases? Should not the special services of some countries work on the territory of other countries, all the more so if it is openly and legally? What do you think?

[Shushkevich] You are absolutely right. These are ordinary things that one can well understand. I would point out that Russia is probably the most careful implementer of such an approach, and so I do not understand your concern, especially your strange examples. I did indeed touch on similar issues both with the Russian procurator general and even with the president—I hope he will forgive me for taking the liberty of mentioning it. But I perceived an entirely correct and cool approach here: everything must be carried out according to the letter of the law.

Such a legal accord does not exist between many states of the USSR [as heard], but we do have such an agreement

with Lithuania, and it is all the more regrettable that our services are not mature enough to implement this agreement. Because the procuracy, which worked for a week on this question with representatives of the Lithuanian procuracy, suddenly came forth with a verbal instruction. This of course is entirely irregular. And, therefore, the concern in the Supreme Council was natural. I hope that coolness will prevail and strict juridical rules will operate and this case will receive a proper assessment.

[Telen] Mr. Shushkevich, you said that this case will receive a proper assessment, but nevertheless the situation is still quite acute today. Clearly you and the Supreme Council will have to take some kind of action to settle the situation. How do you see the situation developing, and what do you intend to do in order to ease it?

[Shushkevich] Lyudmila Olegovna, you know the situation in Belarus quite well. I follow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and your writings closely. It is very difficult to forecast how the situation will develop. The thing is that we lack the analytical disposition and the coolness that a parliament should have. The parliament should not sink to score-settling, forgetting about its main business.

What do we have now? Those laws that would allow us to rectify the economic situation, as well as those corrections to the constitution —or rather the solution of questions concerning the adoption of the new constitution—are being held up by political score-settling. It is not always Supreme Council business; the cases when it is the business of the council are exceptional. Because whatever happens, the work of the council is paralyzed.

And you know, there are serious events ahead of us. There are very serious treaties ahead of us, of a kind not previously seen in practice between CIS states, and indeed it is difficult to find similar approaches anywhere else in the world. We have to work on this and work seriously. But a week has passed and we have made very little progress in the work of our session. So I repeat once again: Professionals, legal experts, and parliamentary commissions should work on issues, submit proposals, and not make decisions or turn the council into a commission of enquiry. That will be fruitless, because emotion will prevail over reason and the juridically correct approach. That must be avoided.

[Semenov] Before handing the floor to our Minsk colleague Igor Rudometov, I have a question here. Viewer Kuznetsov from the Moscow area has evidently been attentively following what has been happening in your country. He is interested in this. Some kinds of troop contingents have twice appeared in Minsk outside the Supreme Council. Is this so? And what was it connected with?

[Shushkevich] You know it seems to me that if the Moscow area has already been informed of this, our affairs are in quite a bad way. Unfortunately, one has here again a case of law by telephone—or, you know, not even law, but an anonymous telephone call. According to the report I received from the commander of our interior troops, an anonymous telephone call led to the fact that, contrary to existing regulations under which contingents of interior troops cannot be moved from the locations where they are stationed without the sanction of the head of government and without the sanction of the interior minister, troops in our country were moved some 150-200 meters from the Supreme Council.

I asked why this occurred and I demanded a written explanation. The explanation was very simple. It said: I received a telephone call, and I was afraid that the deputies would not be treated with due respect when they emerged from the Supreme Council. But what I do not understand is that they do not come out of the council at that spot. These games take on an unpleasant character, and there have been some examples of this in neighboring countries. I think in general that the grave and tragic character of these events has not got through to the understanding of some of our leaders.

Within their understanding they almost want to play a little game with the troops. These games are very dangerous and are very dangerous for Belarus. I think that we must be very emphatic in this regard.

As far as I am concerned, I think that one such occasion was discussed at the security council during its preparation, and there were no grounds for bringing the troops out. All the subsequent events showed that there was no reason, that is to say, there was no attempt to destabilize the situation. Now we have run into it again and there was not even a hint of such an attempt, and again the troops were brought out. I consider it my duty in the most resolute way to address this issue tomorrow on the basis of the documents in my possession. It is essential in general to build a law-governed state and not a state where there can be methods of intimidation. I hope that Belarus will not be an example of such a state and that the Supreme Soviet and the government will do everything possible to see that no further such games take place on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and that such things do not occur. [passage omitted]

[Rudometov] Before we turn to purely economic questions, such as the single ruble zone, I'd like to read the following question. It's from Russia, from someone who describes himself as: Golubovich, a Belarusian living in Russia. Here goes: What were Shushkevich, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin guided by when in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, contrary to the will of the people—that's the way the question is worded— they were wrecking the Soviet Union? I won't make any comments on the question, I'm just passing on to you.

[Shushkevich] I have already spoken about it a thousand times.

If today I had to do everything all over again, I would not have been able to find a better way to ensure that we build legal relations between us in a civilized manner. I would have taken the same road. I believe that there are many negative phenomena both in the CIS and, on the

whole, in individual countries; but the fact that this step was taken has averted much more evil events. I am proud of this step.

[Rudometov] Which leads us to the many questions we have about the single ruble zone.

[Semenov] We too have many such questions. Well, go ahead.

[Rudometov] OK, question number one: What is it? Why are there so many advocates and opponents on either side? One would naturally prefer to be rich and healthy rather than sick and poor, but what should we do now?

[Shushkevich, laughs] You know, the funny thing is that I cannot give a precise, comprehensive, and meaningful answer to the question of what it is. And neither can anybody else, I believe. What I can say is what aim it pursues, what I'd like it to be. It would be very good if we could have a single means of payment; it would be very good if we could pursue an agreed monetary policy; and it would be very good if we could make the settlement process less complicated.

And I'd like to say that Russia is in no way threatened by a unification with our financial system, even on those terms that have been formulated and have been denounced in Russia. Because in general, if, as it were, our Belarusian rubles turn into Russian ones, there will be no inflationary processes—because we have so few that it poses no threat.

In fact, our enterprises are generally penniless. The absence of the financial means that we so often talk about is what we inherited from socialism. This is why I believe that it is a positive move, which should help us to stabilize the economy.

[Rudometov] But there is an opinion that in this case we are going to Russia as poor relations.

[Shushkevich] That will depend on what specific agreements we sign. I think that in the communique signed by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and I, not a single line suggests that we are going to Russia as poor relations. In fact, we believe that we are uniting, that we are unifying the financial systems in order to enable both Russia and Belarus to gain profit because we will simplify a whole range of relations.

But I can tell you what is my main priority. For me the most important point is this: The economy of Belarus can be knocked out, it has in fact been knocked out; that is to say, it is in a sorry state. I will give you an example. In Russia prices went up eightfold last year, while here prices went up 28 times! In Russia, the dollar rate has increased threefold... By the way, I was asked about it during a TV program and I checked later and this is in fact true. Well, in Russia the dollar went up threefold, while here the increase was 16.5 times. This means that we are bad managers. Why? Here is the main problem: Our main market is Russia. This is a fact. And our exports there are of quite good quality. But if we include in the price of these goods the price of the Russian oil—and it is a lot more expensive here than in Russia—we end up with astronomical customs duties! Last year we had to pay $28 for one tonne of oil. If this oil is included in the price of our goods—and our energy consumption is high—our goods will end up being very expensive in Russia. Russia will not buy them. And the primary reason is the price of oil. If Russia does not buy goods, our industries will perish. We have no one else to sell the goods to, because oil is expensive and we will not be able to sell our goods anywhere else.

But look how this backfires on Russia. Enterprises producing these goods use spare parts made in Russia. There are so many of them—and we are not talking about raw materials, but about engines, electronics, and the like. These Russian industries will in turn collapse because they will not have a market either. We are destroying a huge mechanical engineering industry, radio electronics, motor industry, tractor industry. We are ready to kill them through an unreasonable pricing policy. We have to stop this. And for me the solution is in unified prices for energy carriers. This is not a sacrifice for Russia. This is something that Russia must do.

I'd like to make one other remark in this connection. Please understand that Russia is a legal successor to the former Soviet Union on most points. It was not us who generated Chernobyl, it was not us, bear this in mind. But every product we sell there has a 5.2 percent Chernobyl tax, because otherwise we cannot bring these people out of their most difficult plight and resettle them somewhere they can live, and help them settle—because there is no way they can stay where they are.

It was not us who led to a situation in which 15 percent of our budget—mind you, 15 percent, which is more than what is spent on defense, on education, on culture, and many more things taken together—15 percent is spent on the Chernobyl tax. And, therefore, we cannot invest in industry even though it is now necessary that the state should support many positions in industry through planning. But we are deprived of this opportunity. Therefore, I believe that one has to move in the framework of a sensible treaty, understanding that there are no reasons, no grounds for the so-called Russian-speaking population who form a majority in Belarus—there aren't that many Belarusian speakers—there are no reasons for them to complain to Russia about some kind of policy against them—it is not like in other countries.

[Semenov] You know, unfortunately not all your fellow countrymen share your view. The publication of a notorious article by Zenon Paznyak has created a stir in Moscow. Here I have Russian TV viewers' reaction to it. For my part I can only say—I understand that we are probably placing you in an awkward position by mentioning this—but this article has been noticed in Moscow, and it is understandably causing irritation among Russian readers. One cannot speak of the Russian people the way Zenon Paznyak does. And even though

he is trying to frighten Belarusians with Zhirinovskiy, he comes very close to him in some respects, particularly in his use of language and the nature of arguments.

But let us now return to the subject of our discussion. You know, we understand your pain, your concern, particularly regarding Chernobyl. And TV viewers really welcome the fact that Russia and Belarus are coming closer together. [passage omitted] But there are also doubts on this point, connected with fears of some damage for Russia, particularly financial damage if funny money is exchanged one for one. Someone here tried to calculate Russia's financial loss. It can be as high as 1.6 quadrillion rubles. By the way, this figure is marginally higher than the annual budget of Ostankino. These are the estimated losses this exchange can bring the Russians due to inflation. Another problem is that there would be a second center for the emission of rubles.

[Shushkevich] Yulian Aleksandrovich, first of all I cannot leave unnoticed your remark concerning Zenon Paznyak's article. First of all I'd like to say that I categorically dissociate myself from such an approach. But I'd like to explain just one thing. You know what the trouble is? We can, all of us, Russia, Belarus, and many other countries, find in our previous history a whole range of incidents that can lead to a strained and apprehensive attitude to each other. But, you see, one cannot be partial in treating historical facts. I just don't know, with all those things about Malyuta Skuratov and oprichnina [Skuratov was Ivan the Terrible's henchman most associated with the 1565-72 practice of mass repressions, executions, and confiscation of land on suspicion of treason, known as oprichnina].

Was not the oprichnina really calamitous for those who are now Belarusian-speaking, for those who live in these regions. And was it not calamitous for Russian citizens? I could go through history, and sometimes, you understand, the genocide carried out by the Russian authorities against the Russian people was so harsh and so tough that it was simply terrible. And now we are singling out one factor; that, for example, those same authorities that carried out genocide against the Russians more than any others also carried out genocide against the Belarusian people and that's what we'll build a policy upon! This is just juggling facts. I oppose this, and I want to say this: In our history there are many remarkable examples. We can always build and are continuing to build good relations. And the main criterion, the main approach, is the people: No article of any sort, including articles about the inhumanity of Russian Federation imperialism, will nurture anti-Russian Federation attitudes in our republic! As for unification, this is a difficult issue, I repeat. If we manage to resolve the main question, if Russia resolves the main question on pricing policy, then I assess it is a worthy solution.

And now as for the losses: I mentioned the figure of about 15 percent of our budget. This is a higher figure than the one you mentioned, and we are shelling out on Chernobyl expenditure—although I repeat, we have never had, and do not now have, a single nuclear power engineering installation—but why should we remain in isolation? According to contemporary calculations, we are indeed receiving assistance from the Russian Federation, but if you will excuse me saying so, in comparison with the sum you mentioned, this assistance is positively paltry, just peanuts. And so realistically speaking, given our previous history and given whose legal successors we are, we really do have a worthy package of agreements and they must be sacredly observed. And there is sufficiently good motivation and grounds for drawing these up.

[Telen] Mr. Shushkevich, if I may I should like to continue on this topic. The communique that you and the Russian president signed make considerably more difficult both your and his positions within your states. [passage omitted] Can you say, please, will you, as chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet, and President Yeltsin, as head of the Russian state, manage to convince your opponents and convince the people that this decision is for the well-being of both states? [passage omitted] What happens when Russian citizens are told today: unification with the Belarus monetary system means an extra 10 percent inflation a month? Does it not seem to you that this could make relations between peoples more difficult rather than easier?

[Shushkevich] Lyudmila Olegovna, first of all I don't want to give an opinion on who has been saying what and how about joining or not joining the Russian Government. But I ought to say that it is difficult to find a politician in Russia for whom I have more respect than Yegor Gaydar or Boris Fedorov, and I could name many others who have and haven't joined the Russian Government.

The matter is this: Either the Russian reforms, the monetary approach, were excessively intensive and corrections are now needed, that is, they went slightly in the wrong direction, or they were largely correct. There are official declarations everywhere that the reforms are continuing and that the brake won't be applied to them. But on the other hand, given the lineup that we see, they'll have a little less monetarism and a little more state planning. That's how I understand the issue.

I don't think that Belarus can add 10 percent to the inflation rate. We've made some very serious miscalculations, or rather calculations, and that kind of inflation... [pauses] It's quite another matter that everyone who can will claim that such inflation has come about due to unification. So the agreements have to be carefully drawn up, and the reason for that explained.

As far as political unification is concerned, then excuse me. I'll say once again that I'm proud that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the president of Russia...[pauses] It wasn't even me that asked him or pushed him about this. You see, it turned out during talks that we both came up with the same proposal. We should have made it clear that this is two states reaching agreement here, two

countries. That we are preparing a full-scale and far-reaching treaty on relations between our states. But taking into account the realities and the great extent to which we are interwoven, this probably won't be the kind of agreement that is reached between other states. That is, it will be a closer relationship anticipating the kind of links, perhaps, of which some countries in Europe dream. [passage omitted]

[Rudometov] The question of dual citizenship arises. How is it being resolved in Belarus, and in this connection there is a question from our next group of listeners.

[Shushkevich] I can answer that one straight away.

[Rudometov] Go ahead, please.

[Shushkevich] This question has not been resolved in our legislation. It can be decided in two ways: One way is by being drawn up by our commission on nationalities, because we have to find a way. There is a certain category of people affected, and we've understood that this issue has to be resolved. The other way might be set out in this treaty. It could be drawn up applying international law. Instructions have been issued.

[Rudometov] [passage omitted] What measures are being taken by the Belarus Government to uphold ensure rights in Belarus that are being encroached upon in other ex-USSR republics? This question comes from a lady in Riga who didn't give her name.

[Shushkevich] Yes, this kind of question could well be asked in Riga, because there's a problem there. There's a group of servicemen's families who, in our opinion, do not largely enjoy all the rights enjoyed by citizens of Latvia. This is a delicate issue. Our Supreme Soviet commission is aware of it and a whole range of specific approaches to it have been examined. It might possibly be resolved with international involvement. We have told the Latvians about this and also other states who are trying to help Latvia sort this issue out. There are families of former servicemen of Belarusian origin in Latvia who, our commission on inter-ethnic relations is convinced—I stress is convinced—do not have the status that free citizens of a free country should have. This, unfortunately, is a fact. [passage omitted]

[Rudometov] Will the promise about early elections to the Supreme Soviet be honored, and why is there no law on recalling deputies? A lot of people are concerned about this.

[Shushkevich] Once again, I repeat that unfortunately the Supreme Soviet is so distracted from its proper work by secondary issues and investigations it shouldn't be involved in that I think we can only meet the announced deadline by mobilizing all forces within it. Because the process is clearly being drawn out, there's no secret about that. I'm beginning to think certain groups of deputies are even doing this deliberately. [passage omitted]

[Semenov] Viktor Viktorovich Poteskiy from Nizhniy Tagil is interested in your attitude toward your Polish minority.

[Shushkevich] I don't think that we have a problem with the Polish national minority. In particular this is linked to the Catholic faith...[pauses] Our legislation and the realities are such that Poles have a proper status in Belarus.

[Semenov] Regarding your new position on nuclear disarmament by Belarus: You're known to have set a good example for everyone in this respect, but some nuances have appeared.

[Shushkevich] Our position is in no way new. It's as it was, as was announced on literally the first day of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet when I was elected chairman. We are for withdrawal. We signed all the documents and we are withdrawing them.

As far as a share of the value of the materials obtained from the nuclear warheads in our country is concerned, we have an old and long-standing agreement with Russia and the United States with all our fellow CIS members.

[Semenov] Here is a curious question. It is known that President Boris Yeltsin, in his meeting with Bill Clinton, gave him certain official documents on the Lee Harvey Oswald case, who as you know was officially recognized as the man who killed President Kennedy. Meanwhile, there was a report that the volumes on this case were sent to Minsk, where Oswald once lived and was even married. Did you give anything to President Clinton, and do you know anything about this dossier?

[Shushkevich] Yuliy Aleksandrovich, everything that could be done in accordance with our legislation was done previously. We are punctual here in our observance of the law. But I, like all my colleagues in Minsk, have already said everything I can about this, right up to the fact that I personally taught him Russian, the man who is believed to be Kennedy's killer. All the documents that could be handed over according to the law were handed over a long time ago.

[Telen] Stanislav Stanislavovich, your position in the Supreme Soviet is, unfortunately, somewhat complex. Up to now, you've always managed to find some kind of balance and equilibrium to work constructively with the Supreme Soviet. On what political forces are you now ready to rely within the Supreme Soviet, and with whom is it easier for you to find a common language?

[Shushkevich] You know, I've now become a centrist, initially spontaneously but now by conviction. This is a lengthy answer to your question, because I can say that I can rely on the communists as well, because Marx was the greatest free-marketeer of them all. I can demonstrate what's primary and what's secondary, beginning with Engels's speech at Karl Marx's grave.

I'm obliged to rely on the majority who support the government, because they're also all claiming to be

free-marketeers. Therefore, I'm seeking a platform for compromise from the standpoint of rational organization of the economy, and such a platform can be found.

That's why I'm not a member of any political party and do not intend in the near future to create one.

[Telen] One more question. Economic reform is known to be proceeding in a less intensive way than many people and economists in Belarus would like. Are there any differences in this respect between yourself and Prime Minister Kebich?

[Shushkevich] You mentioned differences. I want reforms to move faster than the prime minister can realistically achieve. You see, I want this to happen. We're creating laws on the basis of which they can move faster, but it's the prime minister who has to do it. And this is where the complications arise. It's a lot harder for him—I understand that—but I do think that in the actual present conditions we can head toward a free market faster. [passage omitted]

[Semenov] Did you get a saxophone concert during your meeting with President Clinton?

[Shushkevich] No, we didn't get a saxophone concert because we didn't have enough time and had to tend to business. We didn't have any breaks for a personal chat except in the car. [passage omitted]

[Semenov] Stanislav Stanislavovich, we have a little time left. Perhaps you'd like to speak on something the questions didn't touch upon? Go ahead if you wish.

[Shushkevich] Esteemed colleagues, I'd like to say one thing. It's very difficult to reform a simple structure, and very difficult to reform the economy of a large state. Naturally, difficulties are encountered in the course of such reform. The whole trouble is that without completing one phase or one task, we start making such a noise about these difficulties and cursing the reformers that we sometimes lose sight of the goal.

I appeal for calm and persistence, because once you choose the type of treatment it's impossible to hand the patient over to someone else. That would only kill the patient. You should either believe the doctor or not believe him. In our country, we have every reason to believe in our Supreme Soviet. But in the past week it's badly undermined these reasons because we've started occupying ourselves with secondary tasks.

I'd say this: We shouldn't be diverted from our planned market-economy policy, a policy for a social market economy. I stress the social, so that pensioners, veterans, and Chernobyl victims understand that we should do everything to look after them. But we mustn't be deflected from our course. And the Russian prime minister... [pauses] We can see that things have got better in Russia because Russia has moved more determinedly toward the free market. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry on Arrest of Lithuanians

LD1901195894 Minsk Belarusian Foreign Ministry Department of Information in Russian 1353 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] One of the key events in the republic's political life over the past few days has been the arrest by officers of the Lithuanian security service and law enforcement agencies in Minsk of the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party, N. Burokevicius and J. Jermalavicius, who have been living there illegally. Today RESPUBLIKA and NARODNAYA GAZETA published a commentary from the Belarusian Internal Affairs Ministry on this matter. The commentary says the following:

"In accordance with the treaty between Belarus and Lithuania 'On legal aid and legal relations in civil, family, and criminal cases' signed in October 1992 and ratified by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet in February 1993, the Belarusian side provided assistance to a group of Lithuanian law enforcement officers headed by a deputy procurator general in detaining citizens N. Burokevicius and J. Jermalavicius. Legal grounds for detaining and handing over other persons who are not citizens of Lithuania are not established, and this was stated to the Lithuanian procuracy. The actions by the Belarusian law enforcement officers correspond to the afore-mentioned treaty and to international legal norms."

KGB Denies Involvement

LD1901222294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2022 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Eduard Shirkovsky, Chairman of the Belarussian KGB, told a closed session of the country's Supreme Soviet that Mikolas Burokevicius and Juozas Jermalavicius, leaders of the banned Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU), had been kidnapped in Minsk by two Lithuanian policemen with the aid of the Belarusian Interior Ministry, not by the Lithuanian security service.

The KGB chief said that this "act of international gangsterism" was possible because the KGB did not control the activities of the Interior Ministry.

Vladimir Yegorov, the Interior Minister, told parliament that officers of the Belarusian Interior Ministry detained the two men in the presence of two Lithuanian law enforcement officers. He said that the Belarusian police did not have a written arrest warrant but this action had been discussed by Interior Ministry and prosecution officers, in particular by the interior minister and the prosecutor general of Belarus.

In Yegorov's words, the men involved in the detention believed that an arrest warrant did exist, which is why the car carrying the Lithuanian special service men and the detainees left for the Belarusian-Lithuanian border.

Pyotr Kravchenko, Belarusian Foreign Minister, said that his ministry had not received any messages that

were required by the appropriate agreement between Belarus and Lithuania about the arrest.

Deputies Comment on Arrests

WS2001150594 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Report by Mikhail Rutkowski]

[Text] This morning's session of the Supreme Soviet was held behind closed doors. As I have learned, deputies should have completed their discussion on the briefings by General Attorney Shaladonaw, Interior Minister Yegorov, KGB Chairman Shyrkovskiy, Foreign Minister Kravchanka, and Border Troops Commander Bacharaw regarding the Lithuanian incident—the detention of Lithuanian communists Burokevicius and Jarmalavicius, who were accused of participating in the bloody events of 1991. Unfortunately, I was not allowed to listen to the debate. Therefore, I have to wait for a recess and hope that someone will show courage and relate to me the course of the discussion on this issue and its results.

The recess has been called, and deputies are currently exchanging their opinions on this issue.

[Begin recording] [Rutkowski] My interlocutor is People's Deputy Aleksandr (Parun). What is your assessment on this incident?

[(Parun)] As a matter of fact, there has been no incident. What has really occurred was fulfillment of bilateral agreements signed between the Republic of Belarus and Lithuania. Another issue is that, de facto, we lack strong state authority, and due to that, the law has been violated at different levels. The Attorney General's Office should have issued a warrant to arrest the previously mentioned individuals, and it failed to do so, giving a verbal order by telephone instead. Second, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which conducted this operation along with representatives of the Lithuanian special services, carried out this job without written permission from the Attorney General's Office. The reports by the KGB chairman and the foreign minister, which were requested by numerous deputies, showed that the very lack of strong authority and the lack of a system of subordinating these services to state authority is leading to various violations of the law.

The essential resolution which should be adopted by the Supreme Council should concern not only this incident, but also other episodes in which the rights of our citizens on territories of other republics and citizens of other republics on our territory were violated. Everything should be done in a manner enabling us to finally establish a strong state authority.

[Rutkowski] Is it possible that we will wake up one day and there will be different authorities—power will be assumed by a foreigner?

[(Parun)] We should know what is going on in our country, and we should prevent attempts to violate our Constitution.

[Rutkowski] However, the question of what is hidden behind this political action still remains unanswered. I have addressed this question to People's Deputy Yawhen Huskevich.

[Huskevich] In my opinion this is politicizing. The campaign against the power structures—the KGB, the Attorney General's Office, and the Interior Ministry—establishes the framework for a coup. I believe so because what has happened does not deserve two days of discussion behind closed doors. Today, we have fulfilled this duty and heard those reports. [end recording]

What will be the final result of this story? I believe we will find out soon.

Moldova

Foreign Ministry Protests Zhirinovskiy Statement

AU2101215594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2037 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] In an interview granted to Tiraspol television in the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party and deputy of the State Duma, has made a delirious statement again, throwing menacing statements and invectives at an independent and sovereign state—the Republic of Moldova.

Here is an excerpt from that interview, which caused consternation in Chisinau and not just there:

[Begin Zhirinovskiy recording, in Russian with superimposed Romanian translation] Send us your request immediately to join the ruble zone and that is it! You will have Russian currency, all your payments will be made in rubles, and you will not have any more problems. That is the sole solution.

You are a part of Russia, even if, for the time being, Moldova does not want to become a part of Russia. I promise I will do it! We will incorporate you within Russia on all planes, including the diplomatic, military, financial, and economic aspects.

I wish you courage and manliness. I understand your situation. You are encircled by Moldova and Ukraine. Yours is the most difficult situation in the whole of Russia. Look, the Russians in Lithuania have Leningrad to support them. However, there is no one standing beside you. You represent the most heroic part of Russia! I will do everything I can. I will make all necessary efforts for you to return to Russia, and we will compensate all your losses. Of course, we cannot compensate your losses in human lives, but we will compensate them by severely punishing all those who are guilty for the crimes perpetrated on the soil of the Dniester Republic. We will not

lie to you and we will not betray you! Never, ever! The Dniester Republic shall be a part of Russia! [end recording]

In connection with the aforementioned allegations, which justify the requests of Zhirinovskiy's many compatriots to begin penal investigations against him or send him to a mental hospital, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Moldova has issued the following press communique:

The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Moldova today sent a note to the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Chisinau in connection with the interview granted by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy to Tiraspol television, which was broadcast on 18 January 1994, in which the deputy to the Russian Duma formulated territorial claims against the Republic of Moldova, saying, among other things, that the Dniester Republic should be included in Russia and that the [14th] Army will stay there.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry considers such statements made by a representative of Russia's law-making body as irresponsible and consequently as an attempt made against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. Such statements prejudice Moldovan-Russian relations, create tension among the public opinion, and might negatively influence the talks on the political settlement of the conflict in the eastern rayons [of Moldova] and the withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldova.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Moldova resolutely protests and requests that adequate steps be taken to express the clear distancing of the competent bodies of the Russian Federation from the stance and statements made by Zhirinovskiy, concludes the press communique released by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Moldova.

Armenia

Frontline Fighting Resumes in Nagorno-Karabakh

NC2201105894 Yerevan SNARK in English 0919 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Stepanakert, January 22 (SNARK)—Today the Azerbaijani troops have resumed their attacks after a days respite towards the Armenian positions of Madaghis and Akop Kamari [names as received] villages. By 10 o'clock violent fights went on there.

The Karabakh Defence Army Headquarters told SNARK the Karabakh forces reject the enemy's attacks.

The positional fights take place at the other parts of the front.

Clashes Reported 19-21 Jan

NC2101185094 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The tense situation on the Nagorno-Karabakh front lines has eased. Considering the many men and armored vehicles they have lost in the fighting, the Azerbaijan military forces have reduced the number of their attacks. The Narogno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] military headquarters has disclosed that Azerbaijan lost 117 officers and men in the fighting that took place on the evening on 19 January. Four tanks were hit in the clashes. Meanwhile, the NKR's casualties were six men killed and 13 wounded.

Azerbaijan's military forces resumed their attacks against Mardakertskiy Rayon at 0700 this morning. Reports say that the fighting was still continuing at noon. The NKR forces quickly blocked the enemy's onslaught.

Two of Azerbaijan's military aircraft tried to violate NKR's airspace at 1330 today.

The number of deserters on the enemy side recently increased. In a statement to [name indistinct] news agency, Tahir Rakhimov, a prisoner of war of the Lezgin nationality, said that the Lezgins in Azerbaijan are immigrating to Russia. He also said that his community does not wish to fight for the sake of another community.

Clashes took place in the vicinity of Mardakert and [name indistinct] this afternoon. The NKR forces successfully blocked all the enemy attacks. Both sides suffered casualties in the clashes. The outcome of the fighting is still unknown.

Azerbaijan's military forces directed their attacks against Kenterly and Panakhly in Agdamskiy Rayon at 1600 today. However, the enemy was forced to retreat. Violent clashes took place at about 1800. The Azerbaijani troops and the Armenian forces alternated in achieving success in the clashes.

Meanwhile, two Azerbaijani military aircraft violated NKR airspace and fired on peaceful residential areas this afternoon. No information is available on casualties.

The sides have avoided serious operations in the southeastern sector of the front line.

Combat Situation Detailed

NC2101145294 Yerevan SNARK in English 1044 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Stepanakert, January 21 (SNARK)—January 21 morning was characterized by relative peace at the Karabakh frontier. As SNARK was informed by the press-service of Headquarters of the Karabakh Defence Army, there was only positional exchange of fire in Mardakertskiy, Martuninskiy, Agdamskiy and Fizulinskiy regions. The most of the tension over the last 24 hours was in the front line part located in the north-west of Karabakh—by the Omar pass, where military clashes took place. Today, about 11.30 a.m. several attack planes of the Azerbaijani Air Forces tried to violate Karabakh's air space. The details are being verified.

Casualties Reported in Border Area

NC2101170394 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1459 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The Azerbaijani Army units in Kedabekskiy Rayon opened tank fire on Krasnoselsk-Berd motorway this evening. There are casualties.

The situation remained basically calm in the rest of the republic's border regions last night and today.

Baku Offensive Seen Likely Before Moscow Talks

MK2101124094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Armen Khanbabyann under the "Nagorno-Karabakh" rubric: Karabakh: Fighting Intensifies as Azeris Shoot at Each Other"]

[Text] Starting in the early morning of 19 January, Azeri infantry and armored vehicles launched an attack on the positions of Karabakh's self-defense army virtually along the entire perimeter of the standoff—from Omar pass in the north to Goradiz in the southeast. The more sustained fighting was going on in Mardakert Rayon in the direction of the settlement of Magavuz. According to Nagorno-Karabakh's press department, Karabakh subunits managed to hold back the enemy pressure by the close of 19 January, inflicting on it appreciable losses in personnel—up to 100 killed—and materiel. The Azeri Air Force at the same time once again tried to bomb Stepanakert but was chased away by antiaircraft artillery fire. On the morning of 19 January, Karabakh fighters witnessed a more than two-hour battle between two

Azeri battalions outside the population center of Karakhanbeyli. It is still not clear whether that was a shoot-out between two rival commanders, or whether the Azeris simply had mistaken each other for the enemy.

Military experts believe that despite the extremely difficult situation, the Karabakh Army is capable of holding the front whereas possible Azeri successes may at this stage be of only local nature and should not result in appreciable changes in the sides' positions. The active participation of Russian and Ukrainian mercenaries is not so far producing the expected impact upon the overall situation, although, as commanders certify, some battalions formed from the "Slavic" contingent are fighting very vigorously, and it is hard to withstand their pressure. In particular, the encirclement of Armenian units near the settlement of Magavuz had been organized by two such battalions.

The conviction taking shape in Armenia is that the offensive efforts by the Azeri Army have been caused exclusively by political expediency. Before the meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the two Transcaucasus states and Russia, the men in Baku would very likely want the talks to begin in a different military-political situation. The men in Moscow would possibly want the same: The gamble is that should the Azeri side manage to inflict a major defeat on the Karabakhis, Yerevan's and Stepanakert's stance at the talks according to the plan suggested by Russia may be much softer. At any rate, Azerbaijan is continuing its offensive regardless of losses. The latter, meanwhile, have reached unprecedented proportions. In little more than a month, the Azeri Army lost some 5,000 men. In Baku, this circumstance sparked internal political tensions because casualties sustained so far are not measuring up in any way to success at the front.

Power Shortage Limits Yerevan to 1 Hour Per Day

NC2201050894 Yerevan SNARK in English 1352 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, January 21 (SNARK)—The so called "regime number 8" is retained in Yerevan. It signifies that the population receives electricity only for an hour or 40 minutes a day. Samvel Mavisakalyan, the Deputy Mayor of Yerevan, has informed of it SNARK today. In his opinion it would be possible to supply people with 4 hours of electricity only if necessary amount of gas reach Armenia. Mavisakalyan told Yerevan receives the 40 per cent of all the electricity produced in Armenia.

Nuclear Power Station Restart To Take 18 Months

PM2401092394 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1525 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Behind the Scenes" program]

[Excerpts] [Video shows reflection of cooling tower in pool of water] [Reporter] The flagship of the Armenian power generating industry—a station which used to meet almost half the demand for electricity—has been standing idle for five years now. [Video shows Suren Azatyan, director of the Armenian Nuclear Power Station, identified by caption]

[Azatyan] I find it very hard to take when this superb station suddenly finds itself a consumer of electricity. It would be quite wrong to say it was shut down because of the earthquake. I personally see no connection at all, no link between the two. But the other aspect—of improving safety—is very topical and something that is indeed important.

[Reporter] Of course, the shutdown of the station isn't the only reason for the very severe power crisis in Armenia. Blockades, the increased cost of energy sources, and the breakdown of normal economic ties have taken their toll too. But the station used to generate 800 megawatts a day—almost three times more than all of Armenia's hydroelectric and heat and electric power stations put together. And the loss of those megawatts is keenly felt by industry and ordinary people. [passage omitted] Nobody anywhere in the world has ever mothballed a nuclear power station and then tried to restart it. Under a program scheduled to take 18 months, it is planned initially to restart just one of the two power units—the 407-megawatt no. 2 unit. The work will be in three phases: checks or inventory-taking; then precommissioning proper, including the replacement of equipment; and finally startup. Only phase one has so far been completed.

Azerbaijan

Armenian Units Reportedly Launch Attack

LD2101155494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1403 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Armenian units launched a large scale attack in the north of Karabakh on the town of Ter-Ter Thursday evening, a spokesman for the Azeri Defense Ministry told Interfax. The attacking force of about 2000 troops and nearly ten tanks continued the attack on Friday morning.

According to the ministry, the Karabakh units succeeded in advancing several kilometers towards Ter-Ter but the offensive was fended off in the early hours of January 21. In some areas the enemy had to retreat beyond the line of departure.

According to Baku reports, numerous villages in the Kazakh and Tauz districts of Azerbaijan were shelled from Armenia. There were civilian casualties.

The Karabakh army communique has not been available to Interfax.

Accused of Chemical Weapons Use

NC2201113294 Baku TURAN in English 1958 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 18 (TURAN)—According to the sources close to Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan, Armenian Defense Ministry ordered its Armed Forces located in Karabakh to use war gas against Azeri Army.

Armenia has already sent necessary chemical war gas to Dzhebrailskiy and Beylagan regions (southern part of front). Late December 1993 a specially trained group arrived from Armenia to Karabakh to get the chemical weapons ready for application.

On December 30 Armenian forces have already put chemical gas war into practice in the place of Gural-tepe of Beylagan region of Azerbaijan. As a result of examination of ground and shell- splinters, chemical laboratory under Civil Defense of Republic found chemical war gas "cyanide".

Military experts think that it is prohibited to apply this type of chemical gas war in military activities as they are weapons of mass annihilation.

Azeri Troops Renew Offensive

LD2201121194 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] This morning, after intense rocket and artillery preparation, Azerbaijani troops renewed their offensive in the north of the Nagorno-Karabakh Mardakertskiy rayon. The LUR agency reports that, as of 1200, the Nagorno-Karabakh defensive forces are managing to check the enemy's advance.

According to the information available, the Azerbaijani army has sustained serious losses in men and equipment. Intense firing from fixed positions is going on in other sectors of the front.

Karabakh Forces Down Azeri Aircraft

LD2401115694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1052 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] On January 23, an Azerbaijani war plane was shot down by Karabakh forces not far from Stepanakert, the Karabakh defense army's press service informed Interfax.

This occurred when two Azerbaijani planes were preparing for a bomb attack on the city. Neither the type of the plane, nor the fate of the pilot are known yet.

The same source also announced that Karabakh units had rebuffed all of the Azerbaijani attacks last Sunday in the Mardakert, Askeran, Agdam and Gadrut-Fizuli directions. Thirty-three Azerbaijani and 2 Karabakh soldiers were killed and 6 Karabakh fighters were wounded.

The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry reports that the Azerbaijani forces established control over 12 villages last week in Azerbaijan's Kelbadzhar region, earlier occupied by Armenian formations. In addition, Azerbaijani units forced Armenian forces off the Kelbadzhar-Lachin and Kelbadzhar-Mardakert roads.

The source asserts that during combat operations last week, about 300 Armenian fighters were killed or wounded, and that 14 Armenian tanks, 5 armored vehicles and 5 artillery pieces were destroyed. Four Armenian tanks and 2 armored vehicles were captured.

The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry reports that according to Armenian POWs, servicemen of the Russian division located in Armenia are fighting on the side of Karabakh. Armenian forces constitute the bulk of the fighting contingent.

INTERFAX Reports Attack on Goradiz

LD2301230194 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2200 GMT 23 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to an Interfax report from Baku, Armenian formations are trying to mount an offensive on Goradiz, a strategically important railway station located near the Azeri- Iranian frontier. According to the same source, combat Armenian Army helicopters mounted a rocket strike on the population centers of Terterskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan.

Attack Repulsed

NC2201151994 Baku AZERTAC in English 1315 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January, 22 (AZERTAC)—According to the press service of the Defence Ministry of Azerbaijan another Armenian attempt to attack Goradiz, which is situated in the south-west of Azerbaijan, has been repulsed by the Azeri armed forces. The enemy, who undertook an onslaught in the directions of Ter-Ter and Fizuli- Beylagan has been eager to set up control over railways of Goradiz in order to prevent Azerbaijan to provide food stuffs and fuel to the blockaded Nakhichevan.

According to the information available, in several sectors of the front the Azeri armed forces could repulse the enemy from the earlier occupied territory and take more advantageous positions. The Defence Ministry of Azerbaijan considers that the recent failures of Armenians forced them to spread rumours about firing, which has ostensibly taken place between the units of the Azeri army.

Defense Ministry Update

NC2301205694 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Jan 94

["Text" of Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense Communique of 23 January]

[Text] The struggle waged by the Republic's people and military forces to liberate the territories occupied by the Armenian occupationists is strengthening every day. Responding to President Geydar Aliyev's call to the Republic's people, the Azerbaijan National Army [ANA] has inflicted effective blows on the enemy units and forced them to abandon many of their positions and flee from several towns they occupied in Fizulinskiy and Kelbadzharskiy Rayons.

The troops of our military units, which have significant responsibility to the people in safeguarding Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, have displayed significant heroism in clashes with the ferocious enemy. Regardless of the resistance put up by Armenian occupationists, the blows the ANA units have inflicted on the enemy [words indistinct]. In fact, they are now more determined in their advance against the enemy units. The occupationists are becoming more and more aware of the fact that they are gradually being defeated in a foreign land.

The Armenian Armed Forces, which have lost many men and much military equipment and which have realized that they will not remain unpunished for the acts of violence they have committed in Azerbaijan's territory, are retreating in a disorderly way. Kozly, [place-name indistinct], Kabakchylar, Sarnichlar, [place-name indistinct], Susuzlu, [four place-names indistinct], Kamishly, and Bagyrly in Kelbadzharskiy Rayon were liberated from the occupationists as a result of ANA's successful operations during the past few days.

The ANA units captured several strategically important heights, including [place-name indistinct], in the violent clashes that took place in that rayon. Consequently, they have placed the upper section of the Kelbadzhar-Agdere motorway and the section of the Kelbadzhar-Lachin motorway up to [place-name indistinct] under their control.

The enemy units lost many men and much military equipment in the clashes that took place in Kelbadzharskiy Rayon during the past week. They lost some 300 officers and men, nine tanks, two PDM's [not further identified], and five artillery guns. Azerbaijan's military units seized four tanks, two PDM's, a large quantity of infantry arms, mortars, and arms depots as spoils of war.

According to information from [words indistinct], the number of deserters has increased eight-fold. The deserters are trying to flee to Armenia. Five Armenian officers and men taken as prisoners of war have said that they are affiliated with the 117th Division of Russia's 7th Army. The information they have revealed indicates that morale among the troops in Khankendi [Stepanakert] is very low. Yerevan has recently prepared to dispatch fuel, construction materials, and 20 military vehicles to Khankendi. People are taken from their homes in Yerevan and sent to the front lines. The prisoners also revealed that they joined the fighting because they feared serious repercussions against their families.

This confirms the fact that Armenian military forces supported by Russian military sub-units in Armenia, and not the Nagorno-Karabakh self-defense forces as claimed by the Armenian and Russian mass media organs, are fighting in Azerbaijan.

The ANA units, which are cared for by their state and people, are becoming more and more steadfast every day. The people of the liberated towns can return to their homes. Azerbaijan's people must rest assured that the aggressor will be forced to retreat and our homeland will be liberated.

'Secretary of State' Gadzhiyeva Replaced

PM2101171194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Report by Sokhbet Mamedov: "Having Sent 'Iron Lady' to New York, Geydar Aliyev Forms His Team"]

[Text] Baku—Lola Gadzhiyeva, who aspired to the role of Azerbaijan's "Iron Lady" and who was until recently considered one of President Aliyev's closest associates, has been suddenly removed from her post of republic secretary of state and appointed Azerbaijan's permanent representative to the United Nations. She was number two in the republic.

But her unexpected decision last November to leave the "New Azerbaijan" party, whose chairman is Aliyev, and found her own, liberal democratic, party, was a sure sign of the divergence of positions among the president's inner circle. And this is the result—Gadzhiyeva is on her way to New York, while parliamentary speaker Rasul Guliyev moves into second place in the republic's political hierarchy.

Among the numerous contenders for the vacant post of secretary of state people are mentioning the names of Gasan Gasanov, the republic's current foreign minister, Ramiz Rizayev, Azerbaijani ambassador to Moscow, and Arif Ragimzad, adviser on territorial administration. Most observers are inclined to think that the president will settle on Gasanov as his choice and that the new secretary of state's sphere of activity will be limited to foreign policy.

The Azerbaijani president has set about forming his team in earnest. "I did not have one when I returned to Baku," Aliyev admitted to IZVESTIYA's correspondent. "The first appointments were made merely with the aim of preventing a total collapse of leadership at local level.

My aim is to attract capable and talented young people into governing the republic."

Former CP Chief, Premier Face Charges

PM2101144794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Report by Sokhbet Mamedov under "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" rubric: "Criminal Proceedings Brought in Baku Against Culprits of Black January Tragedy"]

[Text] Baku—Azerbaijani General Prosecutor Ali Omarov has stated that criminal proceedings have been brought against Abdurakhman Vezirov and Ayaz Mutalibov, who are considered the chief culprits of the tragedy on 20 January 1990, when Soviet Army units were brought into Baku.

At that time they held the posts of first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee and chairman of the republic Council of Ministers respectively. But the investigation is being made difficult because both defendants are currently outside Azerbaijan, in Moscow to be exact.

Agreement Signed With Pennzoil

NC2301061194 Baku TURAN in English 1943 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 22 (TURAN)—State Oil Company of Azerbaijan [SOCAR] and an American Pennzoil company signed an extra agreement on the project of utilization of gas at "Neft Dashlari" and "Gunashli".

Representative of Pennzoil told TURAN's reporter that the extra agreement enlarges and specifies the previous agreement, signed in October of the year 1992.

The sides agreed to sign an extra agreement, as the previous agreement envisaged only the shipment of equipment totalling 90 million dollars. As soon as Pennzoil began working here a number of problems appeared—the pipe plant, barge-pipelayer, and auxiliary ships cannot be used for laying an undersea pipeline as they are in emergency condition and need serious repair. Then Azerbaijani side asked to increased the power of compressors from 3 up to 4.3 million cubic meters per day, carry out mounting-construction works and to train Azeri personnel. The volume of expenses increased and reached more then 100 million dollars.

According to the extra agreement the SOCAR may pay for the project differently: in hard currency, oil and oil products, and on the account of Pennzoil's bonus share in the project of exploration of "Azeri " and "Chirag" oil fields.

"The agreement states that the payment will be the most acceptable for Azerbaijan, SOCAR's representative told TURAN's reporter.

Representative of Pennzoil company said, that the work over the project is to end soon, as it is ready for 90 percent by now.

The SOCAR counts that the shipment of gas to the shore will start in the second quarter of 1994. A construction of a big compressor station at "Neft Dashlari" oil field is nearly to end, the laying of the pipeline is planned for late March.

As the specialists consider the implementation of the project will put an end to the escape of about 1.8 billion cubic meters of gas per year from "Guneshli" oil field.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Meets French President Mitterrand

LD2101213294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2109 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris January 21 TASS—Georgian State Head Eduard Shevardnadze, currently here on an official two-day visit, was received by French President Francois Mitterrand here today for one-hour negotiations and signing of a French-Germany [as received] treaty on accord, friendship and cooperation.

The Georgian state head also signed the Paris Charter for new Europe—the fundamental CSCE document.

Shevardnadze, Mitterrand Comment

LD2101235294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2043 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspodent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris, 21 Jan—The signing of a treaty on accord, friendship and cooperation between France and Georgia and the meeting between Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze and French President Francois Mitterrand were the most important moments of the final day of the Georgian leader's visit to France.

After a prolonged conversation between the two countries' leaders in the Elysee Palace there was a ceremonial signing of the French-Georgian treaty, which will create the legal framework for the future relations of cooperation between the two countries. After this, Eduard Shevardnadze signed on Georgia's behalf the Paris Charter for a New Europe - the basic document of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, marking the end of the Cold War and proclaiming the principle of the settlement of all conflicts by peaceful means.

The conclusion of the treaty between France and Georgia means that we are establishing special relations of cooperation and interaction between us, Francois Mitterrand said at the signing ceremony. Today Georgia is encountering significant difficulties of a political and economic nature, and it can count on the solidarity of its

friends, the French president noted. We face interaction in Europe, which is now being built anew, and both our countries bear responsibility for the success of this, the French head of state said.

The signing of today's documents represents a historic moment for Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze said in his reply. Today we are going through a difficult period, but I believe in Georgia's future, and it is linked above all with the fact that we have friends in the world, the Georgian leader said. We arrived in Paris with great hopes, and I must say that these hopes have come true. Today we are opening a new page in the relations between our countries, the head of the Republic of Georgia said.

Eduard Shevardnadze summed up the initial results of his visit to France at a news conference today. The main aims of the visit are to establish normal relations with France and discuss the most important political problems with its leader, and these have been achieved, he said. France, he remarked, has promised aid for Georgia in various fields, including by taking an active role with Russia, the United States and Germany in the work by states friendly to Georgia to find a way of resolving the Abkhazia conflict.

Georgia is placing particular emphasis on developing relations with Russia, Eduard Shevardnadze said. He stressed that there are high hopes in his country for the visit to Tbilisi by President Yeltsin, scheduled for early February. I hope that these hopes are justified, he said.

I spent much time with my French counterpart discussing the new Russia and its new role in the world, meaning in the post-communist period, Eduard Shevardnadze remarked in reply to a question from ITAR-TASS. We noted that this role can only be performed if Russia takes a democratic path, he commented. We believe the adoption of a new Russian constitution to be a significant event and attach great importance to the part that the country's presidency can play in guaranteeing democracy, the Georgian head of state said.

Shevardnadze Comments Further

LD2201235094 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2200 GMT 22 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze today ended his official visit to France and returned to Tbilisi. In his first interview after arrival, Eduard Shevardnadze told journalists that realistic ways for a peaceful settlement of the crisis had taken shape at the talks between Georgia and Abkhazia that are under way in Geneva.

[Begin recording] [Shevardnadze] The main aim has been achieved, I mean the elaboration of a legal basis for cooperation and friendship between the two states [France and Georgia]. A large treaty was signed, and the prospects for economic relations look good. There was much talk, of course, about the state of things in Russia which is our concern and worry, too. The world community must support the democratic choice made by the whole of Russia and its president.

[Correspondent] Touching upon the prospects for relations between Georgia, UNESCO, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Eduard Shevardnadze had the following to say:

[Shevardnadze] This work has just started. The status-...[pauses] I have visited the headquarters of this organization and it seems to me that the prospects here are also good. We have agreed that a special delegation will visit (?us) and we will sort things out on the spot. [end recording]

Shevardnadze 10 Jan Radio Interview Published

AU2301175194 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Traditional weekly radio interview given by Eduard Shevardnadze to correspondent Nato Oniani in Tbilisi on 10 January]

[Excerpts] At the request of correspondent Nato Oniani, Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian Parliament-head of state, began his traditional radio interview by commenting on the speech delivered on Georgian television by Parliament Speaker Vakhtang Goguadze.

[Shevardnadze] Vakhtang Goguadze's speech should become a subject of serious study. I do not think it necessary that the establishment of order, if we understand this in its literal sense, should be entrusted to Russia. We ourselves should establish order in our own country. A country that is unable to establish order does not deserve independence and will be unable to preserve it. It is a different matter when what is under discussion is the resolution of the problem in Abkhazia or Samachablo [South Ossetia]; if the establishment of order relates to these problems, it will be probably difficult and, in practice, impossible to resolve them without the participation of Russia.

As regards the ruble zone, I believe that no one is ready today to convincingly formulate his own views on this question. Batoni [Georgian polite form of address] Vakhtang was expressing one possible variant, namely that Georgia should join the ruble zone when other CIS member states have done the opposite and have encountered certain difficulties in this respect. Apart from Georgia, Belarus is the only country that has more or less determined its position regarding entry into the ruble zone.

It is impossible today to give a decisive answer to this question. A country that has its own national currency cannot state so easily that it is ready to join the ruble or any other zone. I said in my New Year's interview that the introduction of the coupon was a mistake; more

precisely, it was a premature decision taken by the authorities at that time, including me. Unfortunately, it transpired that the country, in the shape of the Cabinet and Parliament, was not prepared to turn toward Russia. If we had turned toward Russia, I am convinced that we would have overcome the bank note crisis, we would have received the necessary amount, and we would have been seriously prepared for the introduction of a national currency. There was a greater desire on our part at the time to introduce as quickly as possible our national currency as one of the attributes of statehood and independence. To tell the truth, both the state and individual families paid quite a high price for this.

Therefore, I am not ready today to give an answer. I will need to have serious consultations with our foreign colleagues. I am going to visit Turkey, France, and the United States and meet with the heads of the IMF, the World Bank, and certain international economic organizations, including the UN, and, thereafter, I will be better qualified to give an answer as to what the solution is. However, it will be very difficult to find one without simultaneous help from some foreign power, be this in the form of large credits or other measures. I think that two or three months are needed in order to give a specific answer to this serious question raised by Batoni Vakhtang.

[Oniani] In your New Year interview, you mentioned that 1994 will be the year of economic revival. Will it also be the year of political revival?

[Shevardnadze] When I said that 1994 would be the beginning of a turnabout in the economy, politics, and, as I put it, state thinking in general, naturally I had in mind political events. We have to put a stop to talk about someone preparing a coup and someone possibly seizing power; there should exist a legal way for doing everything and, in any case, the use of weapons must be excluded.

Batoni Tengiz Kitovani [former defense minister] stated recently: I am not planning any kind of coup; those who want to divert attention from social problems to some other problems are the ones who need to speak about a coup. Batoni Sigua's [former prime minister] frequent pronouncements against the authorities, in particular the head of state, are well known. However, threats of a coup have, as yet, not been heard in his speeches. There have been other speeches, but I do not pay very much attention to all this. I would like to say the following about these two persons: Both Batoni Sigua and Tengiz Kitovani will always remain as heroes regarding those events that marked the beginning of the expulsion of provincial fascism from Georgia [a reference to their role in deposing ex-President Gamsakhurdia in January 1992]. This is an historical process and they not only participated in this process but also were its leaders and will remain so throughout history. As for all the rest, the individual pronouncements and speeches, and Sigua's plans that he is frequently outlining and speaking about in Parliament or on television, I think this should be explained as human weakness, annoyance, anger, a lack of objectivity and knowledge, and, at times, something else. I repeat that all this is a detail; the most important thing is their service to this serious and historic matter.

I do not think that 1994 will be a year of any very great political cataclysms; I do not think that we should expect any coups and so forth as this naturally will not bring society anything.

[Oniani] To what extent are the second stage of the state of emergency and the curfew adopted by Parliament being implemented in Georgia today?

[Shevardnadze] I will not be exaggerating if I say that we are doing everything it is possible to do in such a short period of time following the conclusion of events in western Georgia, and this is being felt little by little in the country. Order is being restored along the highways in western Georgia, and the situation there is being controlled by the police as it is along the highway leading to the Jvari Gorge and in certain other directions. Order is being restored at the oil wells and fuel depots. Unfortunately, we needed to use internal troops there. In the main, order has now been restored at these installations. This means that, in the near future, we will be able to produce 200,000-300,000 tonnes of oil. Order has been established in Zestafoni; the operation conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs involving the participation of hundreds of men and a large amount of equipment is well known. Order has been restored in Mtskheta rayon where a fairly dangerous group has been isolated. [passage omitted]

Finally, for three days now, a very big operation has been underway in Kvemo Kartli where the situation has been unbearable. I was receiving numerous telegrams daily; I don't know how many delegations arrived here; I myself visited these rayons and met with many people. I have to say that such a thing cannot go on in a normal country. Up to 1,500 men have taken part in this operation, mainly Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops who have received assistance from the Ministry of Security; individual subunits from the Ministry of Defense have also taken part in it. As far as I know, the results have been fairly good and convincing. These measures are continuing. The main thing is that, following the establishment of stability in western Georgia, we have been given the chance to get on with restoring order in all rayons.

I think the time has come to get more actively involved in establishing order in the capital and Rustavi where there are very many armed formations, both legal and illegal. I believe that the dreadful firing that occurred on New Year's Eve did not come only from illegal weapons. I am convinced that we probably need one month to take care of the capital and Rustavi. In Rustavi, there are several unregistered armed formations. If they are listening to me now, I advise them to come to Tbilisi tomorrow or join the state structure, or put down their weapons and start living a normal life. Otherwise, things

will end badly. They should take this as a serious warning from me. I know that they fought where it was necessary but, no matter what occurred in the past, the law exists and this has to be obeyed by everyone.

[SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA editorial note] At the constituent congress of the Abkhazian regional organization of the Union of Georgia's Citizens, the statutes read by the head of state had an optimistic ring about them. This gave rise to the following question:

[Oniani] Is the deepening of relations with Russia the reason for this optimism?

[Shevardnadze] One of the reasons is undoubtedly the deepening of relations with Russia and with the CIS member states in general since our turning toward them means, first and foremost, the revival of economic life and the restoration of economic ties. This process has already begun and it is a very hopeful one. I am convinced that the first half of this year will be a period during which very intensive negotiations will be conducted with various associations, departments, different republics, oblasts, and corresponding administrations. However, I think that the second half of the year will be a completely new stage in the economic life of Georgia; a new stage from the point of view that people will begin to work more intensively and on a large scale. I hope that the foreign firms that are coming here to carry out work on oil extraction have definite expectations and, God willing, we will find a little more oil in Georgia. There are also other resources, in particular our coal and certain other alternative sources of energy, which will enable us to be more prepared for next winter. Winter should not mean an economic freeze or the economy coming to a halt. Hence, I repeat that the deepening of relations with Russia itself and our joining the CIS means, first and foremost, the revival of the economy and I think that, if the economy gets going again and in an effective manner, people will have a better life.

There is no disputing the fact that we have to return to Abkhazia. How this should be done is another question. Another meeting is taking place in Geneva. There are definite hopes that the meeting will bring results and, if not, it doesn't matter; our return is inevitable. Furthermore, the view exists that our return to Abkhazia is connected with the more progressive and just position assumed by Russia. At the same time, events focused on Georgia that are taking place not only in Russia but also throughout the world, in particular, the creation of organizations and committees in support of us in various countries, more assistance, investments in the national economy, and humanitarian aid, are also important. However, the main thing is order. If there is order, there will be investment and the flow of capital from different countries throughout the world and, in this way, the country will be saved. This is what I meant when I said that 1994 should be a turning point.

[SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA editorial note] The head of state had the following to say about the news of the death of the former president that was spread last week:

[Shevardnadze] The death of any person arouses serious regret in me, particularly as the ex-president no longer represented any kind of serious political force in Georgia today following those events that took place in western Georgia. His ideology, his world outlook, and his supporters were defeated in every way and from all points of view in accordance with all existing laws.

Regarding those forces that were connected in one way or another with provincial fascism, I do not think that we have the right to feel at peace. Of course, Gamsakhurdia was not alone. He was a politician who adhered to the most categorical and forward positions. However, he had supporters not only at the time when, as we now say, the national-liberation movement embraced the whole of Georgia but also later when he was moving on Kutaisi and Tbilisi; there were people in many political parties that were ready to form an alliance with him. If it is possible to make some kind of forecast, it should be said that these forces will try to create a new organization that is not so much radical but, nevertheless, neo-fascist or profascist in its orientation and if they succeed and come to power, they will conduct the same policies that were implemented by Gamsakhurdia. Therefore, we have to be careful and vigilant.

I do not know whether anyone has witnessed Gamsakhurdia's burial and we do not know where his grave is. The area in which it is supposed to be is, so we are told, still under the control of a small group of his supporters who are quite well armed. We do not want there to be any kind of bloodshed and, therefore, we are not moving in there. It has been confirmed in Groznyy that he indeed committed suicide. According to information brought by our delegation, he wife says the same thing. There is now a very big debate going on regarding where he should be buried or laid to rest. In my view, his family should decide this question. If, as I am being told, it is the wish of his family that he be definitely buried in Groznyy—he found refuge there and this will be no misfortune—we will not oppose this. If his family should want his grave to be in Georgia, this is also up to them. One thing, however, is essential: A serious examination of the body should be carried out with the participation of international experts so that all other versions [of his death] can be either excluded or confirmed. Some people are saying that he did not commit suicide, that certain forces close to him decided that he was no longer needed for anything and, as they say, settled scores with him. Perhaps this is gossip, perhaps it's the truth. Therefore, a legal medical examination should, in any case, be carried out. This is my view.

[Oniani] Today, fascism has become a serious force in Russia. It therefore seems paradoxical that Georgia is taking a serious step toward Russia precisely now....

[Shevardnadze] The expression of a special solidarity with President Yeltsin was felt at the meeting in Ashgabat. I think this was precisely because there was such a real danger of fascism appearing on the large political arena and not only Georgia but also all the CIS member states specifically want and have to adopt the decision to help Russia's democratic forces in the struggle to overcome this terrible sickness. I believe that the same feeling exists in the West, in particular in the US Administration and Europe's leading and non-leading nations that believe that Russia's democracy needs help. If Russia's democracy is saved—I believe this is how the question should be put: Will it be saved or not?—then life on our planet will become stable and assume a normal character. So, Russia's internal problems are now no longer its problems alone but the concern of the whole world. Naturally, Georgia cannot play a decisive role but it can make a specific contribution to this matter by expressing its support for Russia's democratic forces and democratic administration, in particular for President Yeltsin. We have been doing this for a long time and we continue to hold this position. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze Meets Israeli Delegation

LD1901220694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2055 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By GIA correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze met on Wednesday with Israel's official governmental delegation. The delegation included officials of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and some economic agencies.

The talks concentrated on prospects for Georgian-Israeli relations. Participants in the meeting also discussed the proposed visit by Shevardnadze to Israel, during which the two sides are to sign a package of basic agreements to set up a legal framework for ties between Georgia and Israel.

Treaty Concluded With Armenian Procurator

AU2301175494 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 11 Jan 94 p 1

[Report from the press service of the Republic of Georgia Procurator's Office: "Georgia-Armenia: A Treaty Has Been Drawn Up"]

[Text] A treaty on mutual legal assistance has been signed in Tbilisi and Yerevan between the procurator's offices of the Republics of Georgia and Armenia.

"This treaty has particular importance for both sovereign countries," stated Jamlet Babilashvili, Republic of Georgia acting procurator general. "It will promote the joint efforts of the law enforcement bodies of the neighboring states in the struggle against organized crime, in particular terrorism, the narcotics business, and so forth; it will contribute to the successful fulfillment of supervisory functions connected with investigations, the arrest and transfer of criminals, and the resolution of other important questions."

Armenia is the seventh country with whose procurator's office Georgia's Procurator's Office has drawn up a treaty. Such treaties have been concluded with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and other republics. Treaties are being prepared with the procurator's offices of Turkey, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Afghanistan and they will soon become official. In short, Georgia's Procurator's Office is gaining international recognition on a broad scale.

Georgia, Abkhazia Urge Deployment of UN Troops

LD2201092694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0825 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations Organisation January 22 TASS—Georgia and Abkhazia are urging the deployment of the U.N. peace-keeping force in the conflict zone and are expressing their "mutual desire that the Russian military contingent should be included in it," says a communique on the results of the second round of the Geneva talks about the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, which was circulated here on Friday as a document of the Security Council.

According to the communique, "the sides will withdraw all armed units with arms and military hardware from the Inguri river and other possible lines of active confrontation within five days after the arrival of the peace-keeping force.... At the same time, international observers and peace-keeping troops will move into the areas from which armed units are withdrawn."

The communique pointed out that both the Georgian and Abkhazian sides "have recognised that the main task is to achieve a full-scale political settlement of the conflict, and all efforts should be concentrated on attaining this goal." They agreed to continue the discussion of the problem of Abkhazia's political status, taking into account the interests of both sides. The next meeting of experts on this issue will be held in Moscow on February 8.

Following the adoption of the Geneva communique, Georgia asked to convene the Security Council for discussing a possibility of sending a U.N. peace-keeping force to the area of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

Ardzinba on Deployment

LD2301173094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1522 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] The chairman of Abkhazia's parliament, Vladislav Ardzinba, has said that "the normal return of refugees can hardly begin before the issue of deploying

international peace-keeping forces on the border between Georgia and Abkhazia is resolved, because peace-keepers alone can guarantee lasting peace in Abkhazia".

The U.N. Security Council must make the final decision as far as the possibility of deploying peace-keeping forces is concerned, Ardzinba said in an interview with Abkhazian television Saturday evening.

Participants in the Georgian-Abkhazian talks held in Geneva on January 11-13 called for stationing Russian troops as peace-keepers on the border River Inguri.

Abkhazian frontier troops must be deployed on the border alongside of the peace-keeping forces, Ardzinba said. As for Abkhazia's armed forces, their units, he noted, will be stationed in Gali District "behind international peace-keeping forces".

Before the issue of deploying peace-keeping forces is settled "Abkhazia must strengthen its army and be ready to protect its territory", Ardzinba pointed out.

With reference to the return of refugees to Abkhazia, the Abkhaz leader said that this will relate primarily to the inhabitants of Gali District. According to him, the Abkhaz authorities will have individual approaches to everyone who wants to return to Abkhazia. "Those with blood on their hands can hardly expect to get back to Abkhazia," he declared.

Abkhaz Officials Skeptical

LD2301172194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1311 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] Leader of the Liberation of Abkhazia pressure group Boris Kakubava says that a military option is the only way of ensuring the return of refugees to Abkhazia.

In an interview with Interfax news agency on Sunday, he gave a highly negative response to the outcome of the Geneva talks between Georgia and Abkhazia including the problem of Georgian refugees. In his view, Russia cannot act as mediator because of Moscow's role in the conflict leading to the loss of Abkhazia.

Chairman of the national security and defence commission Nodar Natadze was likewise sceptical about the Geneva talks. The deployment of Russian troops along the Inguri river separating Georgia and Abkhazia as asked by the negotiating teams will prevent Georgians from crossing it and turn Abkhazia's Georgian population into slaves or hostages, he told Interfax.

Natadze says, "if Russia is really keen to see Georgia as a stable and integral state, it ought to deploy troops not along the Inguri but Psou river on Russia's border with Abkhazia".

Shevardnadze Authorizes Legal Reform Commission

AU2401115594 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 7 Jan 94 p 3

["Directive of the Georgian Head of State on the State Commission for Legal Reform" issued in Tbilisi on 26 December]

[Text] The construction of a Georgian democratic and legal state, the protection of human rights and freedoms, the development of a free economy, and the implementation of justice are essentially dependent upon the elaboration of legislative acts that will regulate anew the most important social relations taking into account contemporary legal thinking, the achievements of legal practice in developed countries, and national traditions.

In recent years, the Georgian Parliament commissions, state bodies, and scientific establishments have not prepared a single legislative act that has been of vital importance for the political, economic, and social development of the country. At the same time, legislative activity is lagging behind the demands of contemporary life; many spheres of social relations are being regulated in accordance with old legal norms pertaining to other social and political systems; the development of new social relations is being hindered by the corresponding legal disorder; new civil, criminal, labor, administrative, and prison codes and a code of civil procedure should be elaborated without which the systematic development of current legislation is impossible. It is necessary to organize anew the protection of the law, investigations, the Procurator's Office, and the courts and the principles governing these activities.

Proceeding from this:

1. With the aim of preparing draft basic legislative acts, codes, and other acts in the fundamental branches of the law, a state commission on legal reform is to be created that will be attached to the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Justice. It will be composed of the following persons:

Tevdore Ninidze—Republic of Georgia Minister of Justice (commission chairman);

Mindia Ugrekhelidze—chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Court (cochairman);

Jamlet Bibiliashvili—acting Republic of Georgia procurator general (cochairman);

Shota Kviria—Republic of Georgia minister of internal affairs (cochairman);

Igor Giorgadze—Republic of Georgia minister of security (cochairman);

Tengiz Liluashvili—director of the Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute (cochairman, chairman of the Commission for Legislation on Civil Procedure);

Sergo Jorbenadze—holder of the chair of civil law and civil procedure in the Law Faculty at Tbilisi State University (chairman of the Commission for Civil Legislation);

Giorgi Tqeshelidze—holder of the chair of criminal law in the Law Faculty at Tbilisi State University (chairman of the Commission for Legislation on Criminal Law);

Iakob Putkaradze—head of the Department of State and International Law at the Georgian Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute (chairman of the Commission for Constitutional Legislation);

Apolon Paliashvili—holder of the chair of justice and supervision by the Procurator's Office at Tbilisi State University (chairman of the Commission for Legislation on Criminal Procedure);

Valeri Loria—holder of the chair of the principles of the law and legal education at Tbilisi State University (chairman of the Commission for Administrative Legislation);

Gia Meparishvilvi—associate professor in the Law Faculty at Tbilisi State University (chairman of the Commission for the Organization of Activities To Protect the Law);

Lado Chanturia—associate professor in the Law Faculty at Tbilisi State University (chairman of the Commission for Agrarian Legislation);

Roland Giligashvili—Republic of Georgia deputy procurator general (chairman of the Commission for Prison Legislation).

2. The statutes of the State Commission for Legal Reform, the composition of branch commissions, and the plan for preparing draft legislative acts are to be approved by the chairman of the state commission.

3. The Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers is to approve the composition and [budget] estimate of the State Commission for Legal Reform on the basis of proposals submitted by the chairman of the State Commission for Legal Reform.

4. The working period of the State Commission for Legal Reform is to be 1994-95.

5. The State Commission for Legal Reform is to deliver periodically a report on the work it has carried out to the Georgian head of state.

[Signed] E. Shevardnadze
[Dated]Tbilisi, 26 December 1993

Plans Made To Bury Gamsakhurdia in Groznyy

LD2201185994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1849 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[Text] Tbilisi January 22 TASS—Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev said plans have been made to bury Georgian ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Groznyy.

In an exclusive interview with the World Television News Company obtained by ITAR-TASS by its courtesy, Dudayev said "we plan to bury Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Groznyy, on the square of the memorial complex which is being built to commemorate the beginning of the deportation of the Chechen people (celebrated in the republic annually on February 23). This will do honour to all Chechen people."

A Georgian delegation which returned to Tbilisi last night had held talks in Groznyy on Gamsakhurdia's re-burial. The delegation included relatives of the late president, scientists and representatives of the georgian public prosecutor's office.

ITAR-TASS learnt from one of the members of the delegation that in Groznyy Gamsakhurdia's relatives met with his wife Manana.

Deputy: Shevardnadze Rule Part of U.S.'Plot'

WS2101165794 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 20 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Supreme Council Deputy Guram Petriashvili, by Roman Koval, reporter for the State Independence of Ukraine press service; place and date not given: "Empires Turn to Dust, But Nations Live On"]

[Text] [Koval] Mr. Guram, there are different versions regarding unbelievable developments in the Mengreli village of Djikhaskari on New Year's eve. What happened to Zviad Gamsakhurdia? Is he dead or alive? If he is dead, what were the circumstances of his death?

[Petriashvili] Just like many other Georgians I do not believe in the death of our president. However, if the reports are true, I am sure that Gamsakhurdia was murdered—such outstanding people do not commit suicide. Gamsakhurdia has the character of a warrior bound by ties of blood with his nation.

[Koval] It has become evident that an active redistribution of the spheres of influence is under way in the world. Undercover diplomacy is becoming a driving force of the new world order and some nations make decisions regarding the fate of other nations. Do you share these views?

[Petriashvili] It is clear now that a scheme has been designed in world politics: The United Nations and other influential organizations led by the United States have made a secret deal with Russia. Its provisions stipulate that Russia will have no claims on the so-called socialist camp in East Europe and the Baltics. In exchange for this, Western states will support Russian attempts to preserve control over all other republics and to save the diminished empire.

Having consent from the world's influential political forces Moscow inspired a coup in Tbilisi and brought KGB General E. Shevardnadze to power. Why is the "democratic world community" threatening Ukraine and pushing it toward giving up its nuclear arms for Russia's advantage? This is another component of the same criminal plot against former Soviet nations.

[Koval] Can we believe Western mass media claiming that Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia to fight Gamsakhurdia's "totalitarian regime" and to build a democratic Georgia?

[Petriashvili] "Gamsakhurdia's totalitarian regime" is a myth invented by the KGB and blown up by those political forces of the world that participate in the plot. "World democracies" are not satisfied with Gamsakhurdia's desire to win genuine and not token CIS-type, independence for Georgia. When in 1991, Moscow came forward with an initiative to sign the new Union Treaty, the Georgian president categorically refused. The U.S. President's reaction was very ambiguous: "Zviad Gamsakhurdia is swimming against the stream."

With regard to Shevardnadze, it is no secret that this imperial secret service general has only one goal, namely to subordinate Georgia to Russia again. Even those who once fought against legally elected President Gamsakhurdia have realized this. A member of Shevardnadze's "legislature" Vazha Adamia points out: "Shevardnadze was sent to Georgia on a secret mission." Tengiz Sigua, one of the leaders of the Georgian putsch agrees: "Shevardnadze has been destroying the Georgian economy on purpose so as to make CIS membership the only way to save the situation."

The myth of Shevardnadze being a freedom-fighter was invented by those who want the Russian Empire's humble slave to be Georgia's leader.

Lawlessness reigning in Georgia since the ousting of the legal power makes the purges of 1937 look like innocent children's games. People who have not seen Georgia for the last two years may find witnesses' testimonies exaggerated and fantastic. Executions without investigations and trials, kidnapping, and robberies represent Georgia's "democracy" of today.

If someone disregards the people's choice demonstrated in the general elections he will hardly lead the nation to democracy and happiness. Those who come to power by means of violence can only bring bloodshed and suffering. History testifies to this.

Shevardnadze has always been and remains a Bolshevik regardless of his speculations about democracy. Commenting on establishing the Georgian Security Ministry he said: "The ministry's primary task will be to fight zviadists" (in fact he meant dissidents).

[Koval] How will the events in Georgia develop in 1994?

[Petriashvili] I do not want to give forecasts, but this much I am sure of: No matter what happens, the Georgian people will not give up their fight for independence. No Lenins, Stalins, or Shevardnadzes can bar the movement of Georgians and other nations of the Russian empire toward freedom. Empires turn to dust, but nations live on.

Country Said To Rely on Russia in Economy

MK2201101094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by Konstantin Smirnov: "Regulating Russian-Georgian Trade. New Georgiyevsk Treaty in Pipeline"]

[Text] To stop Georgia's slide toward economic collapse is now possible only on condition of restored traditional economic links with Russia. The first step in this direction was Georgia's entry into the CIS last fall. In the meeting between Russian and Georgian Prime Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Otar Patsatsiya, KOMMERSANT- DAILY reported yesterday, concrete mechanics for the republic to join the Commonwealth were discussed, and a number of bilateral agreements including one to establish a free-trade regime were approved.

Georgia's desire for close economic relations with Russia stems from the crisis in the national economy, which is on the brink of collapse. In the estimate of the International "Reforma" fund, Georgia's state budget deficit in 1993 came close to 100 percent. Its debt to Russia tops 50 billion rubles [R], and the prospects for paying it are rather nebulous because Georgian exports to Russia were constantly falling, and in 1993 did not exceed R26 billion. This is in parallel with the devaluation of the Georgian coupon, whose rate against the ruble has fallen since last August by a factor of more than 100. The situation is being made even worse by an appreciable decline of supplies from Russia, primarily of energy. Deliveries of Russian natural gas were stopped as early as 1992, and after the Georgian side had been discovered illegally re-exporting Russian petroleum products (Russian raw material worth $23.1 million was shipped to France alone in the second part of 1992), the Russian side sharply cut back its oil and petroleum products supplies.

Georgia hopes to stabilize the economic situation by signing bilateral agreements with Russia on trade and economic relations in 1994, and on a free-trade regime. Under these understandings, Georgia will be guaranteed supplies of Russian energy in agreed amounts while Georgian goods for Russia will be exempt from import duties. The latest meeting of the two countries' premiers in Moscow finalized 3 and 4 February as the dates of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Georgia. The above agreements will be signed during this trip. Besides, Eduard Shevardnadze is going to bring Georgia back into the ruble zone. The advantages for the Georgian side are apparent. As for the ruble, it will further weaken as a result of such an

alliance. On the whole, Georgia is counting on Russia's financial and economic support in solving its own national problems.

[Saneblidze]**Of course.**

[Lominadze] It is difficult but absolutely necessary and it has to be done through systematic and purposeful propaganda and actions and not, as some leaders imagine, by thinking that, having entered these places, there is nothing else for us to do but sit idly by and wait for the results.

This was precisely the mood when we entered Abkhazia. Yes, we did get from the Inguri River to Sukhumi! However, we did not advance further. It is well known what the consequences of this were for us. The same thing could possibly happen here as well.

There was no hand-to-hand combat in Senaki or Khobi or Zugdidi or anywhere else. However, although those armed people have dispersed, they still exist, do they not? Of course they do. Who can guarantee to us that they will not unite again or will not use those socioeconomic problems that exist in reality for their own purposes? No one.

Finally, there is a trend toward an improvement of the situation. However, we must not relax our efforts for a single moment. [passage omitted]

Estonia

Meri Receives French European Affairs Minister

LD2101105694 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Alain Lamassoure, French minister [delegate] for European affairs, is currently on a visit to Estonia. He held a meeting with Estonian President Lennart Meri today. One of the key aims of Lamassoure's visit is to make preparations for the European stability pact's opening conference in the Baltic states. For Estonia, the main political importance of the European stability pact—or the so-called Balladur initiative—comes from the fact that the pact views the Baltic states as possible European Union members for the first time.

Lamassoure will be leaving Estonia at noon today. He will travel on to Latvia and Lithuania.

Security Issues Dominate Talks

LD2101143994 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Alain Lamassoure, French minister [delegate] for European affairs has ended his visit to Estonia. Erik Samel will sum up his visit.

[Samel] [passage omitted] According to the French minister, the main subject in his discussions with Estonian politicians were issues to do with European security, including the so-called Balladur plan or the European security pact, whose opening conference will take place in April, in Paris. The pact aims to provide an opportunity for all European countries to have their security ensured. The French minister emphasized that for France, Estonian security is also French security.

According to [Foreign Minister] Juri Luik, who also attended the news conference, Lamassoure's visit took place at a very good time for Estonia since Estonia is now taking great strides toward Europe.

[Begin Luik recording] We talked about several issues of mutual interest. First, of course, about security issues. The Estonian position is that the closer Estonia is to the European Union, the more Estonian security is safeguarded. Of particular importance here is Lamassoure's position—which the Estonian side also encouraged—that a free-trade agreement with Europe is a good thing but it must contain a strong political dimension. A political dimension, which, in fact, would equate us with the Visegrad foursome, would equate us with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. This is the position that the French minister emphasized and that is also what we emphasized.

We also emphasized the need to develop new European security structures. First and foremost, the West European Union. The West European Union is a promising organization alongside NATO. There was also talk about an associated member status, which is being developed at the West European Union. Given the status of an associated member Estonia would be willing to take part in the work of the West European Union.

We discussed the Balladur plan and the French minister emphasized (?and said that he is in full support of) the Balladur plan developing into a mechanism for resolving bones of contention between Estonia and Russia because the strength of the Balladur mechanism is that the European Union member states will act as guarantors to agreements reached. They will also help to broker such agreements. I would not, for example, rule out the possibility that the Estonian-Russian border issue may find a solution through precisely this mechanism, in the spirit of cooperation it provides. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Withdrawal Talks With Russia Set for 1-2 Feb

WS2101122494 Tallinn BNS in English 0731 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 20, BNS—The next round of intergovernmental talks between Estonia and Russia are to be held in a location near Moscow on Feb. 1-2.

The talks, originally scheduled for Jan. 18-19, were postponed at Russia's request after the Russian delegation leader Vasiliy Svirin was reported to have fallen ill.

The two parties reached agreement on the new date of the talks on Jan. 20, said Ago Tiiman, secretary of the Estonian delegation. Russia has said it will this time present a detailed timetable for the withdrawal of its troops from Estonia.

Russia in the last round of talks suggested Aug. 31, 1994, as the final deadline for the pullout. Estonia has agreed in principle with the deadline but says Russia still must present a timetable showing the terms for the withdrawal of each major unit.

The head of the Estonian delegation, Vaino Reinart, has earlier said the presenting of the timetable won't affect the final deadline.

Inquiry Urged Into Russia's Nationalist Party

WS2401111494 Tallinn BNS in English 1255 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 22, BNS—The Estonian Minister of Justice, Kaido Kama, says information published by the media provides reasons to suspect that the representative of Russian radical nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's party in Estonia is engaged in activity aimed against Estonia's national interests.

A resident of the northeastern border town of Narva, Pyotr Rozhok, has identified himself as the representative of Zhirinovsky's misleadingly-named Liberal Democratic Party in Estonia.

"Concrete proof is needed to sanction legal action against Rozhok," Kama said. He added that a decision on Rozhok's possible arrest had to come from the country's Defense Police.

The minister said defense police officials first have to make sure if Rozhok really was a member of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party.

The director general of the Defense Police, Juri Pihl, told BNS Rozhok was having a membership card of the party.

"But we cannot claim with full confidence that he is the party's official representative in Estonia," Pihl said. He added that Zhirinovsky's party had a few dozens of members in Estonia.

The security police chief said Rozhok in his statements had voiced disrespectfulness toward the Estonian president, the government and members of the parliament.

"I cannot say if this is sufficient for initiating criminal proceedings," he said.

The chief spokesman for the Russian Liberal Democrats, Eduard Yermolayev, confirmed to BNS that Rozhok was the party's official representative in Estonia.

Russian Assembly in Tallinn Appeals to Leaders

LD2001145894 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] The Russian Representative Assembly has appealed to the Russian and U.S. Presidents for help with ending the continuing discrimination of Estonian inhabitants on the basis of their citizenship. An aggressive nationalist policy aimed at establishing a nation state, which manifests itself through a well-considered system of legislative acts, is directed toward ousting the Russian-language population from Estonia and brings them humiliation and suffering. This is what the appeal adopted at the session of the Representative Assembly's presidium on 18 January says.

The appeal states that over a third of permanent Estonian residents have been declared to be foreigners; the principles of the Human Right Declaration and the Convention on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness have thereby been ignored. The Representative Assembly notes that until now the awarding of citizenship on the basis of one's free will has not been decided, as had been envisaged in the agreement on the foundations of interstate relations concluded between Estonia and Russia on 12 January 1991, as well as the granting of permits for permanent residence. This is what the Representative Assembly's statement says.

Centrists Urge Communication Between President, Parliament

WS2401121194 Tallinn BNS in English 1729 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 22, BNS—The Estonian Rural Centrist Party, which as a member of the Moderate alliance is part of the country's governing coalition, calls on the president to hire a special official to be responsible for contacts with the legislative body.

Rural Centrist leader Ivar Raig at a press conference Friday [21 January] said the president's parliament relations officer should attend the plenary meetings of the State Assembly and stay well informed of the work done by the parliamentary commissions so that no information blackout would again occur between the president and the parliament.

Raig, whose comments were about the recent dispute over Cabinet nominations between the president and the prime minister, said the ruling coalition and the government had been right to seek the replacement of Economics Minister Toomas Sildmae.

He said Sildmae was sacked because of his ministry's failure to work out laws.

"The Economics Ministry during the past year didn't submit to the parliament even one single original bill drawn up in ministry itself. The ministry paid more attention to industrial development and seeking contacts in other countries than to working out an economic policy," Raig said.

He also said that the practice when interest groups in the economy turned their requests to the president rather than the government or the parliament was contradicting the principles of a parliamentary state.

Raig was referrng to statements in support of Sildmae delivered to the president by a number of business associations and influence groups when the government revealed its plans for Sildmae's replacement.

Industrial Output Declined 26 Percent Last Year

WS2401121894 Tallinn BNS BALTIC BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 1727 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] The volume of industrial output in Estonia in the valid sales prices without the VAT and excise tax totaled to 14.61 billion kroons last year.

Data by the Statistics Department shows the industrial sector's annual output in 1993 was down 26.6 percent from the respective figure for 1992.

Better results were reported in the fishery and fish-processing sector, where the output rose 4.3 percent from 1992, in the production of beverages (up 26.9 percent), of motorized vehicles (up 16.3 percent), of other means of transport (up 56.7 percent), publishing, printing and recording (up 3.8 percent).

Meanwhile, the volume of industrial output in December was 1.48 billion kroons, showing a 0.4 percent rise from November.

Latvia

Ulmanis: U.S. Made No Secret Deals With Moscow

LD2101154594 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] At a press conference held today, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis announced that his telephone conversation on Thursday with U.S. President Bill Clinton allows him to conclude that Moscow and Washington have no secret agreements that could threaten Latvia's sovereignty.

The U.S. President, in his 30-minute telephone conversation, emphasized that the issues of human rights and citizenship are not linked to the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops. The United States, since the incident in Latvia on 10 January and the events connected with it, has not changed its stance on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops and believes that the issue of human rights and citizenship is to be settled by the Latvian state itself, stressed Guntis Ulmanis.

Bill Clinton also informed Ulmanis about his visit to Moscow last week. The U.S. President discussed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin the issue of the Skrunda radar station. Clinton recommended continuing talks at the level of the government commissions on this issue and seeking a compromise solution.

Talks Held With France on Security, Defense

LD2301180694 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1000 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] In Riga today, Alain Lamassoure, minister delegate of European affairs at the French Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offered Latvia several proposals for tackling issues of national security. One of the proposals is joining Balladur's plan, or the European stability pact, the draft of which was worked out by the French premier.

This plan envisages joint discussion and tackling of various conflicts and problems between neighboring countries. It is planned in the draft to pay particular attention to problems which occur in relations between small countries and neighboring great powers.

France will also assist Latvia in joining the European Union. An agreement is currently being worked out between the European Union and Latvia, and France wishes that the agreement will also have a political significance and make it possible for Latvia to become a member state of the European Union in the future.

In addition, Lamassoure said that France supports the concept of Latvia joining the West European Union as an associate member.

The Partnership for Peace cooperation program offered by NATO would also help to tackle the issues of Latvian security. As Lamassoure said, an agreement is currently being prepared between Latvia and France on cooperation in defense issues. The agreement provides for training of Latvian military experts in France. Both countries have already coordinated all the political aspects of the agreement and it could be signed in the near future.

Further on Discussions

LD2301225394 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0500 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Excerpt] President Guntis Ulmanis received a delegation headed by Alain Lamassoure, minister delegate of European affairs of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his residence at Jurmala yesterday.

Looking at the sea through a window of the meeting hall, Mr. Lamassoure said that the seascape reminded him of the Atlantic coast of France. There the sea is rough but the land tranquil. Here the sea is calm but the land restless. Prime Minister Edouard Balladur has therefore asked him to visit the Baltic states in precisely this situation which has evolved after the elections in Russia. The elections brought about insecurity, to a certain extent even threats to the Baltic states, therefore, (?the minister said), France expresses support for Latvia.

Speaking about relations with the European Union, Alain Lamassoure stressed that France and Germany are in favor of Latvia becoming an associate member of that organization. He indicated that France fully supports Latvia's demand for the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian army, because Latvia is a sovereign state.

An acceptable timescale should be laid down for the dismantling of the Skrunda radar station; this has nothing to do with the Russian community in Latvia.

President Guntis Ulmanis emphasized the security issue in Latvia and all the Baltic states, which has come to the fore due to the events of recent days. (?Therefore), the cooperation which has already started with France is of special significance for strengthening the Latvian defense forces.

Alain Lamassoure reported that he will confer with the French defense minister within the next few days to prepare a document for signing on cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of defense.

Speaking about the NATO Partnership for Peace plan and Latvia's involvement in this program, the minister noted that for countries which are not NATO member states this offers the possibility for obtaining new security guarantees.

Touching on the issue of minorities, the French minister stressed that if the Latvian Government relies on recommendations made by the CSCE, France will be able to render more palpable support.

At the end of the meeting the president recalled that France has not yet resolved the issue of the Latvian Embassy. The minister replied that action would begin quite soon to get out of the deadlock.

Alain Lamassoure handed to Latvia's Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs a letter from French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur with an invitation to visit the French capital in the near future. During the talks Mr. Birkavs stressed that Latvian security has become the main priority of state policy and expressed support for the draft of the European stability pact worked out by the French prime minister. [passage omitted]

Birkavs, Chilean Ambassador Discuss Cooperation

WS1901174894 Riga LETA in English 1550 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, January 19 (LETA)—According to the Ministers Cabinet Press Service, Tuesday [18 January] the Latvian Prime Minister, Valdis Birkavs, and the Ambassador of Chile, Karlos Parra, discussed the possibilities for development in cooperation between both countries. Birkavs considers it is time to launch economic ties between Latvia and Chile. The sides are unanimous it is of special importance to enhance trade between the two countries. Nowadays, the volume of goods imported from Latvia by Chile comprises only 4,000 lats. The ambassador sees good possibilities to more extensive bilateral trade in the fact that Latvia has a large trade fleet, while Chile produces relatively cheap goods. Birkavs, in turn, proposed that work be started on providing the economic ties of both countries with a legal basis, reviewing agreements on investment protection and on avoiding double taxation. Latvia would be the first country to have an agreement with this South American country on avoiding double taxation. Birkavs and Parra view the exchange with high-ranking delegations as the important contribution to the cooperation between Latvia and Chile.

Birkavs also proposed the information exchange on the reform process, stressing that Latvia wishes to know the way success in economic reforms was achieved in Chile.

Parra, in his turn, called the experts in forestry and sea economy of Latvia to join launching the projects dealing with the research carried out in these branches in Chile.

Parliament Rejects Counterintelligence Rules

WS2101212194 Tallinn BNS in English 1932 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, Jan 21, BNS—Latvian lawmakers rejected the Cabinet's Jan. 11 regulations on counterintelligence, thus approving the National Independence Movement's proposal.

The other 37 resolutions, which the government accepted in between the parliament sessions, were sent for consideration to the Saeima (parliament) standing committees.

The rejected rule stipulated the setup of counterintelligence services to prognosticate, monitor and neutralize any danger to the national security. The services were also designed to gather information on concrete candidates for important government posts.

A heated debate arose when considering the Cabinet resolutions on the Riga local government and the amendments to the law on the status of a local deputy.

As reported, the government adopted these norms Jan. 10 after the conflict between local authorities and Russian officers. The rules allow for dismissing any local government head who repeatedly fails to observe laws or Cabinet resolutions.

The norms are inconsistent with the principles of a rule-of-law state, according to which an elected person is dismissed only by a court ruling, said Maris Budovskis, of the National Independence Movement faction.

If the Saeima had rejected the resolution, Andrejs Rucs, the fired Vidzeme district head, should have been restored in office.

Parliament Approves 1994 Budget

WS2101132094 Tallinn BNS in English 1047 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, Jan 21, BNS—The Latvian Saeima (parliament) adopted the 1994 budget plan Thursday [20 January] after its first reading.

The plan was endorsed by the ruling Latvia's Way - Farmers' Union coalition, the Concord for Latvia faction, the Democratic Party faction and the Equality of Rights (Lidztiesiba) faction.

The Latvian National Independence Movement faction, the Homeland and Freedom, and the Christian Democrats Union factions, however, proposed to postpone the approvement until the draft's "conceptual rearrangement."

The budget lacks clearcut concepts for the defense sphere and the local administration, said Alexander Kirsteins of the Independence Movement.

The government adjusted the planned incomes to the chaotically developing economy, said Equality of Rights' Larisa Lavina, who objected to the plan's economic motivation.

On the other hand, the budget plan duly reflects "the budget of a small, economically haphazard country" that earns almost nothing from industry and foreign investments, said Concord's leader Edvins Kide.

The debate corresponded to the general world practice—the ruling coalition tried to persuade the critical opposition into approving a project, said Andrejs Pantelejevs, the head of the Latvia's Way faction.

Russia Still Remains Major Trade Partner

WS2401122294 Tallinn BNS BALTIC BUSINESS WEEKLY in English 1727 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] According to the Latvian Statistics Committee, Russia continues to remain the country's leading trade partner.

Over the first 11 months, Latvia imported from Russia goods worth 160.3 mln [million] lats, i.e. 28.4 percent of the country's overall imports. Latvia's other major trade partners are Germany (57.3 mln lats, or 10.2 percent share in overall imports), Lithuania (55.6 mln lats, or 9.9 percent) and Sweden (30.9 mln lats, or 5.5 percent).

Last year, Russia was also the major importer of Latvian goods which totalled 182.2 mln lats, or 29.5 percent of the country's overall exports. Exports to the Netherlands made 54 mln lats and to Sweden and Germany—41.2 mln lats each.

A considerable share of Latvian imports, a total of 44.8 percent, involves energy and fuel resources, while the bulk of exported commodities deals with goods produced outside Latvia, for example, oil products, the export volume of which accounted for 14 percent over 11 months of 1993. Timber and timber products made 8.7 percent of Latvia's overall exports.

Government Imposes Comprehensive Duty on Imports

WS1901154594 Tallinn BNS in English 1344 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, Jan 19, BNS—The Latvian Cabinet passed regulations Tuesday [18 January] imposing an import duty on all foreign-made goods, Finance Minister Uldis Osis told reporters.

The resolution replaces the earlier order that allowed to waive import duties on certain categories of goods. The duty will vary from 15 percent to 20 percent depending on whether the exporter country has a free trade agreement with Latvia, Osis said.

The lowest tariff is levied on raw materials, which are being brought in to supply the local industry.

Imported products that can be made on the spot will be taxed 45 percent, Osis said.

The tariffs are tailored to protect the domestic market, the minister noted. Simultaneously, Osis conceded, the tariffs increase alone is unable to protect the Latvian market. Latvia should also improve the tax collection mechanism and customs control, he said.

The new tariffs take effect 30 days after their publication in the LATVIJAS VESTNESIS newspaper.

In other actions, the Cabinet gave the go-ahead for the liquidation of a series of profitless state-run enterprises and adopted the order for repayment of excise taxes on diesel fuel, which were earlier paid by Latvian farmers in accordance with an erroneous government resolution.

Government Strives To Strengthen Eastern Borders

WS2001171794 Tallinn BNS in English 1318 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, Jan 20, BNS—The Latvian Government is working to strengthen the country's bounday with eastern neighbors, Defense Minister Valdis Pavlovskis told the Saeima plenary session Thursday [20 January].

Pavlovskis was asked by MP [member of parliament] Juris Janeks to comment on the issue.

The government will draft new frontier regulations soon, pledged Pavlovskis.

The Baltic frontier guards leadership met Jan. 19 in Jurmala, in the framework of the Baltic summit there, said Pavlovskis. They started to shape a cooperation agreement of Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian frontier services, the minister said.

The signature of the agreement is scheduled for February. The first results of this cooperation may be seen already in March, the defense minister said.

Lithuania

Officials: Country May Be First To Sign NATO Plan

WS2101211494 Tallinn BNS in English 1932 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Brussels, Jan 21, AP - BNS—Lithuania will most likely become the first East European country to sign up next week for NATO's new plan granting limited partnerships to its former adversaries, officials said Friday [21 January].

Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas was scheduled to sign the "Partnership for Peace" document during a visit next Thursday to the 16-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

At a recent summit, President Clinton and other alliance leaders invited their Warsaw Pact foes to accept the plan, which would draw the nations closer but without granting them membership.

NATO officials said the East Europeans can begin signing the partnership document on Monday.

After they do, they will work out individual programs for taking part in military exercises, peacekeeping and other

NATO activities. In turn, the nations will have to share information about defense budgets, promise civilian control over the military and standardize weapons systems.

Lithuania earlier this month became the first former Soviet republic to ask for membership in the alliance and the security guarantees that would go with it. Poland, Hungary and others also want to join.

But the allies have refused to admit the East Europeans, fearing to do so would create a new divide in Europe and isolate and upset Russia, a formidable military power.

Conservatives Worried Over International Security

LD2201141894 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian 1300 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] The political council of the Homeland Union has made public a statement on further steps in the consolidation of Lithuania's international security. The conservatives state that after Lithuania's official statement on its intention to join NATO, new steps will undoubtedly be taken. As Russia's foreign policy toward the Baltic states is becoming ever more aggressive, the political council of the party of conservatives believes that during the upcoming visit by Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas to Brussels and the signing of the document on cooperation for peace, the president should ask for consultations with NATO, provided by this document to Lithuania, as a partner who is facing direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, and security.

The political council of the party of conservatives is convinced that the NATO political consultants and observers should be working in Vilnius.

French Minister on Defense Cooperation Treaty

LD2201135094 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Alain Lamassoure, French minister [delegate] for European affairs, told journalists last night that a defense cooperation treaty between Lithuania and France would be signed in the immediate future. The text of the treaty has already been coordinated, and it has been signed by Lithuanian National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius. Lamassoure said that he would take this treaty to French Defense Francois Leotard, who intends to visit Lithuania this year.

The purpose of the current official visit by Lamassoure is to establish economic and political contacts between France and Lithuania. According to Lamassoure, his visit has been speeded up by the parliamentary elections in Russia, because France has always supported the struggle of the Baltic countries for freedom, and it feels its responsibility regarding the situation here.

France thinks that North and Central European countries should have associated membership in the West European Union, a defense organization uniting nine West European states, Lamassoure said. France also has other initiatives concerning Lithuania. Negotiations on a trade agreement between Lithuania and the states of the European Union are taking place. Lamassoure said that this involves not only economic but also political agreement, which may decide Lithuania's admission to the European Union, if this Lithuania's wish.

Yet another proposal by France is the so-called Balladur plan—submitted by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur—which concerns countries having problems with their neighbors or with national minorities. This is a kind of peace conference where the countries of the European Union would be mediators. It is planned to convene such a conference in Paris next April.

Lamassoure met on Friday the chairman of the Seimas, Ceslovas Jursenas, members of the Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee, representatives of all political forces, Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys, Defense Minister Linkevicius, and the leader of the opposition, Vytautas Landsbergis. He is meeting Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius today.

Lamassoure will go from Vilnius to Latvia.

Czech Minister Baudys Comments on Visit, Talks

LD1901151894 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2230 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] [Announcer] The minister of defense of the Czech Republic, Antonin Baudys, and the delegation headed by him began a visit to Lithuania on Monday. The report that follows was filed by Jonas Kernigis of the Lithuanian service of Radio Vilnius.

[Kernigis] The Czech defense minister was met at Vilnius airport by his Lithuanian counterpart, Linas Linkevicius, and other top-ranking military officials of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Lithuania.

The defense ministers of the two states had an exchange of opinion on bilateral cooperation between the Czech Republic and Lithuania. According to the Czech defense minister, Antonin Baudys, his country can sell Lithuania arms, if Lithuania expresses such a wish. Mr. Antonin Baudys said that the situation in Europe was complicated, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and owing to the unending military conflict in the Balkans. The war actions in the Balkans make NATO be cautious about admitting post-communist states to the organization. The Czech minister of defense, Mr. Antonin Baudys:

[Begin Baudys recording in Czech, fading to English translation] The government of the Czech Republic considered the issue of NATO membership all through the year 1993. Therefore the American Partnership for Peace initiative did not surprise us. We realised that this is the maximum that can be achieved in Europe. We

were the first to approve the project. We understand that NATO must treat Russia as an economic and military partner. [end recording]

[Announcer] According to the Czech minister of defense, the Visegrad states, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as other East European states, seek NATO membership, striving to ground [as heard] that cooperation on a democratic state system and market economy. The Czech Republic also speaks up for the preservation of the existing state borders in Europe, and against the formation of any new military blocs on the continent. According to the Czech defense minister, the U.S. Partnership for Peace project makes it possible to put into practice the potential of East and Central European states, without doing harm to the peculiar interests of a given country.

According to the Czech minister of defense, Antonin Baudys, it was accentuated during the visit of the American President that the Partnership for Peace initiative did not only mean cooperation in the military sphere:

[Begin Baudys recording] The words uttered by the U.S. President during the visit to the Czech Republic witnessed that the United States will support European states by way of economic programs and investment. A draft of such cooperation has already been worked out and it will soon be submitted to the Czech Government. [end recording]

[Announcer] According to the Czech defense minister, each East European state must draw up its individual program of participation in the Partnership for Peace project. Lithuanian minister of national defense, Linas Linkevicius, told Radio Vilnius that new links of partnership with the Czech Republic were going to be established.

[Begin Linkevicius recording] Five groups of Lithuanian officers will go to the Czech Republic to gain experience there. At present, deputy minister of defense and the commander of the Air Force are having a course in that country, too. We expect Czech assistance in the sphere of armament development. Cooperation between the two states is concrete and fruitful, and that is most important. [end recording]

[Announcer] The defense minister of the Czech Republic will stay in Lithuania until Wednesday. The official visit of the Czech minister envisages meetings with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas and chairman of parliament, Ceslovas Jursenas. He will also visit units of the Lithuanian Army in Vilnius, Kaunas and Siauliai.

Communists' Trial Seen Inspired by Moscow

MK2201132094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Tamara Nikolayeva in the "Lithuania" column: "The Outcome of the January 'Games' in the Baltics May Be a Death Sentence for Lithuanian Communists. Their Arrest Has Provided Cause To Revise the 'Tragic January' in Vilnius"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The most independent of Lithuania's independent newspapers, RESPUBLIKA, in one of its recent issues cited K. Gashki, a member of the Seimas National Security Committee, as saying that such an action [the Belarusian authorities' arrest of Lithuanian Communists in Minsk] may threaten Lithuania with an undesirable political scandal for two reasons: First, Lithuanian armed officials have crossed the Lithuanian- Belarusian border; and second, the capacity in which Lithuanian General Prosecutor Arturas Paulauskas visited Minsk to hold talks about the possibility of arresting Mikolas Burokyavicius and Yuozas Yermolavicius. According to Gashki and another member of the Seimas National Security Committee, A. Ivashkyavicius (who, it will be noted, has no sympathy for either communism or communists), the operation to detain these persons, who have long been on the wanted list of Lithuanian law enforcement bodies, could have been carried out only by Belarus officials, whereupon they were handed over to the Lithuanian side on the border of the two states. Incidentally, the above mentioned members of the Lithuanian Seimas National Security Committee suggest that the arrest of Burokyavicius and Yermolavicius became possible only because they were "sold out." "We would never have gotten Mikolas Burokyavicius or Yuozas Yermolavicius if it was not beneficial to Moscow," K. Gashki told RESPUBLIKA's correspondent. "They were transferred to Lithuania so that in the course of a judicial process in Vilnius some tasks confronting a 'third party' could be resolved; in other words, Moscow is imposing its own rules of the game on Lithuania." According to the National Security Committee members, it would be a mistake to think that Burokyavichus and Yermolavichus were the organizers and perpetrators of the coup attempted in January 1991. The Lithuanian communist leaders could not have played a role greater than stage director assistants because "they had no way of calling in a paratroopers division from Pskov or summoning V. Sakalauskas, former chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, who at the time was a staff member at the Soviet Embassy in Mozambique and was allegedly tasked with composing a new Lithuanian government. Also, it certainly took more than the desire or will of the Lithuanian communists to get Soviet armored cars into the streets of Vilnius. [passage omitted]

Time will tell whether the ongoing trial of the communist leaders in Vilnius will be used to strip some veils of secrecy from the January and subsequent events. On one hand, it would be very attractive for Lithuania to reveal the role of a third state. But on the other, there is the danger of also exposing some internal mechanisms and levers about which the Lithuanian social democratic weekly LETUVOS ZHINES wrote recently. According to the paper, the leaders of Sajudis, which was in power in 1990-1991, came to the conclusion that Moscow could

be forced to abandon its plans of preserving Lithuania as part of the USSR precisely by aggravating the situation because it feared bloodshed. Sajudis members, the paper writes, deliberately insulted and provoked the army, and calls for armed resistance were coming from all quarters. In chess, a victory appears the more brilliant the more pawns and other pieces have been sacrificed. On the evening of 12 January 1991 the radio and TV were urging the people to congregate around the TV tower in Vilnius, assuring them that Soviet soldiers would be using only blanks. As a result, 13 people were killed and hundreds wounded or injured. According to LETUVOS ZHINES, it was the persistent sadistic propaganda about armed defense that gave the attackers cause for using firearms against peaceful, unarmed civilians. Gunmen from the Alfa group, the paper writes, accepted the offered chess sacrifice: It was the final response from the USSR leadership—a personal punishment for Vytautas Landsbergis. [passage omitted]

Country Termed 'Object of International Spying'

WS2101211394 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1854 GMT 21 Jan 94

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 420]

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 21, ELTA—A newly appointed chairman of parliamentary National security committee Vytautas Petkevicius MP [member of parliament] arranged his first news conference on Friday [21 January].

He told the news conference Lithuanian Army could not fight against an aggressor for any longer period of time, therefore the national defence conception should be based on the resistance of all the nation. But the Army is not ready even for that—it seems to be very poor.

Meanwhile, bureaucrats of National Defence Ministry live in prosperity. Petkevicius said the committee would do its best to leave not more than 30-40 employees in the ministry instead of 214. And the Army is needed as much as the state is capable to maintain.

130 million lats [as received] are provided for needs of national defence in 1994 and this reflects real possibilities of today. Petkevicius expressed indignation the means were used irrationally and sometimes even wasted.

Voluntary National Defence Service /SKAT/ should be a reserve of Armed Forces, a sub-unit of National Defence Ministry and not an organization organizing rallies, Petkevicius said. Some units and services of SKAT are headed by people with no understanding of military things.

Speaking about state border protection Petkevicius said it should be and will be given over to the border police.

National Security service was in principle destroyed by earlier governments and now the things must be newly restored, Petkevicius said. Lithuania had become an object of international spying. Foreign secret services knew about Lithuania, its national defence and national security more than Lithuania itself, he added.

The committee is preparing draft laws determining activity of services of national defence and national security, Petkevicius said.

Cites 'Financial Machinations'

LD2101152894 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] The Baltic News Service reports that the Lithuanian General Procuracy will today institute criminal proceedings concerning financial machinations in the supply of arms to the Lithuanian Army. This was announced at a news conference given by Vytautas Petkevicius, chairman of the Seimas National Security Committee. According to him, all the reports in the newspapers RESPUBLIKA and LIETUVOS RYTAS on the purchase of helicopters and warships are correct.

Petkevicius said that everything will be decided by the court, but he is convinced that many machinations and the creation of various closed joint stock companies have harmed (?the litas). He also stressed that there are people with two or three previous convictions serving in military units. According to the law, they should not be given arms.

Speaking about the main tasks facing the Seimas National Security Committee, Vytautas Petkevicius mentioned the conclusion of the creation of the army legal base [as heard], the handing over of border protection duties to the border police, and the creation of the national security service. According to him, the national security service has been neglected but is now in the embryo stage.

Meanwhile, Lithuania has become a hotbed of espionage. Both the East and West are spying, and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Western experts know more about the Lithuanian Army than its commanders, Petkevicius claimed. Petkevicius refused to dwell further on the activity of foreign special services, saying that he has no right to do this. Speaking about the arrest of Mykolas Burokevicius and Juozas Jermalavicius, he stressed that due to rumors by some Lithuanian officials in describing events on the border [as heard], the Belorusian minister of internal affairs and the procurator general have suffered a great deal.

Fellow Party Members Clamp Down on Minister

WS2101202394 Tallinn BNS in English 1632 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 21, BNS—Lithuanian Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius came under severe criticism of the ruling Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP] faction for a number of unsolved problems in the system of national defense.

Linkevicius, who is a member of the LDLP faction himself, was appointed as defense minister last fall on the recommendation of his faction.

On Thursday [20 January], the board of the LDLP faction invited Linkevicius for a discussion. MP Arvydas Ivaskevicus, member of the parliament's National Security Committee, called Linkevicius' attention to "machinations" of high-ranking Defense Ministry officials. The lawmaker said he obtained information that the ministry unlawfully rents military facilities to commercial structures.

The meeting's participants said they are concerned about a high death and injury rate in the Armed Forces. "The Lithuanian Army is a smaller model of the Soviet Army," Ivaskevicius said.

MP Vytautas Petkevicius, chairman of the National Security Committee, said he is completely unsatisfied with the national defense reorganization plan that was submitted to the president behind the committee's back.

Defense Minister Cited on Defense Appropriations

PM2101113994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Gromak under "News" rubric: "If We Had the Money, Would We Buy Ourselves a Defense Capability?"]

[Text] Vilnius—Budget appropriations for Lithuanian territorial defense needs in 1994 will remain proportionally unchanged compared to last year, comprising 4.6 percent of the budget. However, the size of these appropriations has increased 60 percent and stands at 130 m[illegible] litai (approximately $33 million). This was announced by Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius.

National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius is sure that, despite these meager budget appropriations, the country will be able to establish a defense system that befits our membership of international security structures.

Ruling Party Faction Approaches Split

WS2001202194 Tallinn BNS in English 1619 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 20, BNS—Lithuania's Future Forum will soon register its faction in the Lithuanian parliament, MP [member of parliament] Aleksandras Bendinskas told reporters Thursday [20 January].

Bendinskas, who is a member of the forum, said the matter will be decided by all representatives of the organization in parliament. The forum participated in parliamentary elections on the list of Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP]. In Bendinskas' words, the forum currently holds 22 seats.

A possibility to form a new faction appeared when the parliament amended its statute and allowed to create faction regardless of affiliation in pre-election lists.

Up until now, the ruling LDLP faction had 71 seats and enjoyed an absolute majority. If it loses 22 members, as well several others who intend to leave it during faction reregistration, the ruling faction will become almost equal to the rightist opposition coalition in size. There is a possibility, however, that the ruling majority will remain as unified as earlier when dealing with key issues.

Leftist Union Emerges

WS2101213194 Tallinn BNS in English 1932 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 21, BNS—The initiative group of the Lithuanian Union of Leftists (LUL) published its draft program saying that the union would be a parliamentary party of democratic-socialist orientation.

The draft was published Friday [21 January] as a classified ad in the leftist TIESA newspaper. According to unofficial reports, the LUL wants to unite former members of the Soviet Communist Party, who broke away from Moscow in 1990 but neither joined the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party nor the pro-Moscow wing of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

The emergence of a political organization based on the LUL program would mean the creation of a new communist party in Lithuania. The draft says, however, that the union would be a completely new political force, unrelated to "communist and Stalinist crimes."

The program emphasizes the need to protect "the interests of the biggest, most impoverished and robbed part of the population."

Law on Income Declaration by Officials Rejected

WS2101202694 Tallinn BNS in English 1401 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 21, BNS—The Lithuanian parliament bowed to the president's veto that was put on the law on income declaration by officials and civil servants. The law was rejected during repeat consideration Thursday [20 January] by a 53-13 vote, with 34 abstentions.

The abstentions virtually determined that the president's veto would come into effect. 71 votes were needed to approve the law repeatedly. In such case, the president's would have to sign the law and to promulgate it within three days.

During debates, a majority of lawmakers said the problem of income declaration by officials should be referred to the Constitutional Court.

President Algirdas Brazauskas sent the law back to the parliament for reconsideration because, in his opinion,

some portions of the law contradict the constitutional principles of property inviolability and equality before the law.

The law was first adopted Dec. 23 under pressure of the rightist opposition. The law set two deadlines for income declaration by officials - May 1, 1994 for property owned prior to Feb. 1, 1994 and March 1, 1995 for property acquired in 1994.

Services Refuse To Employ Former KGB Officer

WS2401112394 Tallinn BNS in English 1255 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 22, BNS—Lithuanian national security institutions categorically denied press reports that Vytautas Karinauskas, former head of the 1st KGB department in Lithuania, is employed in the National Security Service [NSS].

Suppositions appeared Friday [21 January] in the RESPUBLIKA newspaper.

"He is definitely not in the staff of the service," well-informed sources said and added that the basic principles of the NSS remain unchanged—former KGB leaders cannot be employed in Lithuanian security.

Experts said, however, that Karinauskas may have been invited for consultations when certain structures of the NSS were being created. The 1st KGB department was engaged in espionage.

Experts characterize Karinauskas as a "Western-minded" person, who has considerable experience of work abroad and is a "top level professional." Experts said Lithuanian national security services often lack such features.

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